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Abstract 
Objective: Identifying the sources of personality development across the adult life 
span is a key issue of current personality research. The present dissertation 
investigates the long-term, mutual inter-relationships of personality traits with life 
satisfaction (publication 1), constructs of health (publication 2) and different cognitive 
abilities (publication 3). Guiding questions where: (1) Can personality and its 
development be predicted by these different domains? (2) Are these predictions 
sensitive to aging, namely the change from middle adulthood to old age?   
Method: Analyzes were based on data from the “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study 
on Adult Development and Aging (ILSE)”, a prospective German cohort study of mid 
adulthood (Age baseline = 44y) and old age (Age baseline = 63y), longitudinally spanning 
across 12 years. Participants were recruited stratified by cohort (N mid adulthood = 502, N 
old age = 500), sex (♂ = 52%, ♀ = 48%) and region of residence (Region of Heidelberg 
= 50%, Region of Leipzig = 50%). After 12 years the overall response rate was 
76.7%. Personality traits were measured by the 60-item NEO-FFI inventory. Life 
satisfaction was assessed by a single-item measurement and health variables by an 
individual’s self-rating and an extensive physician-rating. Cognitive abilities 
(processing speed, crystalline intelligence, fluid intelligence) were measured by a 
comprehensive test-battery of various well-established cognitive tests of different 
cognitive domains (e.g. processing speed was measured by the Digit Symbol Test, a 
subtest of the WAIS-R). Furthermore, gender, education (years of education) and 
depression (SDS, self-rated depression scale) were used as control variables. In 
publication 1 and 2 multi-group cross-lagged panel analyses were used and in 
publication 3 multi-group dual latent change regression models were conducted. 
Results: The results of publication 1 suggest that there is only limited evidence of life 
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satisfaction predicting the personality traits extraversion and neuroticism in later life. 
The path coefficients were small and only significant in the old cohort. Integrating 
health into the models weakened the inter-relationships. The results of publication 2 
show that physician-rated health is an important predictor for the personality traits 
neuroticism, extraversion (uncontrolled) and agreeableness at later life. Self-rated 
health demonstrated to be more of an outcome measure of earlier personality in 
adulthood. There were no considerable cohort differences regarding the cross-lagged 
predictor paths. The results of publication 3 illustrate the important role of cognitive 
abilities as a predictor for 12-year personality changes in the personality traits 
neuroticism, extraversion and openness. Cohort differences, again, were limited. 
 
Conclusions: All in all, health (publication 2) and cognitive abilities (publication 3) 
are demonstrated to be important driving forces for following personality development 
in adulthood for all of the Big-Five personality traits, except conscientiousness. 
Physician-rated health was a particularly important predictor for later life neuroticism 
and agreeableness, while cognitive abilities proved to be important predictors for 
following personality changes in neuroticism, extraversion and openness. Life 
satisfaction (publication 1) is demonstrated to be more of an outcome than a 
predictor of later personality. Moreover, there were (almost) no effects of aging on 
the cross-relationships, highlighting the non-transient importance of the predictor 
domains across life span. Lastly, a differential perspective is highly recommended for 
future research, as the results appeared to depend highly on the personality trait and 
predictor considered. 
 
Keywords: ILSE, longitudinal, personality, life satisfaction, self-rated health, 
physician-rated health, cognitive abilities, adulthood, midlife, old age
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
“Personality development is a lifelong phenomenon. It is influenced by a 
multitude of factors that directly, indirectly and in transaction with each other 
shape who we are and who we become.”  
(Cited from Specht et al., 2014, p. 226) 
 
The present publication based doctoral thesis addresses, in the spirit of the 
preceded citation from the work by Specht and colleagues, the field of personality 
development across adulthood. It aims at contributing to the growing body of 
research trying to explain how and why individuals’ personalities change across their 
respective lifespans. It features three recent articles that (1) are all based on data of 
a comprehensive, longitudinal German cohort study (ILSE, Sattler et al., 2015), (2) 
use state-of-the-art longitudinal analyses across a long time interval of 12-years, (3) 
compare two distinct adult age cohorts (middle adulthood and old age) and (4) 
investigate the reciprocal longitudinal interrelationships of the Big Five personality 
traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b) with the important and impactful constructs of 
different psychological life domains (i.e., life satisfaction, health, cognitive abilities).  
Chapter 1 introduces the basic concepts, defines the field of research and 
describes the general and specific research questions. Moreover, it introduces the 
data set, namely the “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Adult Development and 
Aging (ILSE)”, and, further on, deals with issues of longitudinal statistic modelling. 
Chapter 2 comprises the manuscript concerned with the longitudinal interrelationship 
of personality with life satisfaction. Chapter 3 contains the manuscript on the 
longitudinal interrelationship of personality with different conceptualizations of health. 
Chapter 4 comprises the manuscript investigating the longitudinal interrelationship of 
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personality with different domains of cognitive functioning. Lastly, Chapter 5 covers 
the synoptic integration of the different researches of chapters 2-4 into the broad 
scope of the literature, discusses strengths and limitations, and, finally, addresses 
future directions in theory and practice regarding personality development in 
adulthood. 
 
Personality across the life span 
Research on personality differences can be traced way back to ancient 
Greece philosophers and scientists (Amelang, Bartussek, Stemmler, & Hagemann, 
2006). For instance, Hippocrates (460-377 BC) divided individuals by their 
temperament into four personality types, i.e. sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric and 
melancholic persons, who are characterized by resembling and recurring 
conglomerates of different attributes and features. It is common knowledge that 
people differ widely from one another regarding preferences, behavior patterns, 
intelligence, et cetera. As an example, some people tend to be easy going and 
relaxed, while others are anxious and prone to influences of stressors. Explaining the 
origins and consequences of these interindividual differences inspired a whole 
research tradition – personality research as part of the discipline of differential 
psychology. Modern psychological research on interindividual differences in 
personality commenced in the early 20th century (e.g., Allport, 1937; Cattell, 1944) 
and proceeds to this date. Personality has been investigated by many renowned 
scientists throughout the years, for example Gordon W. Allport, Joy P. Guilford, 
Raymond B. Cattell and Hans-Jürgen Eysenck, but the precise definition, 
operationalization and capturing of personality is still, even today, an issue of 
energetic debate (e.g., Amelang et al., 2006).  
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Current proponents of personality research agree that an individual’s 
personality is describable using the concept of personality traits. Personality traits are 
defined as combinations of thoughts, feelings and behaviors that are relatively 
consistent across different situations, contexts and over time (e.g. Specht et al., 
2014; McCrae & Costa, 2008; Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). The trait concept 
encompasses stable, inner-psychic patterns of different descriptive dimensions that 
distinguish a single individual from others and, moreover, by its temporal, trans-
situational stability, provides individuals with a sense of sameness throughout their 
lifetimes.  
There are different personality trait frameworks that arose from lexical, 
questionnaire and factor analytical investigations. Historically, there was the 
approach of Cattell (1944) who envisioned 12 different distinguishable dichotomous 
personality factors like, e.g. emotional maturity and character stability versus 
demoralized general emotionality or intelligence versus mental defect and, equally 
importantly, the Giant Three of H.-J. Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) who 
condense human personality to the three factors neuroticism, extraversion and 
psychoticism. Despite many different conceptualizations of personality, the Big Five 
framework of Costa and McCrae (1992a, 1992b) emerged as the most prominent 
and influential personality trait conception through today (Matthews, Deary, & 
Whiteman, 2009; Amelang et al., 2006). According to this framework, personality can 
be comprehensively captured by 5 different continuous factors, namely neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Neuroticism 
describes an individual’s anxiety, hostility, depression-proneness and vulnerability for 
negative emotions. An individual scoring low on neuroticism can be described as 
self-assured and emotionally stable. The trait of Extraversion covers an individual’s 
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gregariousness, activity, warmth and affinity for positive emotions. People scoring 
low on extraversion tend to be calm, withdrawn, self-sufficient and are generally 
reported to have smaller social networks. The trait openness for new experiences 
comprises creativity, curiosity, sensitivity to beauty and delight in trying new activities. 
Its opposite is defined by conservativeness and proneness to consistency. The trait 
of agreeableness describes an individual’s tender-mindedness, altruism, modesty 
and compliance. Individuals scoring low on agreeableness are more detached from 
others, but can also be more rivalling, hostile and disagreeable. Lastly, the trait 
conscientiousness encompasses self-discipline, deliberation, proclivity for order, 
achievement striving and dutifulness. People who score low on conscientiousness 
can be described as easy-going, careless, flexible and tentatively more chaotic. Even 
though the Big Five framework has been target of extensive critique directed at the 
interpretation of the five factors and/or the exact number of factors, it provides a 
comprehensive framework to investigate personality traits and is, moreover, 
supported by numerous investigations (e.g. O’Connor, 2002; McCrae & Allik, 2002; 
De Raad, 2000; Amelang et al., 2006). In summary, cited from Kandler, Kornadt, 
Hagemeyer and Neyer (2015), the Big Five cover the general trait landscape in many 
different languages, societies and across cultures. 
Inner locus principle, causal primacy principle and causality. 
Theoretically, there are two stereotypic principles regarding personality trait research, 
regardless of the comprising trait-framework that need to be addressed (Matthews, 
Deary, & Whiteman, 2009): (1) the inner locus principle of personality traits and (2) 
the causal primacy principle of personality traits. The inner locus principle of 
personality traits states that traits are linked to inner qualities of individuals being 
genetic and/or physiological in nature. Traits are, therefore, according to this 
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perspective, biologically based, heritable and, most importantly, fixed characteristics 
of individuals. Evidence of twin and adoption studies support this principle, by 
indicating that personality traits are, indeed, highly heritable and in a broad sense 
stable across time (e.g. Kandler et al., 2015, McCrae & Costa, 2003; McCrae & 
Costa, 2008). Despite this theoretical foundation and the compelling empirical 
evidence, it is important to mention that personality researchers today also 
acknowledge personality to feature variable components, possibly affected by 
environmental influences (e.g. Specht et al., 2014). As Bleidorn, Kandler and Caspi 
(2014) demonstrate, genetic and environmental factors in conjunction are the driving 
forces of continuity and change in personality development. This issue will be 
addressed in following paragraphs. The following section, in particular, presents 
empirical studies covering stability and change of personality traits across the adult 
life span.  
The causal primacy principle of personality traits puts forth the notion that the 
dominant direction of causality between traits and behaviors is exclusively directed 
from traits to behaviors (e.g., McCrae, Costa, Ostendorf et al., 2000). This means 
that the origin of a situationally observed behavior is strictly and primarily attributed to 
the underlying traits of the individual. This way of thinking has determined personality 
research throughout many years. Traits undoubtedly influence behaviors, but the 
relationship should, from a modern perspective, more precisely be perceived as 
interactional (with environmental factors) or reciprocally (derived from Matthews et 
al., 2009).  
Causality in itself is a prime issue in science. In most scientific disciplines 
detecting causality is the final and ultimate goal and purpose, but establishing a 
definite causal relationship of two variables is nearly impossible to achieve, 
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especially in psychological research for several theoretical and practical reasons. For 
instance, given two closely associated concepts like personality and health, the 
relationship of the two can be that (1) personality causes health, (2) health causes 
personality, (3) personality and health change might cause each other reciprocally (4) 
personality and illness might be causally influenced by a third (unknown) variable, 
and, lastly, (5) that mediating and moderating processes might be crucial for the 
interpretation of the causal relationship (Matthews et al., 2009). Furthermore, to 
approximate causality, temporal sequencing of events is required, which is a 
necessary—but not a sufficient—condition to detect true causality. Due to this 
critique, overconfident derivation of possibly wrong causal inferences should be 
omitted whenever possible. Considering the present work and its comprised 
manuscripts, the more cautious concept and associated phrase of predictors was 
predominantly used. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that longitudinal 
investigations have an affinity for causal language and that caution is warranted 
when interpreting findings, because it is impossible to control for all potential 
confounding influences. 
Taken together, personality traits are a widely recognized working definition of 
the concept of personality at large and the Big-Five personality factors are currently 
the best-established and most influential framework. Personality traits are linked to 
inner-individual qualities, which are presumably interacting with behaviors and 
environmental influences. It is important to note that by being inner psychological 
entities in nature, the measurement of personality traits is fundamentally limited to 
self-reports and observational inferences known to be valid trait indicators (McCrae 
et al., 2000; originally by: Tellegen, 1988). Therefore, they are subject to the classical 
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critiques of questionnaire and observational data as discussed in the limitations of 
the present dissertation. 
Personality and developmental psychology. The discipline of 
developmental psychology focuses on changes and stability in human aging 
(Montada, 1998). It is especially interested in developmental conditions, as well as 
developmental goals and, furthermore, aims at extensively describing changes of 
psychological concepts with time. One dominant general perspective in 
developmental psychology is life span psychology. Life span psychology is 
characterized by the general view that developments and changes arise throughout 
the entire human life span (Baltes, 1987; Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998) 
and are not limited to specific life stages, i.e. infancy, adolescence, etc. Following 
Smith and Spiro III. (2002), life span psychology is characterized as follows: (1) 
change is multi-directional, (2) change has multiple causes, (3) change occurs 
embedded in social and historical contexts, (4) change can affect multiple and 
differing dimensions of constructs, and, (5) change is an intraindividual phenomenon 
that can differ intensively between individuals (interindividual differences in 
intraindividual changes). Of course, these principles of life span psychology similarly 
apply to life span personality development (Mroczek, Spiro III., & Griffin, 2006).  
Even though many changes do occur across the life span, it is important to 
remark that these changes do not arise without a process that initiates the change. 
As Wohlwill (1970) discusses, aging (per se) is not an independent variable when 
investigating change processes, but changes are influenced and predicted by other 
inner and outer psychological phenomena that are temporally aligned. Therefore, it is 
important to go beyond a plain description of changes across the life span, and to 
investigate the relevant predictor dynamics to understand why psychological 
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constructs change with age. The manuscripts 1-3 all deal with different predictor 
dynamics of personality with important psychological constructs.    
When asking: how does personality change across the life span, a conflict 
arises between the original definition of personality as a stable, highly reliable and 
conceptually time-invariant construct and the perspective that changes in personality 
are not only possible, but also normal signs of life long, as well as being adaptive and 
healthy, personality development. As Matthews et al. (2009) argue, a trait needs to 
have a substantial degree of stability over time or the entire theory of traits fails at its 
core. Even though, the prime empirical finding of developmental personality research 
on traits is that there is ample stability across time (e.g. McCrae & Costa, 2003), 
recent empirical studies report that personality is susceptible to changes across the 
life span (e.g. Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; Roberts & Del Vecchio, 2000). 
As noted by Mroczek and Spiro III. (2003), the question of change and stability of 
personality traits has for a long time, and misleadingly, been framed as a yes or no 
question, i.e. stability versus change, while it is more plausible that personality 
development across the life span is a result of both processes (stability and change) 
(read also: Ryff, Kwan, & Singer, 2001). Therefore, to merge the perspectives, 
personality change is defined as systematic variation in personality traits that are 
relatively enduring over time (Specht et al., 2014; Luhmann, Orth, Specht, Kandler, & 
Lucas, 2014). This definition acknowledges that personality traits can have both, 
substantial stability at its core and a scope for adaptive processes of plasticity and 
changes. The following section continues by defining personality stability and change 
across adulthood more precisely. 
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Change and stability of personality across the adult life span 
As mentioned before, the issue of personality development across the adult 
life span has been discussed highly controversially with proponents reporting 
dominant stability (e.g. McCrae & Costa, 2003), others highlighting meaningful 
changes (e.g. Specht et al., 2014) and others arguing for a synthesis of the two 
perspectives (Mroczek & Spiro III., 2003). It is important to acknowledge that change 
and stability are indeed complex concepts and individuals might vary on different 
manifestations of personality change and stability, which depends highly on the 
underlying conceptualization and modeling of change. As Mroczek, Spiro III., and 
Griffin (2006) argue, “change is an individual differences variable in and of itself” (p. 
365). Following this thought, conceptual precision is crucial when addressing the 
issue of personality change and stability (e.g. Allemand, Steiger, & Hill, 2013; 
Allemand, Zimprich, & Martin, 2008). The following section defines the most 
prominent kinds of change and stability – conceptions across the life span in 
conjunction with supporting empirical findings. The relevant concepts are (1) mean-
level stability, (2) rank-order/differential stability and (3) the concept of interindividual 
differences in intraindividual changes and (4) structural continuity (Allemand, Steiger, 
& Hill, 2013; Allemand, Zimprich, & Hertzog, 2007).  
Mean-level stability refers to the stability of a personality trait’s average level 
over time and/or across different ages. Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer (2006) 
conducted an extensive meta-analysis on 92 investigations regarding change and 
stability of the Big Five traits across the human life span. They find that the traits of 
agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional stability (i.e. the inverted value of 
trait neuroticism) increase systematically across the entire life span from the age of 
10 up to the age of 70 years. The trait of openness shows an increase in the early life 
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stage from 10 to 22 years and remains almost stable until old age, when it decreases 
again after the age of 60. Extraversion was split into two sub-factors, namely social 
vitality and social dominance. While social vitality increases in very early age (10-22 
years) and decreases very slightly thereafter until very old age, social dominance 
increases enormously until the age of 40 and plateaus until old age. Taken together, 
Roberts et al. (2006) comprehensively present meaningful mean-level personality 
trait changes across all of adulthood. Even though these changes are singularly 
rather small (i.e. change of one trait from the 20s to the 30s), they accumulate across 
the entire life span. 
Differential/rank-order stability describes the extent to which individuals keep 
or change their relative position in relation to other individuals in the reference group. 
Rank-order stability of personality increases across young and middle age until the 
age of 50 as specified by the cumulative continuity principle (Roberts & Del Vecchio, 
2000; Roberts & Wood, 2006) and decreases again in old age (Ardelt, 2000), 
resulting in an inverted U-shaped function of personality rank-order consistency 
across the life span (e.g. Specht et al., 2014). Derived from these findings, 
personality change should be strongest in early adulthood and late life, while the life 
phase of mid adulthood should (standardly) be characterized by stability.  
A lot of research has so far focused on mean-level and rank-order stability of 
personality across the life span, but research directly targeting at the investigation of 
interindividual differences in intraindividual changes are still scarce. Prior studies 
investigating differential personality changes, indeed, found significant and 
noteworthy, but admittedly small, interindividual differences in intraindividual change 
dynamics for all Big Five personality traits across adulthood (e.g. Allemand, Zimprich, 
& Hertzog, 2007; Allemand, Zimprich, & Martin, 2008; Soto & John, 2012). In direct 
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comparison to mean-level and differential stability there is still a lot unknown and 
many issues available for future investigation, especially when it comes to conditions 
and implications of interindividual differences in intraindividual personality changes. 
Lastly, structural continuity deals with the degree of continuity and change in 
interrelations of the specific indicators of the personality factors over time (Allemand, 
Zimprich, & Hertzog, 2007). It is a concept that is very closely related and possibly 
better known by the statistical modeling issue of longitudinal measurement invariance 
(e.g. Horn & McArdle, 1992; Meredith & Horn, 2001). If a construct is measured by 
different indicators, it is important to ensure that the meaning of the latent construct 
has not changed across the years. For this reason, the invariance in factor loadings, 
intercepts and residual variances is tested between the two temporally different 
measurement models (e.g. Meredith, 1993; Horn & McArdle, 1992). If the factor 
loadings can be set equal across groups, the two constructs have weak invariance. 
If, additionally, the intercepts can be set equal the constructs have strong 
measurement invariance, which is a prerequisite for comparing the two latent 
constructs. Moreover, if the residual variances of the indicators can be set equal 
between the groups the two latent constructs can be considered as temporally 
different equivalents, which is termed strict invariance. The treatment of the issue of 
invariance is very important when interpreting latently modelled longitudinal 
constructs and will be discussed in a following section on statistical analyses and 
modeling issues. 
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Theoretical models of life span personality change and stability 
The present section addresses several different basic theoretical frameworks, 
principles and models explaining personality change and stability across the life span 
(for a more extensive overview on the frameworks read: Specht et al., 2014).  
According to the neo-socioanalytic approach (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts, 
2005, 2006), mainly advocated by Brent W. Roberts, personality stability and 
changes are adaptive for an individual’s aging process and describable across the 
life span by several basic principles. Personality changes in adulthood are primarily 
triggered by influences of changing environments (plasticity principle) and social 
roles (social investment principle). Stability and coherence in personality is a result of 
an increasingly developing identity (identity development principle) and a 
commitment to stable roles and related role demands (role continuity principle). The 
corresponsive principle of personality development suggests that life experiences 
affect personality development in strengthening the characteristics that ultimately 
have caused those experiences. For example, an individual scoring high on 
extraversion might attend a social event, feel positively reinforced in the following and 
ultimately adapt his or her personality to the experience and score even higher in 
subsequent tests measuring extraversion. The neo-socioanalytic framework builds on 
two additional principles, namely (1) the cumulative continuity principle (Roberts & 
Wood, 2006; Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005), stating that rank-order consistency of 
the personality traits increases across adulthood, and (2) the maturity principle which 
argues that people become more emotionally stable, agreeable, conscientious and 
socially dominant, i.e. mature, with increasing age (e.g. Roberts, Walton, & 
Viechtbauer, 2006). 
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Another theoretic framework highlighting the adaptive role of personality 
changes across adulthood is the model of self-regulated personality change 
(Denissen, van Aken, Penke, & Wood, 2013). In this framework personality is 
conceptualized as functional behavior towards an individual’s developmental goals, 
social norms and hedonic preferences, in summary named reference values. Change 
is initiated to primarily achieve desired environmental features (primary goal) and/or 
secondarily to optimize personal behavior in these situations (secondary goal). For 
example, when a person begins a new job, agreeable behavior protects him or her 
from arguments with the superior. Agreeable behavior should, therefore, be adaptive 
to the new environment and in response be conducted more often and generally 
preferred to aggressive and hostile behaviors. Constant repetition of the rewarded 
behaviors reduces effort and difficulty making these self-regulatory endeavors easier 
until they become automatic. These behavior patterns will in the long term manifest in 
trait level changes until the environmental challenges change again, consequently 
demanding new adaptive behaviors. 
Another basic model of personality change and stability is the dynamic 
equilibrium model (e.g. Ormel, Riese, & Rosmalen, 2012). It states that there are 
genetically influenced and determined set-points for an individual’s personality traits 
around which the personality trait itself is expected to fluctuate. Therefore, the actual 
and current manifestation of a trait is not only person-specific, but also changeable in 
response to changing environmental circumstances. Personality change in this 
framework is describable as permanent changes in these set points and occurs due 
to far-reaching life experiences. As has been shown, life events can influence 
developmental trajectories leading to systematic differences between those who lived 
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these specific life events and those who did not (e.g. Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & 
Nagy, 2011; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011).  
Another important theoretical connection, especially inspired by research on 
life span personality change, is the mastery of age-specific developmental tasks 
(Havighurst, 1972). Admittedly, this concept is not a comprehensive model like the 
previously mentioned, but nonetheless another important theoretical driving force 
behind individuals’ adaptive personality trait changes. As life span psychology 
argues, the ratio of gains and losses changes across adulthood. When the ratio is 
positive, individuals experience processes of growth and expansion. A negative ratio 
forces processes of loss management (Mueller, Wagner, & Gerstorf, in press; Baltes 
& Baltes, 1990; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010). For example, if an individual 
is hit by debilitating health issues or chronic diseases, it becomes difficult for him or 
her to maintain an adequate lifestyle and properly contest environmental demands, 
leading to possible long-term personality changes (Baltes, Lindenberger, & 
Staudinger, 2006; Roberts & Wood, 2006), such as an increase in neuroticism. Life 
stages of adolescence and early adulthood should ordinarily be characterized by a 
positive gains to losses ratio, eliciting broadening, optimistic and expanding 
personalities, while this ratio in late life might bring loss related changes to 
individuals’ personalities (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; Staudinger & 
Fleeson, 1996). 
Taken together, there are different theoretical notions, mechanisms and 
principles considering personality stability and change across the life span. The 
theoretical conceptions share that personality stability and change is an issue of 
individual adaptability. The present dissertation and included manuscripts aims to 
investigate this adaptation process more closely, trying to detect longitudinal 
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predictors of personality and its changes.  Even though the present work can offer 
only a limited glimpse at the ongoing and expanding research on personality trait 
change, it sets the needed frame for evaluating the publications 1-3 and the 
discussion of the results in chapter 5. To obtain a more in-depth overview on 
theoretical notions on personality change and stability the reading of Specht et al. 
(2014) is suggested. 
 
Predictor dynamics of personality with life satisfaction, health and cognitive 
abilities – introducing a conceptual model 
The construct of personality is in general perceived as an influential predictor 
for various important late life outcomes (e.g. Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & 
Goldberg, 2007; Ryff, Kwan & Singer, 2001; Matthews et al., 2009). This section 
introduces a conceptual model as a basic reference and means of inclusion for the 
different investigations on the predictor dynamics of personality.  
Starting point for the construction of the conceptual model (Figure 1.1) is the 
work by Mueller et al. (in press). Their model illustrates that change and stability 
(consistency and variability) of personality predict subsequent health. Health within 
this framework is very broadly conceptualized, incorporating the constructs of 
physical functioning, cognitive functioning, sensory functioning and subjective well-
being. According to the model, health will in turn influence later manifestations of an 
individual’s personality. The predictions depend on different behavioral, physiological 
and social mediators, which, in accumulation, influence later health or personality. As 
an example, an individual might score high on neuroticism and therefore be highly 
prone to influences of stress. The individual may begin to cope with its life problems 
by drinking alcohol, which in turn changes the individual’s subsequent health (in a 
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broad sense). These health changes will influence who this individual becomes in 
later life, due to life circumstances, such as limited resources and changes in the 
individual’s social environments. These health changes will, in turn, influence later 
health, and so forth.  
Hill and Roberts (2016) extensively discuss the interrelationship of personality 
and health. They state two important central ideas for current and future research, 
namely that (1) “age has the potential to moderate all links in the framework” (p. 215) 
and that (2) “research must strive toward understanding health as a potential 
feedback loop throughout the model” (p. 215). Additionally, as previously discussed, 
individual adaptability plays a key role considering personality development (following 
the theoretical ideas imbedded in the work by Specht et al., 2014). These three 
theoretical approaches were merged with the model by Mueller et al. (in press) to 
create the basic framework model of the present dissertation, which is pictured in 
Figure 1.1. The model highlights the reciprocal interrelationship of personality and 
important domains of individual functioning, i.e., well-being (manuscript 1), health 
(manuscript 2), and cognitive ability (manuscript 3). The system changes across 
time, which exerts its influence on the framework distally through, for example, 
changing environments, critical life events and related adaptation pressures. The 
pathways from personality traits to the domains of individual functioning are, in line 
with Mueller et al. (in press), behavioral, social, and biological in nature, and 
moderated by the processes of adaptation and age-related dynamics. The domains 
of individual functioning and personality traits adapt in an interdependent manner to 
one another with a time lag in impacts. It is important to note that the model does not 
claim to be exhaustive, nor is it conceptualized as closed or isolated.  
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Figure 1.1.  The interrelationship of personality and domains of individual functioning – the role of 
processes of continued adaptation. Based on the model by Mueller, Wagner and Gerstorf (in press) and 
enhanced and adapted by theoretical ideas from Hill & Roberts (2016) and theoretical perspectives on 
adult personality development (Specht et al., 2014). 
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The issue of bi-directionality 
Research on the predictive power of personality for important late life 
outcomes is extensive and, as a consequence, the current section features a 
selection of key studies, namely studies emphasizing the importance of personality 
as a predictor in the domains of individual functioning previously introduced. 
Personality is related to well-being and its determinants (read e.g. Steel, Schmidt, & 
Shultz, 2008) as well as to basic health outcomes (read e.g. Smith & Spiro III., 2002). 
Especially the personality factors of neuroticism and conscientiousness are highly 
relevant considering health outcomes (Hill & Roberts, 2016). For example, 
neuroticism has been shown as a risk factor for poor physical health (Friedman, 
2000) and is related to stress proneness and the vulnerability to psychiatric 
symptoms, as well as to maladaptive life style factors (read e.g. Amelang et al., 2006, 
Matthews et al., 2009; Mueller, Wagner, & Gerstorf, in press), ultimately leading to 
impaired psychological striving across the life span. Additionally, the personality 
factor of conscientiousness has often been reported as being very protective for 
various different variables of late life health (e.g. Chapman, Roberts, Lyness, & 
Duberstein, 2013; Human et al., 2013; Turiano et al., 2012; Hill & Roberts, 2016). 
The factor of extraversion is, on the one hand related, to positive emotionality and 
social support—hinting at its protective power for later health—but on the other hand 
also to health risk behaviors like alcohol consumption, smoking, etc. (e.g. Matthews 
et al., 2009). Researchers have shown that high neuroticism and low 
conscientiousness are related to lack of exercise, unhealthy eating habits and 
smoking (Bogg & Roberts, 2004; Rhodes & Smith, 2006; Malouff, Thorsteinsson, & 
Schutte, 2006). As summarized by Mueller et al. (in press), studies show more 
emotionally stable, extraverted, agreeable and conscientious individuals to 
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experience less (interpersonal) stress (e.g. Bolger & Schilling, 1991), receive more 
social support (e.g. Cukrowicz, Franzese, Thorp, Cheavens, & Lynch, 2008) and 
have more favorable neuroendocrine, inflammatory and cardiovascular parameters 
(e.g. Chapman et al., 2009a; Sutin et al., 2010; Nater, Hoppmann, & Klumb, 2010), 
which has most likely positive effects on later life well-being, general health and 
overall personal ambition.  
All in all, the concept of personality, or more precisely the Big Five traits, has 
proven to predict a variety of important late life outcomes such as mortality/longevity, 
divorce, occupational attainment, health, risk behaviors and well-being and is, 
therefore, considered as one of the most important determinants of adult 
development and optimal aging (e.g. Roberts et al., 2007; Ryff, Kwan, & Singer, 
2001). This is why understanding the sources and conditions of personality 
development is not only a theoretical issue, but also one of practical importance, 
because knowing how to protect, enhance or facilitate an adaptive and positive 
personality development may open pathways for professional health care 
practitioners and psychotherapists to help people achieve so called ‘successful 
aging’ (Rowe & Kahn, 1997; for an overview on the concept of successful aging read: 
Wahl, Siebert, & Tauber, 2015). The following section discusses the predictors of 
personality and personality change across the life span attempting to complete the 
feedback loop (Figure 1.1). 
What psychological constructs predict personality changes? A classic 
distinction separates predictors of personality change into biological and 
environmental influencing factors (e.g. Specht et al., 2014). The biological 
perspective considers genes, brain structure and the general physiology (e.g. 
McCrae & Costa, 2008; Scarr & McCartney, 1983; Roberts & Wood, 2006; McAdams 
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& Pals, 2006) as influential predictors, while the environmental perspective highlights 
the importance of life events, cultural norms and social roles, settings and dynamics 
(e.g. McCrae & Costa, 2008; Caspi & Moffitt, 1993; Roberts & Wood, 2006; 
McAdams & Pals, 2006; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Reitz, Zimmermann, Hutteman, 
Specht, & Neyer, 2014).  
The present work focuses on important and influential psychological 
constructs that yield interesting predictor dynamics with personality. Different 
domains of individual functioning, namely health, well-being and cognitive ability, are 
supposedly complexly interwoven with personality (Figure 1.1). The following section 
very briefly reviews the interrelationships of these three psychological domains of 
individual functioning (well-being, health, cognitive abilities) with personality to 
introduce the general starting points for the three different manuscripts contained in 
this dissertation. 
Well-being. Well-being is most comprehensively defined as a combination of 
an individual’s general satisfaction with life itself (life satisfaction), satisfaction with 
important life domains (e.g. work satisfaction, family satisfaction), high levels of 
positive affect and low levels of negative affect (Diener, 2000; Deci & Ryan, 2008).  
Prior research has extensively investigated the cross-relationship of well-being 
and personality (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Two meta-analyses have 
pointed out the general importance of personality as a predictor of well-being and the 
vice versa relationship (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008). 
Theoretically, well-being is a developmental goal and, therefore, also a driving force 
of successful adaptation processes. Numerous studies point to the importance of 
personality for predicting well-being (e.g. Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Griffin, 
Mroczek, & Spiro, 2006), but more recent studies also suggest the possibility of a 
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reciprocal longitudinal relationship of well-being and personality (Specht, Egloff, & 
Schmukle, 2013; Soto, 2015). A recent study by Kandler, Kornadt, Hagemeyer and 
Neyer (2015), however, contradicts this notion, indicating only personality (i.e. 
Neuroticism, Conscientiousness) to be predictive for subsequent well-being, but not 
vice versa. Taken together, available results seem inconclusive regarding the bi-
directionality of the personality well-being interrelationship. Manuscript 1 of the 
present dissertation specifically targets this issue, investigating the longitudinal cross-
relationship of personality and life satisfaction, the cognitive component of general 
well-being. 
Health. Psychologically, health is a multi-dimensional construct (Spiro, 2001) 
that incorporates both, objective and subjective sub constructs under its umbrella 
term (Pinquart, 2001). Despite the elaborate definition by the WHO that health “is a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity” (Preamble to the Constitution of WHO as adopted by the 
International Health Conference; World Health Organization, 1948), health in 
psychological studies is most commonly operationalized as a continuous construct 
that is indicated by the subjective perception of a human about his or her general 
health (subjective health) and/or, additionally, more objective measures like disease 
lists, physician ratings, laboratory blood tests, tests of physiological functioning, etc. 
(objective health; for a basic discussion read e.g. Lippke & Renneberg, 2006). 
The Big Five personality traits (except openness) have been shown to be 
important predictors for subsequent (self-rated) health (Chapman, Roberts, Lyness, 
& Duberstein, 2013; Turiano et al., 2012), but findings on the opposite direction are 
still scarce. Some researchers found weak predictive effects of health (disease list) 
on subsequent personality (e.g. Sutin, Zonderman, Ferrucci, & Terracciano, 2013), 
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while another study reports significant effects of the loss of health (diagnosis of 
serious diseases) on nearly all Big Five personality factors, i.e. decreases in 
extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness and openness, but no changes 
for agreeableness (Jokela, Hakulinen, Singh-Manoux, & Kivimäki, 2014). A recent 
article by Hill and Roberts (2016) reviewed the reciprocal relationship of personality 
and health, highlighting healthy behaviors and illnesses as predictor mechanisms for 
personality development as well as discussing the importance of age as a moderator 
for the interrelationship of the two constructs. 
Again, empirical results do not seem exhaustive. In the light of the 
comprehensive empirical work by Jokela et al. (2014) and the theoretical review by 
Hill & Roberts (2016), health might currently be undervalued as a predictor for 
personality changes in adulthood. Therefore, manuscript 2 specifically investigates 
the possibly reciprocal longitudinal interrelationships of personality with two distinct 
health constructs, a subjective self-rating and an objective health rating done by a 
physician. The rationale behind including different health modes was that prior 
investigations show objective and subjective health to unfold differently across 
adulthood (e.g. French, Sargent-Cox, & Luszcz, 2012; Pinquart, 2001) and they 
might, as a consequence, demonstrate differential effects. 
Cognitive Abilities. Cognitive abilities, as used in the present work, is an 
umbrella term incorporating three different constructs of mental capacity following the 
earlier works by Daniel Zimprich and colleagues (e.g.; Zimprich, Allemand, & 
Dellenbach, 2009; Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010), namely crystallized intelligence, 
fluid intelligence (Cattell, 1987), and the concept of information processing speed 
(McGrew, 2005). According to the well-established Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory 
(McGrew, 2005), these constructs cover three of nine different broad cognitive 
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abilities that together form human intelligence, which can be considered a 
representative proportion. Also of importance are the different cognitive abilities that 
underlie different aging dynamics (e.g. Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Baltes, 
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; Martin & Zimprich, 2005). Both processing speed 
and fluid abilities show noticeable decline, beginning as soon as early adulthood 
(Salthouse, 2009), whereas crystallized abilities are largely stable or even increase 
until old age (e.g. Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2003; Singer, 
Verhaeghen, Ghisletta, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 2003; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). 
These differing age trends might lead to differential predictor dynamics of personality 
and cognitive abilities across adulthood.  
There are strong hints by research on pathological cognitive development that 
indicate cognitive degeneration to be highly associated with personality changes 
(Rankin, Baldwin, Pace-Savitsky, Kramer, & Miller, 2005). Furthermore, noteworthy 
small-to-moderate relationships of cognition and personality are reported (e.g. Curtis, 
Windsor, & Soubelet, 2015; Salthouse, 2014; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011). Empirical 
findings are still ambiguous regarding the strength of the interrelationships, i.e. 
whether they are small, moderate or even strong (e.g. Curtis et al., 2015). Overall, 
more research is needed to investigate the longitudinal interconnection of the two 
constructs. Manuscript 3 directly targets this issue, utilizing latent change regression 
models to investigate the reciprocal longitudinal interconnection of personality and 
cognitive abilities. More precisely, the influence of cognitive abilities at baseline on 
subsequent personality changes and vice versa are analyzed. 
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Effects of adult developmental phase on the predictor dynamics: Midlife 
versus old age 
As numerous influential theories of life-span psychology suggest (e.g. 
Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010; Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006), 
individuals and their needs and goals, as well as their environmental demands and 
social roles change dramatically over the course of one’s life, especially when 
approaching old age. Key developmental strains comparing mid with old age are 
(e.g. Filipp, 2007): (1) facing the challenges of retirement versus being part of the 
workforce, (2) facing the increasing risk of health restrictions and cognitive decline, 
and (3) keeping and maintaining satisfying social-relationships. Interestingly, these 
are also in line with the psychological basic needs as described by self-determination 
theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). To maintain high well-being, people need to adapt their 
thoughts, feelings and behaviors (i.e. their personality). Therefore, personality 
change across adulthood arises as a fundamental process of successful adaptation 
to the changing demands of the (social) environment. This is, for example, supported 
by empirical investigations demonstrating considerable mean-level personality 
changes across the adult life span (e.g. Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006) and 
findings demonstrating personality adaptation following major critical life events (e.g. 
Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011).  
As considered in the theoretical framework model (Figure 1.1), time varying 
processes of adaptation and age related dynamics are crucial for the longitudinal, 
reciprocal interplay of personality and the domains of individual functioning. Across 
their lifetimes, individuals face different hardships, are torn between various social 
roles and effected by various pressures of the ‘external world’. Personality 
development apparently depends on the ratio of capacity to fit one’s environment and 
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social roles to one’s personal needs in relation to the changing pressures on the 
individual to adapt themselves to their environments. Ontogenetically, this adaption 
pressure is presumably highest in very young age and old age, while capacity to 
change the environment is lowest, theoretically increasing the probability of 
personality development before the age of 30 and after the age of 60 (e.g. Lucas & 
Donnellan, 2011). This is supported by the findings on rank-order stability of 
personality, which operates as an inverted U-shape across the life span (e.g. Specht, 
et al., 2014; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Specht et al., 2011), as resumed in the 
cumulative continuity principle (Roberts & Wood, 2006) and the findings by Ardelt 
(2000). Overall, this leads to the notion that the interrelationship of personality and 
the domains of individual functioning should hypothetically be stronger in old age 
when compared to mid adulthood. The heterogeneity (variability) of personality 
development across the adult lifespan increases (e.g. Maddox & Douglass, 1974; 
Bengtson, Kasschau, & Ragan, 1977; Baltes, 1979; Neugarten, 1982), which might 
lead to two possible outcomes. First, the interrelationship might fall apart, due to the 
increasing heterogeneity in the constructs of personality and the domains of 
individual functioning, because the relationship becomes more ‘noisy’ or collapses. 
Second, the predictor dynamic might become stronger in old age, because there is 
more explainable variability in both constructs that mutually interrelates. This means, 
more precisely, that the possibility of joint variability increases. I argue that the 
second outcome is more likely. 
The process widely labelled as personality maturation (e.g. Roberts & Wood, 
2006; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2013) states that emotional stability, 
conscientiousness and agreeableness increase across the life span, as a means to 
adapt to the needs of society. As outlined above and in line with the model of 
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selection, optimization and compensation (SOC, Freund & Baltes, 2002), old age is 
less focused on dynamics of personal growth (i.e. contributing to society), but on 
successfully managing loss and effectively coping with adverse and often 
uncontrollable life experiences (e.g. death of loved ones, physical impairment, and 
pathological cognitive development; Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; 
Staudinger & Fleeson, 1996; Baltes & Baltes ,1990; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 
2010). For example, the compensation of losses in cognitive abilities is a major 
developmental challenge in late adulthood imposing considerable adaptation 
pressure on the individual (e.g. Freund & Baltes, 2002). Since the capacity to 
change, adapt and optimize the environment to face personal needs decreases with 
aging, it seems plausible that the converse trend of adaptation increases, i.e. 
individuals’ personalities should increasingly adapt to the needs of the ‘external 
world’, when compensating for loss dynamics (e.g. Brandstädter & Rothermund, 
2002). Accordingly, Kandler et al. (2015) argue that personality traits develop 
contrary to the process labelled personality maturation when old and very old age are 
considered. These authors refer to (1) the change of health status as a source of an 
older persons’ increase in neuroticism; (2) the coping with cognitive changes as a 
source of decreasing openness; (3) the focus on specific, close personal 
relationships (e.g. Carstensen, 2006) and activities as a source for decreasing 
extraversion and agreeableness; and (4) the transition to retirement as a source for 
decreases in conscientiousness. Although some of these changes in living 
circumstances (environment) and behavior are rather normative, I argue that most of 
these transitions are idiosyncratic (e.g. Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980).  
In summary, there are convincing theoretical notions of life span 
developmental research that suggest the interrelationship of personality with domains 
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of individual functioning (i.e. with health, well-being and cognitive functioning) might 
become stronger in old age, when compared to middle adulthood. This general 
hypothesis represents another guiding research question considering the three 
different manuscripts of the present dissertation. 
 
Research questions and respective contributions of dissertation-related 
publications  
In summary, more research on long-term predictors of personality traits is 
needed. As discussed in the previous sections on the framework model and 
longitudinal predictor dynamics, the relationships between personality traits and 
important domains of individual functioning should be both reciprocal and susceptible 
to age group differences. 
The present research investigates these longitudinal interrelationships more 
closely, using data from the “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Adult 
Development (ILSE)” (Sattler et al., 2015). The ILSE design and study population 
allows testing the cross-predictor dynamics across a comparatively long-term time 
interval of 12 years in two distinct age groups, a midlife sample and an old age 
sample, making the data set particularly suited for performing the statistical modeling 
needed to answer the research questions.  
More precisely, the current dissertation has three specific hypotheses. First, it 
is presumed that personality traits and other psychological domains are mutually 
important as longitudinal predictors for each another. Second, the cross-predictor 
dynamics are assumed to be stronger in the old cohort than in the mid-life cohort. 
Third, it is expected that results vary immensely depending on the specific 
personality trait and domain of individual functioning considered. 
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Taken together, the following manuscripts investigate the 12-year longitudinal, 
reciprocal interrelations of personality with three different domains of individual 
functioning (Figure 1.1) in two distinct age groups (mid adulthood/old age). 
Manuscript 1 investigates the longitudinal interplay of personality traits (i.e. 
Neuroticism, Extraversion) with life satisfaction. Manuscript 2 deals with the 
longitudinal interplay of personality (i.e. all of the Big Five personality traits) with 
objective and subjective health. Finally, Manuscript 3 addresses the longitudinal 
interplay of personality traits (i.e. all of the Big Five personality traits) and cognitive 
abilities (processing speed, fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence).  
 
The ILSE-Study – an introduction  
This section briefly introduces the “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Adult 
Development and Aging (ILSE)” (Sattler et al., 2015), which contains the data set 
used in all three manuscripts. The description of the study population included here 
is, due to being incorporated in all three manuscripts, brief.  
The “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Adult Development and Aging 
(ILSE)” (read e.g. Sattler et al., 2015; Martin & Martin, 2000; Schmitt, Wahl, & Kruse, 
2008) is a longitudinal German cohort study of mid adulthood and old age. Goal of 
the ILSE-Study is to investigate individual, societal and socio-structural preconditions 
for aging well (Sattler et al., 2015). Therefore, the ILSE is most helpful for 
investigating long-term predictor and change dynamics of various important 
constructs, featuring an interdisciplinary approach, in which psychologists, 
physicians, geriatricians, dental physicians, sociologists and even linguists jointly 
collaborate with each other. The ILSE started in 1993 under the auspices of Prof. Dr. 
Dr. Ursula Lehr and has occupied, since its first implementation, many influential 
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researchers of psychological and medical aging research, like Prof. Dr. Hans 
Thomae, Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas Kruse and Prof. Dr. Johannes Schröder to name a 
few. Currently, project directors are Christine Sattler, Johannes Schröder, and Hans-
Werner Wahl. 
The basic design of the ILSE-Study is a 2 (cohort) x 2 (region) x 2 
(sex/gender) x 3 (measurement point) design (Martin & Martin, 2000). Participants 
were either born between the years 1930-1932 (old cohort) or 1950-1952 (younger 
cohort). Regions of data collection at measurement time 1 were Heidelberg, Leipzig, 
Bonn, Erlangen-Nürnberg and Rostock (all centers are situated in Germany). Across 
the years the centers in Heidelberg (former West-Germany) and Leipzig (former 
East-Germany), which contributed the biggest samples at time 1 into the ILSE data-
pool, continued their data collection endeavors and are, currently, the referred 
centers when the term “ILSE-Study” is used. Participants were randomly drawn from 
city registers (register sample: n = 4,000 per region). The sample was stratified by 
gender and birth cohort to achieve approximately equal distributions considering 
participants sex and age. Further sample descriptions and cohort analyses can be 
found in the study populations sections of the manuscripts 1-3. Historically, the most 
important difference between the two cohorts is that the elder cohort went through 
the hardships of WWII. Both cohorts, though, witnessed the separation of Germany 
into the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD, West) and the German Democratic 
Republic (DDR, East), the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany in 
1989. All in all, the two cohorts experienced different socio-cultural contexts during 
their transition into adulthood and across their whole lives.  
Measurement took place between the years 1993-1996 (t1), 1997-2000 (t2) 
and 2005-2008 (t3), leading to a 4-year time interval from t1 to t2 and a 12-year time 
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interval from t1 to t3. On top of this, the fourth measurement wave (t4) from 2013 is 
currently being compiled, and will be ready for statistical analyses in 2017 providing 
the ILSE with an investigation interval that covers up to 20 years in each cohort (for 
more information read Sattler et al., 2015). ILSE measurements include (1) a semi-
standardized biographical interview, (2) a medical examination, (3) a psychogeriatric 
examination, (4) a dental examination, (5) a multi-dimensional cognitive testing 
battery, and (6) a comprehensive battery of questionnaires (e.g. demographic, 
educational, social, psychological, and medical) (Sattler et al., 2015). This research 
uses the ILSE personality, subjective health and life satisfaction measurements 
drawn from the set of questionnaires. Furthermore, objective health based on 
medical and psychogeriatric examinations, as well as a subsample of cognitive 
abilities drawn from the cognitive test battery, were used. Participants’ sex and 
education were conducted as control variables. 
 
Issues related to statistical modeling and effect interpretation  
Longitudinal statistical modeling is a consistently complex issue in 
developmental science. Even though there are many good recommendations and 
guidelines (e.g. McArdle, 2009; Hu & Bentler, 1999), there is, currently, no generally 
established best-practice approach for longitudinal modeling. On the other hand, the 
research questions and data nature of ILSE suggest certain procedural approaches 
as more convincing than others. These are described below.  
First, the longitudinal models used in manuscripts 2-4 reveal similarities and 
differences regarding their key statistical approach. In terms of similarities, all data-
analysis are based on multi-group analyses (McArdle, 2009). This enables the 
integration of both cohorts into the same model by separately estimating parameters 
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for each cohort. The most important advantage of this procedure is that the whole 
sample is used at once, increasing statistical power (i.e. model fit parameters). 
Furthermore, differences between models are directly testable via nested model 
comparisons. This is especially important when the issue of measurement invariance 
is considered (here: measurement invariance across groups).  
Regarding differences, the analyses in manuscripts 1 and 2 are based on 
dual-cross-lagged autoregressive models (McArdle, 2009) with two measurement 
points, respectively. Figures 2.1 and 3.1 illustrate the different used modeling 
approaches. The models illustrate the cross-predictions from one construct to the 
subsequent other construct, controlled for the respective auto-regression of the 
variable (cross-path/cross prediction). Furthermore, the model gives the baseline 
correlation and the concurrent correlation at the follow-up measurement time. 
Furthermore, the auto-regressive parameters can be interpreted as measures of 
rank-order stability of individuals over time and the cross-lagged parameters as a 
measure of variation in one construct at baseline to predict variation in the other 
construct at follow-up adjusted for controls. This enables the detection of bi-
directional (mutual/reciprocal) or uni-directional longitudinal predictions between the 
studies’ variables of interest.  
Analyses in manuscript 3 are based on dual-change-regression models 
(McArdle, 2009) and depicted in Figure 4.1. The change-regression models are 
based on classic change score models. In such a model, instead of a correlation from 
measurement time 1 to the change variable, a regression coefficient is used. This 
enables the model to be more independent from the precise time the change 
occurred (McArdle, 2009). In short this model is better suited to the change process 
at hand, because of our long study interval and the nature of the studied change 
 37 
process. The dual-change-regression model features two change scores, predicted 
by their respective variables at baseline, the baseline correlation, the correlations of 
unexplained change and the construct (at baseline) to change in the other construct 
cross predictions (intervariable cross-lagged predictions). Stability and change is 
contained in the respective change variables and not in predictor paths, which is a 
key difference when compared to the previously introduced autoregressive models. 
Conceptually speaking, the change scores represent interindividual differences in 
intraindividual changes of personality and cognition as well as their cross prediction 
from baseline, which represents the theoretically interesting change prediction.  
Measurement invariance. Groups might systematically differ in their 
interpretation of indicators. More precisely, if a construct is measured with one single 
questionnaire in two distinct groups (or at two measurement times) the same 
questions might be interpreted systematically different by the two groups and, 
therefore, the latent constructs might yield different meaning (interpretation value) in 
each group. Measurement invariance counteracts this important problem, but despite 
being of high importance, it has often times been neglected by previous research. 
Establishing measurement invariance is achieved by constraining parameters in 
measurement models to be equal across groups and in longitudinal analyses also 
across measurement occasions (e.g. Horn & McArdle, 1992; Meredith & Horn, 2001). 
There are different degrees of measurement invariance, namely weak, strong and 
strict (Meredith, 1993). Very briefly, weak measurement invariance is given when 
pattern matrices are fully invariant (across groups and/or time). Strong measurement 
invariance is given, when, additionally, the intercepts of the manifest indicators are 
invariant (across groups and/or time). Strict invariance is given when, in addition to 
the two previous conditions, also the unique variances are invariant (across groups 
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and/or time), meaning more precisely that the residual variances are equal. In 
practice, establishing measurement invariance is a highly problematic issue. 
Meredith (1993) acknowledged that the different stages of invariance are, despite 
their enormous application value, idealizations. Especially strict factorial invariance is 
often times not achievable. Strong measurement invariance allows for interpretation 
of the cross-predictor paths, which were the target variables of the analyses in the 
upcoming manuscripts. Therefore, strong measurement invariance was perceived as 
mandatory for interpretation of path coefficients in the following analyses and set as a 
precondition in the basic modeling process. The rationale behind this approach is the 
following: Every psychological model is a simplification of reality to statistically 
investigate and evaluate phenomena and derive conclusions with necessary 
parsimony and accuracy. Therefore, preconditioning strong measurement invariance 
is implemented in the current research in the basic modeling procedure. If the 
restricted models fit reasonably well to the data, strong measurement invariance can 
be perceived as given for the present investigations. Taken together, if latent 
modelling was used in the following manuscripts, strong measurement invariance 
was preconditioned and is evaluated in conjunction with the model fit. 
Interpretation of effects. As mentioned before, results should be interpreted 
cautiously with regard to causality. Even though the analyses of the present study 
fulfill the criterion of temporal alignment, the used analyzes cannot rule out the 
possibility of important moderators and mediators that were not captured in the 
present study as being explanatory for the described results. Moreover, additional 
third variables that were not investigated could also account for the found effects. 
This critical remark and advice for caution is, therefore, of high importance 
considering the effect interpretation of the present manuscripts (1-3). 
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The classical method of effect interpretation is by null-hypothesis significance 
testing using p-values. There are a couple of problems concerned with significance 
tests. First, significance tests are dependent on multiple parameters of statistical 
testing, namely the sample size, the liability to the relationship of alpha- and beta-
error and the “true” effect in the population. Furthermore, statistical tests give no 
predication about the actual size of the effect. An alternative option is to interpret the 
path coefficients not based on their significance, but on their effect sizes, namely the 
magnitude of their standardized path coefficients (on interpretation of general effect 
sizes read: Cohen, 1992). The present dissertation uses a two-step approach. First, 
significance values are used to indicate a possible effect. Second, the actual sizes of 
the standardized path coefficients are consulted whether the result demonstrates 
practical relevance. These both are discussed separately in the discussion (chapter 
5), when the results of the manuscripts are summarized and interpreted. 
In summary, having established a general basis for interpretation and critical 
discussion of the used method and statistical modeling, the stage is set for the three 
manuscripts (1-3) printed in the chapters 2-4 of this dissertation. 
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Abstract 
Theoretical reasoning and empirical data suggest that personality and well-
being have substantial interrelationships. However, more longitudinal evidence is 
required and the relationship lacks research attention from a lifespan perspective. 
We examined mid-term and long-term interrelations of neuroticism and extraversion 
with life satisfaction in 2 cohorts of middle and late adulthood, using data from the 
“Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on Adult Development and Aging (ILSE)”. Multi-
group, cross-lagged models reveal personality to be more predictive of life 
satisfaction than vice versa. Furthermore, an aging effect occurs regarding the 
relationships between life satisfaction and personality, with life satisfaction being 
predictive for personality only in the old cohort. Controlling for health weakens the 
interrelationship. Results add to the understanding of life-span dynamics among 
personality and life satisfaction. 
 Keywords: personality, life satisfaction, longitudinal, age effect, adulthood 
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Longitudinal Intertwine of Personality and Life Satisfaction in Middle and Late 
Adulthood 
A close interrelationship of personality and subjective well-being seems 
theoretically plausible and is empirically well documented (e.g., meta-analysis of 
Steel, Schmidt & Schultz, 2008). However, most of the evidence so far is restricted to 
cross-sectional data; longitudinal evidence typically has not exceeded 4-year 
observational intervals. Hence, it is still not clear how long-term personality 
development in adulthood may affect change in well-being and vice versa. In 
particular, longitudinal data targeting the interrelation between personality and life 
satisfaction in middle versus late adulthood remains scarce. This paper aims to 
contribute to filling this void by analyzing 12 years of personality and life satisfaction 
change data of the Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on Adult Development and 
Aging (ILSE) (Sattler et al., 2015). We restrict the treatment of personality to the traits 
neuroticism and extraversion, because of two reasons: (1) These traits have been 
generally revealed at the meta-analytical level (Steel et al., 2008) as highly influential 
for life satisfaction (neuroticism: ρ = -.45; extraversion: ρ = .35) and have also been 
found to be more strongly associated to life satisfaction than other traits such as 
openness (ρ = .04), conscientiousness (ρ = .27) or agreeableness (ρ = .19). (2) 
Neuroticism and extraversion have most frequently been considered in the previous 
literature, when it comes to interlinkages between personality and life satisfaction 
(see again Steel, et al., 2008). Hence, when we use the omnibus term personality in 
what follows, we always mean neuroticism and extraversion. 
Rationale behind the Personality and Life Satisfaction Intertwine 
  In order to better understand possible interlinkages between personality and 
well-being, we refer to a theoretical framework based on person-environment-fit 
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considerations that also draws from the sociogenomic model suggested by Roberts 
and Jackson (2008). This perspective predicts that if a person perceives an 
enhanced personality-environment fit (e.g., adequate living conditions, etc.) higher 
life satisfaction will result. More importantly, if a person experiences higher levels of 
life satisfaction, he or she might, in a second step, enhance his or her endeavor to 
maximize the congruence of personality and environment demands. Theoretically, 
these changes might manifest at first in short-term momentary thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors; later, they may transition into deep-seated, long-term personality and 
life satisfaction developments. Throughout the course of their lives, individuals are 
confronted with hardships, changing social roles and demands, such as establishing 
and maintaining success at work or mastering family roles. As is argued, coping with 
stressful events and maintaining a coherent identity and personality requires constant 
adjustment. Successful fit achievement is awarded with higher levels of life 
satisfaction, while unsuccessful fit corresponds to lower levels, which again may 
trigger subsequent future personality change processes. Supporting empirical 
evidence for this framework comes from studies on self-regulation and adaptation 
factors. High extraversion and low neuroticism are, for instance, related to less 
stress-sensitivity (e.g. Bolger & Schilling, 1991), the application of more adaptive 
coping styles (Cosway, Endler, Sadler & Deary, 2000), and available opportunities to 
recruit more and better social support (Russell, Booth, Reed & Laughlin, 1997). Such 
constellations might foster subsequent positive developments in long-term well-being 
and, in turn, be perceived as a motivation to readjust one’s personality. High well-
being supports positive personality developments through increasing social 
investment and increased efforts to maximize person-environment fit (e.g. Roberts & 
Wood, 2006; Specht, Egloff & Schmukle, 2013). 
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Empirical Evidence Concerning the Interrelationship of Personality and Life 
Satisfaction 
The interrelationship of personality and well-being has been the target of two 
meta-analyses by DeNeve and Cooper (1998) and Steel, Schmidt, and Shultz 
(2008). While DeNeve and Cooper (1998) found—in light of what has been said 
above—surprisingly weak connections (overall correlation = .19), Steel et al. reported 
10 years later, based on newly generated data and more refined analyses, 
approximately twofold higher relationships. Therefore, substantial correlations 
between personality and life satisfaction are considered established, but 
unfortunately, there are currently few longitudinal studies targeting the 
interrelationship of personality and life satisfaction and even fewer that target cross-
lagged effects.  
Scollon and Diener (2006) conducted cross-lagged analyses on work and 
relationship satisfaction with extraversion and neuroticism in 1,130 participants 
across an 8-year interval. Results revealed both traits to be significant longitudinal 
predictors of work satisfaction (extraversion: β = .10, p < .001; neuroticism: β = -.09, 
p < .01), while work satisfaction had only significant cross-effects with extraversion (β 
= .09, p < .01) and no significant role-to-trait-effect with neuroticism. On the other 
hand, only neuroticism was a significant predictor of relationship satisfaction (β = -
.06, p < .05), while extraversion was not. Role satisfaction was longitudinally only 
marginally predictive for extraversion (β = .05, p = .08) and was not significant in 
predicting neuroticism. Specht, Egloff, and Schmukle (2013) used data from the 
German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) and investigated the relationship of 14,718 
participants (M = 47.21; SD = 16.28) across 4 years. Combined dual latent change 
models—comprised of a latent change approach and a latent growth approach—
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revealed the change correlations of personality and well-being to be moderate to high 
in magnitude. Furthermore, life satisfaction was more influential for personality 
change than the other way around. Going further, Soto (2015), similar to the Specht 
et al. study, analyzed data from a large representative sample (n = 16,367, M = 
40.39, SD = 18.88). Soto’s latent growth curve models on the interrelationship 
revealed subjective well-being to also predict personality changes better than the 
other way round. Soto also conducted completely prospective cross-lagged analysis 
and found well-being and personality to predict each other equally well. 
All in all, longitudinal evidence points to both effects of personality on life 
satisfaction and vice versa. However, seen as a whole, the current state of evidence 
is limited, for two primary reasons. First, both the studies by Specht et al. (2013) and 
Soto (2015)—so far the most ambitious studies in terms of sophisticated data 
analysis—were restricted to 4-year observational intervals, which may be a too short 
period to address the linkage between personality and life satisfaction; in particular, 
as suggested by the environment-fit and self-regulation perspective introduced above 
(e.g. Roberts & Jackson, 2008), underlying change processes may operate slowly 
and thus only surface across longer time intervals. Moreover, Soto (2015) argues 
that the mutual prospective effects of personality and life satisfaction on each other 
might accumulate over time, which also supports the assumption that stronger 
relationships will be found in longer time intervals (e.g., a decade or longer) as 
compared to rather short observational periods such as observational periods of less 
than 5 years. So far, it remains largely an open question of how personality and life 
satisfaction are cross related under the condition of such longer time intervals. 
Second, to our knowledge, no previous study has addressed the issue of age effects 
related to the adult lifespan—particularly, the later window from mid- to late 
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adulthood. Addressing this question is important, because old age comes with a 
range of significant changes in day-to-day life, such as no longer being in the labor 
force ecosystem and undergoing health and functioning challenges.  
Personality, Life Satisfaction, and the Transition from Middle Adulthood to Old 
Age 
Here, we rely on a set of elements primarily derived from lifespan concepts of 
various origins. First, classic theories of human development, such as those of 
Erikson (1950), as well as more recent theories, such as socio-emotional selectivity 
theory (Carstensen, 2006), all have the common fundamental premise that 
individuals undergo important motivational changes as they age. More specifically, 
most lifespan models assume a transition from an outward orientation to a more 
inward orientation, such as an increased focus one’s own life story and self-narrative, 
as well as values such as intimacy. Second, prominent lifespan developmental 
models, such as the motivational theory of lifespan development (Heckhausen, 
Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010), point to the importance of circumscribed "windows” for goal 
engagement opportunities as people age. In particular, the opportunity to be engaged 
in the workforce as a major and decade-long developmental context ends in many 
countries (such as Germany) at around 65 years of age; thus, it can no longer serve 
as a source for life satisfaction and purpose in life considerations. Combined with the 
increasing aging-related inward focus described above, this may result in stronger 
referral to “what we have in us,” i.e., what has been wired as our personality. Third, 
established models on emotional development, such as the strength and vulnerability 
integration model (SAVI; Charles, 2011), support the notion that older individuals are 
highly efficient in selecting and maintaining ecologies that best fit with their 
personalities. As SAVI argues, by doing so, older adults maintain and secure positive 
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affect and the avoidance of negative affect. Hence, older adults may be seen as ideal 
candidates for the ecology-fit perspective as suggested by Roberts and Jackson 
(2008). Taken together, we assume that the linkage between personality and life 
satisfaction will increase as we move from middle adulthood to old age. 
However, it may be asked whether this assumption proves to be true when 
health is also considered. Across the lifespan, major and minor health problems 
emerge and accumulate. This new source of life stress is particularly important, 
because when comparing mid-life with old age, the probability of facing bodily decline 
and illness continually increases, limiting developmental possibilities and straining 
people’s adaptation capacities. Regarding neuroticism, in accordance with 
reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray, 1987), highly neurotic individuals are 
especially prone to experiencing accumulated health burdens and related stress, and 
perceive health problems as more severe than emotionally stable people (Matthews, 
Deary & Whiteman, 2009), which—combined with the age-related aggregation of 
health burdens—leads to high neuroticism being a risk factor for life satisfaction in 
late life (e.g., Wahl, Heyl & Schilling, 2013). Extraversion has proven to be important 
for stress buffering, is viewed as a protective factor against influences of life stress 
and is theoretically related to the dopaminergic system and positive affect (e.g., Gray, 
1987; Matthews et al., 2009); people scoring high on extraversion are better at 
choosing and using effective coping strategies and have better mental health, making 
them, overall, more superior at enduring harmful influences of health burdens (e.g. 
Matthews et al., 2009).  
Empirically, health demonstrated to be a longitudinal predictor of life 
satisfaction across many studies (e.g. Gana et al., 2013), but there are also studies 
that present a somewhat mixed picture of the relationship of personality and health. 
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For example, one study shows neuroticism and conscientiousness to be important 
predictors of subsequent health (Chapman, Roberts, Lyness & Duberstein, 2013), 
while Turiano et al. (2012) found that each of the Big Five traits, except openness, 
are important predictors for subsequent self-rated health. Focusing on the reciprocal 
relationship between health and subsequent personality impacts, Sutin, Zonderman, 
Ferrucci, and Terracciano (2013) found no evidence for the predictive power of 
health for personality, while Jokela, Hakulinen, Singh-Manoux, and Kivimäki (2014) 
observed a rather consistent role of lowered health, being related with decreases in 
extraversion and increases in neuroticism.  
 In conclusion, we arrive at the following predictions regarding the relationship 
of neuroticism and extraversion with life satisfaction. For one, we expect that the 
relationship becomes stronger in old age as compared to midlife, because, in the 
light of the arguments described above as well as the person-environment fit model 
at large, older adults are better in selecting and maintaining best-fitting ecologies. 
Second, because the need to cope with increasing health burdens becomes 
increasingly important throughout the course of one’s life, and particularly in old age, 
controlling for health should reduce the effect of age on the interrelationship between 
personality and well-being.  
The Present Study 
The goal of the present study is to examine longitudinal interrelationships of 
neuroticism and extraversion with life satisfaction. We aim to extend previous insights 
with three elements: (1) We are in a position to lengthen the time interval of 4 years, 
commonly used in prior research and also available in our data, to 12 years, which 
allows for comparing rather short and long-term relationships. Based on this larger 
data set, we expect personality and life satisfaction to be more strongly interrelated in 
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their cross-paths in the 12-year interval as compared to the 4-year interval. (2) 
Regarding the impact of the transition from middle to old age for the relationship 
between personality and life satisfaction, we expect a closer relationship in the period 
of old age as compared to mid age. (3) Based on the previous findings, we expect 
that the consideration of health will weaken possible differences in the strength of 
relationships between personality and life satisfaction from middle adulthood to old 
age.  
Method 
Study Population and Sample Description 
Data are obtained from the “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on Adult 
Development and Aging (ILSE)” (Sattler et al., 2015). The ILSE-Study consists of 
three finished times of measurement: 1993-1996 (n = 1002), 1997-2000 (n = 896), 
and 2005-2007 (n = 789). There is an approximately 4-year time interval between 
measurement occasions 1 and 2 and a 12-year time interval between measurement 
occasions 1 and 3. The ILSE-participants can be divided in two cohorts by age, either 
born before WWII (1930-1932; older cohort) or afterwards (1950-1952; younger 
cohort) and two cohorts by residence (Heidelberg/Leipzig, Germany). Data collection 
was conducted by questionnaires, testing of cognitive abilities, and an extensive 
medical assessment executed by the study’s trained geriatricians. Further 
information, like additional sample characteristics and attrition analyses, have already 
been compiled and reported (e.g., Sattler et al., 2015; Allemand, Zimprich & Hertzog, 
2007). 
Measures 
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured using a 1-item questionnaire. 
The question targets general satisfaction with life itself at the “precise moment”. 
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Answer options range from 1 = “not at all satisfied” to 5 = “totally satisfied”. Life 
satisfaction provides good longitudinal convergent validity and moderate-to-good 
discriminant validity (Lucas, Diener & Suh, 1996). Moreover, single-item measures of 
life satisfaction are found to cross the frequently cited heuristic of 0.70, indicating 
acceptable reliability (Lucas & Donnellan, 2012).  
Neuroticism and extraversion. Neuroticism and extraversion were assessed 
using the corresponding subscales of the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; 
Costa & McCrae, 1992b). The NEO-FFI consists of 60 items (12 per subscale), 
worded as defining statements, which are rated on personal accordance by the 
participant on 5-grade scales ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly 
agree”. The questionnaire has proven internal and temporal reliability (e.g., Murray, 
Rawlings, Allen & Trinder, 2003) and is widely recognized as a well-normed, robust, 
reliable and valid measure (e.g., Lang & Lüdtke, 2005). Internal consistencies 
(Cronbach) regarding neuroticism are .79/.82/.84 at t1/t2/t3. Respective internal 
consistencies for extraversion are .71/.71/.77.  
Health. Health at time 1 was assessed via two separate ratings. First, a self-
rating for subjective health was conducted and participants were asked to rate their 
personal health perception “at the precise moment”. Answer options on the 6-point 
Likert scale ranged from 1 = “very bad” to 6 = “very good”. Second, an objective 
health assessment—comprising an anamnesis, a blood analysis, a gero-psychiatric 
assessment, and a medical checkup, conducted by one to two trained study 
geriatricians—was also available (see Miche, Elsässer, Schilling & Wahl, 2014, for 
more details). The professionals aggregated the data and rated the participants’ state 
of health on 6-point Likert scales. Answer options ranged from 1 = “very bad; 
professional health care is urgent” to 6 = “very good”.  
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Statistical Analyses 
Utilizing Mplus (Version 6, Muthén, & Muthén, 2011), multi-group, cross-
lagged-path models were constructed, which are depicted in Figure 2.1. The 
grouping variable was cohort (mid adulthood/old age). The different personality 
factors at times 1 and 2 (4-year time interval) or times 1 and 3 (12-year time interval) 
were measured latently, using 3 indicator-parcels of 4 items for each parcel. Item 
parceling was conducted due to reasons of parsimony. Life satisfaction, due to being 
a single-item measurement, was entered as a manifest variable. In a following step, 
the model (Model 1) was enhanced by adding objective and subjective health at time 
1 as control variables (Model 2) to predict time 2 (4-year interval) or, respectively, 
time 3 (12-year interval) of personality and life satisfaction. The logic behind including 
the health variables only at time 1 was to operate with prospective predictors of equal 
time intervals. Strong measurement invariance was assessed following 
recommendations by van de Schoot, Lugtig, and Hox (2012). Cut-off criteria of 
model-fit indices were used following Hu and Bentler (1999). 
 
Results 
Descriptive Data and Examination of Basic Model-Fit 
The descriptive statistics of the study variables are given in Table 2.1. At time 
1, 500 participants of the older cohort and 502 participants of the younger cohort 
were investigated. At measurement time 3, only 381 of the older cohort population 
remained, while the younger cohort population still consisted of 408 participants. The 
sex ratio in both cohorts at time 1 amounts to roughly 48% women to 52% men. The 
overall means depict only small changes. Life satisfaction remained stable for the 
older cohort, but decreased slightly for the younger cohort. The means for both 
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neuroticism and extraversion were decreasing, for both cohorts, respectively. There 
were no remarkable differences in participant’s self- and externally rated health (i.e., 
subjective health, objective health) at time 1.  
The model-fit indices of the multi-group cross-lagged models are shown in 
Table 2.2, separated for Model 1 (without health) and Model 2 (with health). The fit 
indices of the sub-models of Model 1 (E/N, 4/12) ranged from .027 to .055 for the 
RMSEA, from .975 to .992 for the CFI, and from .042 to .052 for the SRMR, 
indicating good-excellent fit. The four implementations of Model 2, likewise, revealed 
good-to-excellent model fits. The RMSEA values ranged from .025 to .052, the CFI 
values from .971 to .981, and the SRMR values from .038 to .046. In what follows, 
the model paths of Model 1 and Model 2 for neuroticism and extraversion are 
extensively reported. Tables 2.3-2.4 illustrate the respective correlations and 
prospective paths. 
Examination of Stability, Cross-sectional Correlations, and Longitudinal 
Interrelationships 
There was high stability for neuroticism and extraversion across all models 
regardless of cohort, time interval, or the inclusion of health as a predictor. The path 
coefficients of neuroticism at time 1 to neuroticism at time 2, or respectively, time 3, 
ranged from β = .683 to β = .870 (all p < .001). The path coefficients of extraversion 
at time 1 predicting extraversion at time 2 or time 3 ranged from β =.685 to β = .890 
(all p < .001). Life satisfaction revealed mild to moderate stability across all models. 
Overall, the coefficients of life satisfaction at time 1 predicting life satisfaction at time 
2 and time 3 ranged from β = .248 to β = .397 (all p < .001). Looking at the cross-
section, both neuroticism and extraversion correlated significantly with life 
satisfaction, revealing mild to moderate relationships (neuroticism: r = -.207 to r = -
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.465; extraversion: r = .196 to r = .394) across all measurement occasions and both 
cohorts (all p < .001).  
In Model 1, neuroticism significantly predicted 4-year-later life satisfaction 
(older cohort: β = -.142, p = .004; younger cohort: β = -.126, p = .016). Respectively, 
extraversion’s ability to predict life satisfaction 4 years later was significant for both 
cohorts (older cohort: β = .137, p = .009; younger cohort: β = .120, p = .025). The 
opposing prediction of life satisfaction for personality (neuroticism, extraversion) 4-
years-later, showed a different picture. Here, only in the older cohort, life satisfaction 
significantly predicted neuroticism 4 years later (β = -.018, p = .019). Briefly 
summarizing, the present data support personality significantly predicting life 
satisfaction 4 years later, but contradicts regarding the opposing idea that life 
satisfaction predicts personality factors 4 years later. 
Extending the time interval from 4 to 12 years has significant impact on 
extraversion's interrelationship with life satisfaction, while revealing almost no effect 
considering the interrelationship with neuroticism. The path from neuroticism to life 
satisfaction 12 years later barely missed significance for the older cohort (β = -.125, p 
= .054), but remained highly significant for the younger cohort (β = -.164, p = .007). 
The relationships between life satisfaction to neuroticism 12 years later were 
significant for the older cohort (β = -.030, p = .006) and not significant for the younger 
cohort (β = -.010, p = .855). Regarding extraversion, both relationships between 
personality and life satisfaction 12 years later were not significant (older cohort: β = 
.003, p = .964; younger cohort: β = .045, p = .468); surprisingly, however, the 
relationship between life satisfaction to later extraversion became significant for the 
older cohort (β = -.042, p < .001). The corresponding relationship for the younger 
cohort failed to reach significance (β = .041, p = .441).  
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Examination of Differences in the Relationship of Personality and Life 
satisfaction between Middle Adulthood and Old Age 
While the magnitudes and significances of the relationships between both 
personality factors and life satisfaction indicated almost no differences between the 
cohorts, with the exception of the relationship between neuroticism and life 
satisfaction 12 years later, which missed the statistical significance level in the old 
cohort (see Table 2.3), the opposing relationships between life satisfaction and 
personality differed systematically. Life satisfaction was in 3 out of 4 cases a 
significant predictor for subsequent personality in the older cohort (N 4: β = -.018, p = 
.019; N 12: β = -.030, p = .006; E 4: β = -.008, p = .307; E 12: β = -.042, p < .001); 
however, in the younger cohort, life satisfaction was on no account a significant 
longitudinal predictor (N 4: β = -.002, p = .969; N 12: β = -.010, p = .855; E 4: β = 
.017, p = .678; E 12: β = .041, p = .441). All in all, there is evidence for an aging 
effect that is concerned with life satisfaction being predictive of subsequent 
neuroticism (both intervals) and extraversion (only long time interval). 
The Role of Health 
The inclusion of health (Table 2.4) did not remarkably change the stability 
effects and cross-sectional relations, but the longitudinal interrelationships were 
weakened, and of the former 8 significant longitudinal cross-effects, only 4 remain. In 
the short time interval, the relationships between neuroticism and subsequent life 
satisfaction were significant for both cohorts (older cohort: β = -.112, p = .034; 
younger cohort: β = -.117, p = .028). Furthermore, the relationship between 
extraversion and life satisfaction 4 years later were significant for the older cohort (β 
= .115, p = .028) and barely missed significance for the younger cohort (β = .109, p = 
.052). In the long time interval, only the relationship between neuroticism and later-
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life satisfaction in the younger cohort showed significance (β = -.131, p = .027). In 
conclusion, the results hint at three findings. First, in the short time interval and 
controlled for health, personality remains a predictor of later-life satisfaction, while life 
satisfaction does not significantly predict later neuroticism or extraversion. Second, in 
the long time interval, when controlled for health, the interrelationship gets slightly 
weakened and only one effect remains significant. Third, it is particularly noteworthy 
that all life satisfaction to later personality factor effects became insignificant after 
entering health into the models, indicating that the life satisfaction to personality age 
effect might vanish when controlled for health.  
As expected, objective and subjective health were highly correlated with each 
other (r’s ranging from r = .452 to r = .495; all p < .001). Cross-sectional, subjective 
health was mild to moderately correlated to neuroticism (r’s ranging from r = -.269 to r 
= -.362; all p < .001), extraversion (r’s ranging from r = .199 to r = .261; all p < .001), 
and life satisfaction (r’s ranging from r = .177 to r = .222; all p < .001), across both 
time intervals and cohorts. Longitudinally, subjective health was not significantly 
predictive of neuroticism, extraversion, or life satisfaction, with one exception. The 
relationship between subjective health at time 1 to life satisfaction 12 years later was 
significant in the older cohort (β model with neuroticism = .165, p = .009; β model 
with extraversion = .196; p = .002). Objective health showed a more complex cross-
sectional and longitudinal relationship pattern, being mildly correlated with 
neuroticism (r’s ranging from r = -.138 to r = -.230; all p < .01) and extraversion (r’s 
ranging from r = .112 to r = .133; all p < .05) at time 1 across all cohorts and in all 
calculated models. Moreover, objective health was mildly correlated to life 
satisfaction at time 1 in the older cohort (r = .166, p < .001), but not in the younger 
cohort (r = .044, p = .324). Objective health at time 1 revealed no significant 
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longitudinal relations to the personality factors at time 2 or time 3, with one exception. 
In the older cohort, a significant longitudinal effect of objective health to 12-year-later 
extraversion reached significance (β = .132, p = .026). In the models with 
neuroticism, the paths of objective health predicting life satisfaction in the older 
cohort barely missed significance (4: β = .093, p = .066; 12: β = .131, p = .052), 
which was reached in the long time interval of the younger cohort (12: β = .208, p < 
.001). In the model with extraversion, these paths emerged as significant longitudinal 
predictors (older cohort 4: β = .103, p = .042; older cohort 12: β = .135, p = .046; 
younger cohort 12: β = .208, p = < .001). Therefore, the longitudinal influences of 
subjective and objective health showed relevance, especially for life satisfaction and 
the long time intervals.  
 
Discussion 
 The research goal of the present study was to add long-term evidence to the 
relationship of personality (neuroticism, extraversion) and life satisfaction. 
Additionally, and for the first time, two very important enhancements were made to 
the present body of research. First, in contrast to the usually rather short-term 
observation intervals (e.g., 2-6 years), we offered long-term, longitudinal, cross-
lagged data on the relation between personality and life satisfaction, amounting to 12 
years. Second, we contrasted for the first time mid-adulthood and old age, based on 
theoretical reasoning regarding the link between personality and life satisfaction.  
The overall results of stability and cross-sectional correlations of the cross-
lagged models were in line with previous research in terms of confirming high stability 
for both personality factors across the 4- and 12-year time intervals (e.g., Roberts & 
Del Vecchio, 2000); we also found smaller yet substantial stability coefficients for life 
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satisfaction. Moreover, our cross-sectional correlations of neuroticism and 
extraversion with life satisfaction accord well with the meta-analytical results of 
DeNeve and Cooper (1998) and Steel et al. (2008), revealing mild to moderate 
relationships.  
Across all our models—meaning both those controlled and uncontrolled for 
health—the relationships between the personality factors predicting life satisfaction 4 
years later reach significance in 7 out of 8 cases, with one relationship barely missing 
significance (p = .052). On the other hand, only one prospective relationship between 
life satisfaction and neuroticism 4 years later reached significance (cohort 30). While 
the standardized betas of personality predicting later-life satisfaction were small but 
statistically meaningful, their counterparts from life satisfaction to personality were 
practically in the zero range. These results are quite surprising, when compared to 
Specht et al.’s (2013) and Soto’s (2015) findings, who argued that well-being effects 
on traits are equally predictive or even stronger than vice versa. Our data do not 
support this notion. We found personality clearly predicting life satisfaction 4 years 
later, but almost no effect for the reversed cross-lagged relationships.  
Interpreting these results, some key differences between the present study 
and Specht et al.’s (2013) and Soto’s (2015) analyses must be addressed. First, 
there is a wide gap between sample sizes. They investigated very large samples of 
14,718 and 16,367 participants, while we were restricted to only 1,002 participants at 
time 1. Second, their study samples covered the full adulthood period (i.e., early, mid, 
and late), while we concentrated only on mid-adulthood versus old age. Third, they 
investigated the whole set of personality factors, whereas we restricted ourselves to 
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neuroticism and extraversion alone1. A comparison of the present study’s results with 
Soto’s (2015) results revealed the same pattern of significant relationships regarding 
life satisfaction and neuroticism/extraversion with one remarkable difference: the 
standardized trait effects in the present study are far larger in magnitude (Soto’s 
neuroticism trait effect: β = -.084; extraversion trait effect: β = .045). Fourth, Soto 
(2015) included measurements of positive and negative affect in addition to life 
satisfaction and, sixth, modelled life satisfaction latently. All these reasons might 
account for the differences in results. It is plausible that life satisfaction might predict 
later-life personality, specifically in its early stages. It is also possible that 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness may be more reactive to earlier life 
satisfaction than neuroticism and extraversion. All in all, we were partly able to 
replicate previous research regarding the short-term interrelationship of personality 
and life satisfaction. Our study, however, does not support the importance of life 
satisfaction as a predictor for personality change across 4 years.  
Turning to our long-term observations—covering 12 years with a focus on 
neuroticism—the long-term, cross-lagged paths were of equal magnitude and thus 
different from the short-term observations. This, however, was not true for 
extraversion. Extraversion was well predictive for life satisfaction 4 years later, but in 
the long-term models, these relationships became insignificant and, surprisingly, very 
small. Although it appears hypothetical, it is possible to derive from our results that 
neuroticism might address the more long-term oriented (e.g., health behavior, 
                                            
1 In response to one of our reviewers’ comments, we conducted additional analyses on the remaining three 
personality traits of the Big-Five, namely conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness. Overall, only two out 
of 24 possible cross-lagged paths reached significance (old/young cohort, 4/12 years, cross-lagged trait/life 
satisfaction effect). One significant relationship is between conscientiousness at time 1 and life satisfaction at 
time 2, while the other significant relationship is between life satisfaction at time 1 and agreeableness at time 
3. The two effects remained unaffected by the inclusion of health into the models. 
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tendency for social isolation) and extraversion the more short-term oriented 
components (e.g., participation in social activities) of life satisfaction, which is an 
open question for future studies. It is of additional interest that the relationship 
between life satisfaction and extraversion became significant in the long time interval 
(older cohort). As Soto (2015) argued, the prospective effects of life satisfaction and 
personality might grow larger when allowed to accumulate in longer time intervals. 
Overall, our data do not consistently support the theoretically assumed stronger 
interrelations of longer time intervals when compared to shorter time intervals. 
Obviously, more research is needed to further clarify this issue and observations 
even longer than 12 years may be helpful in this regard.  
In terms of possible age effects regarding the relation between personality and 
life satisfaction, we also expected (based on theoretical reasoning) that the 
longitudinal interrelationship might be stronger in old age as compared to mid-
adulthood. We also assumed that health may be an important control variable for 
such possible differences in cross-lagged effects. According to our findings, no 
difference between the two age cohorts was observed, when it comes to the cross-
paths from neuroticism or extraversion to later life satisfaction, which supports 
rejection of the assumed age effect. However, our data also revealed that the 
corresponding cross-lagged effects from life satisfaction to neuroticism were 
predictive for the old cohort, but not for the mid-adulthood cohort. Regarding 
extraversion, in the long time interval and old cohort, the same pattern is observed. 
Taken together, the relationship between life satisfaction and subsequent personality 
change seems—at least for neuroticism and partly for extraversion—to be 
systematically different between the two age groups, supporting the existence of an 
age effect. It thus seems that a differential argument is needed to better understand 
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possible differences in personality–life satisfaction relations in mid-adulthood versus 
old age. 
 Finally, the inclusion of health weakened the cross-lagged relationships 
between personality and life satisfaction and vice versa, leaving only 4 of the former 
8 effects as significant and erasing the partial age effect as described above. Thus, 
health seems to have an important influence on life satisfaction predicting later 
personality, when middle adulthood and old age are contrasted. Furthermore, in line 
with our theoretical argument, we cautiously interpret that health is partly responsible 
for the cross-relationships of neuroticism and extraversion with life satisfaction as 
indicated by the differences in results after health has been included. It, however, 
remains unclear how health unfolds its influence on the interrelationship. We 
therefore recommend future studies on the interrelationship to include health as a 
time varying covariate.  
Furthermore, the two health variables revealed the expected cross-sectional 
results with each other, life satisfaction, neuroticism, and extraversion, with only one 
exception. In the younger cohort, objective health and life satisfaction were not 
significantly correlated. We interpret that in mid-adulthood, objective health 
constraints are seemingly superimposed by other sources of life satisfaction, like, for 
example, success at work and striving in family roles, which changes when people 
grow older and bodily decline becomes a more frequent issue. The longitudinal 
results of health were surprising to us, because subjective health scarcely showed a 
significant relationship to life satisfaction or personality. Objective health, in contrast, 
showed a couple of interesting prospective relationships. According to our long-term 
data, objective health seems indeed to be more important than subjective health, 
which questions to some extent the now-classic but mostly cross-sectional based 
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priority of subjective health as compared to objective health, when it comes to the 
prediction of life satisfaction and well-being in general. Surprisingly, personality was 
hardly affected by objective health. 
Limitations and Future Research Needs 
 The present study analyzed data from the German “Interdisciplinary 
Longitudinal Study on Adult Development and Aging (ILSE)”, which has numerous 
important strengths: its long study interval, multidisciplinary data gathering, and 
refined cohort design to explicitly cover mid- and late adulthood. However, the study 
has also considerable limitations. First, the present investigation, as well as Specht et 
al. (2013) and Soto (2015), heavily relied on very short assessment formats (and, 
indeed, 1-item formats to some extent). Although such short assessments are found 
to be acceptable in terms of reliability and validity (e.g., Diener, Suh, Lucas & Smith, 
1999; Lucas & Donnellan, 2012; Diener, Inglehart & Tay, 2013), findings need to be 
replicated and extended, driven by the spirit of a multi-trait, multi-method analysis 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Second, the used measurements were mostly self-reports. 
Even though self-reports are state-of-the-art in psychological panel studies, external 
assessments might shed further light on the subject. Third, the modeling became 
asymmetrical, because personality was measured latently and life satisfaction was 
implemented into the models as a manifest variable. More indicators for life 
satisfaction than one item would certainly improve the plausibility of the construct and 
help equalize the relationship. The lacking predictability of life satisfaction for later-life 
personality changes might be partly due to the chosen approach. Fourth, a different 
modeling—as compared to the multi-group, cross-lagged models—could be 
promising. Specht et al. (2013) and Soto (2015) partly used latent-growth curve 
models to describe the interrelationship. Even though this approach is not fully 
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prospective, change correlations and the cross level to change effects might be 
affected by the implementation of health and the enlarged time intervals. Fifth, to 
better understand the impact of health on the interrelationship, a more refined 
measurement approach and modeling of health seems promising. We included 
health only at time 1 to align with the prospective cross-lagged effects, but 
recommend future studies to include health as a dynamic change variable.  
Conclusion 
Despite the limitations of the present study, a number of conclusions were 
supported by our data. First, neuroticism and extraversion were shown in our data to 
predict subsequent life satisfaction in the short time interval. In the long time interval, 
however, a mixed picture appeared and only neuroticism was able to predict life 
satisfaction longitudinally. Furthermore, a (partial) age effect regarding the 
intertwining of personality and life satisfaction emerged. Life satisfaction was 
predictive for neuroticism in old age, but not in mid-adulthood, which was also true for 
extraversion (but only in the long time interval). This age effect appeared 
nevertheless as health dependent. Overall, our data support taking a differential 
perspective to understand better developmental trajectories and interlinkages of 
multi-dimensional constructs like personality and life satisfaction. 
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Table 2.1 
Publication 1: The Basic Descriptive Statistics. 
 t1 t2 t3 
Population    
 older cohort  500 (♀ = 47.9%) 449 381 
 younger cohort  502 (♀ = 48.2%) 447 408 
Life satisfaction    
 older cohort  3.94 (SD = .798) 4.11 (SD = .644) 3.94 (SD = .814) 
 younger cohort  3.82 (SD = .837) 3.82 (SD = .790) 3.55 (SD = 1.051) 
Neuroticism    
 older cohort  18.63 (SD = 6.88) 18.17 (SD = 6.84) 17.43 (SD = 6.59) 
 younger cohort  17.74 (SD = 6.99) 16.27 (SD = 7.14) 16.97 (SD = 7.46) 
Extraversion     
 older cohort  26.51 (SD = 5.67) 26.23 (SD = 5.40) 25.43 (SD = 6.00) 
 younger cohort  28.50 (SD = 5.71) 28.27 (SD = 5.56) 27.68 (SD = 5.83) 
Health    
 older cohort obj. 3.53 (SD = .876)   
  subj. 3.45 (SD = .912)   
 younger cohort obj. 3.73 (SD = .782)   
  subj. 3.53 (SD = .813)   
 
Note.  Table displays the participant count in the first two rows and mean values with their 
associated standard deviations (SD) in the following rows. Measurement times 1, 2, and 3 
are abbreviated as t1, t2, and t3. Older cohort = cohort born 1930-1932; younger cohort = 
cohort born 1950-1952; ♀ = female participants; Obj. = objective health; Subj. = subjective 
health.  
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Table 2.2 
Publication 1: Model-Fit Indices of the Multi-group and,-Cross-lagged Models. 
Model-Fit Indices χ² df p RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Model 1 N 4  128.315 51 .000 .055 .975 .042 
Model 1 N 12  109.786 51 .000 .048 .975 .047 
Model 1 E 4  69.172 51 .045 .027 .992 .049 
Model 1 E 12  78.851 51 .007 .033 .984 .052 
Model 2 N 4  158.394 67 .000 .052 .971 .038 
Model 2 N 12  135.001 67 .000 .045 .973 .043 
Model 2 E 4  87.200 67 .049 .025 .991 .043 
Model 2 E 12  98.289 67 .007 .031 .983 .046 
 
Note.  N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; 4 = 4-year time interval; 12 = 12-year time interval; 
Model 1 = Model without health; Model 2 = Model with health; χ² = chi-square value; df = 
degrees of freedom; p = probability value; RMSEA = root mean squared error of 
approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual. 
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Table 2.3 
Publication 1: Correlations and Standardized Prospective Paths of Model 1 (Without Health), Separated for Personality Factor, Time Interval, 
and Cohort. 
Paths Neuroticism Extraversion 
    4 12 4 12 
Base correlations  
(P t1 ↔ LS t1) 
older cohort -.299*** -.304*** .219*** .201*** 
younger cohort -.369*** -.370*** .246*** .245*** 
Subsequent correlations  
(P t2/t3 ↔ LS t2/t3) 
older cohort -.217** -.316*** .394*** .386*** 
younger cohort -.465*** -.383*** .255*** .277*** 
Trait stability  
(P t1 → P t2/t3) 
older cohort .849*** .744*** .890*** .850*** 
younger cohort .748*** .709*** .841*** .706*** 
Life satisfaction stability  
(LS t1 → LS t2/t3) 
older cohort .362*** .290*** .356*** .327*** 
younger cohort .294*** .342*** .311*** .397*** 
Cross-lagged trait effects  
(P t1 → LS t2/t3) 
older cohort -.142** -.125† .137** .003 
younger cohort -.126* -.164** .120* .045 
Cross-lagged life satisfaction effects  
(LS t1 → P t2/t3) 
older cohort -.018* -.030** -.008 -.042*** 
younger cohort -.002 -.010 .017 .041 
Note.  Values represent standardized model parameters. P = personality factor; LS = life satisfaction; t1/t2/t3 = measurement times 1/2/3; 4 = 
4-year time interval; 12 = 12-year time interval; older cohort = cohort born 1930-1932; younger cohort = cohort born 1950-1952; ↔ = 
correlation; → = directed path. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, †p < .1 
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Table 2.4 
Publication 1: Correlations and Standardized Prospective Paths of Model 2 (With Health), Separated for Personality Factor, Time Interval, and 
Cohort. 
Paths Neuroticism Extraversion 
  4 12 4 12 
Base correlations  
(P t1 ↔ LS t1) 
older cohort -.302*** -.302*** .209*** .196*** 
younger cohort -.369*** -.370*** .246*** .245*** 
Subsequent correlations  
(P t2/t3 ↔ LS t2/t3) 
older cohort -.207** -.294*** .382*** .382*** 
younger cohort -.464*** -.351*** .256*** .257*** 
Trait stability  
(P t1 → P t2/t3) 
older cohort .870*** .736*** .877*** .850*** 
younger cohort .736*** .683*** .839*** .685*** 
Life satisfaction stability  
(LS t1 → LS t2/t3) 
older cohort .339*** .248*** .334*** .271*** 
younger cohort .288*** .330*** .305*** .382*** 
Cross-lagged trait effects  
(P t1 → LS t2/t3) 
older cohort -.112* -.073 .115* -.049 
younger cohort -.117* -.131* .109† -.007 
Cross-lagged life satisfaction effects  
(LS t1 → P t2/t3) 
older cohort -.003 -.046 .020 -.022 
younger cohort .006 .000 .015 .037 
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Table 2.4 – Continued 
Paths Neuroticism Extraversion 
     4 12 4 12 
Subj. health ↔ Obj. health  older cohort .495*** .494*** .494*** .495*** 
    younger cohort .453*** .452*** .453*** .452*** 
Subj. health ↔ LS t1  older cohort .222*** .221*** .222*** .221*** 
    younger cohort .178*** .181*** .177*** .181*** 
Subj. health ↔ P t1  older cohort -.362*** -.354*** .199*** .215*** 
    younger cohort -.271*** -.269*** .257*** .261*** 
Obj. health ↔ LS t1  older cohort .166*** .165*** .166*** .165*** 
    younger cohort .044 .044 .043 .044 
Obj. health ↔ P t1  older cohort -.230*** -.223*** .120* .133* 
    younger cohort -.142** -.138** .112* .114* 
Subj. health → LS t2/t3  older cohort .056 .165** .076 .196** 
    younger cohort .050 .079 .043 .104† 
Subj. health → P t2/t3  older cohort .052 .017 -.011 -.087 
    younger cohort -.038 -.075 .023 .039 
Obj. health → LS t2/t3  older cohort .093† .131† .103* .135* 
    younger cohort -.003 .208*** -.001 .208*** 
Obj. health → P t2/t3  older cohort -.025 -.050 .064 .132* 
    younger cohort -.047 -.097† -.043 .068 
Note. Values represent standardized model parameters. P = personality factor; LS = life satisfaction; t1/t2/t3 = measurement times 1/2/3; 4 = 
4-year time interval; 12 = 12-year time interval; older cohort = cohort born 1930-1932; younger cohort = cohort born 1950-1952; ↔ = 
correlation; → = directed path; Obj. = objective; Subj. = subjective. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, †p < .1 
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Figure 2.1   
Multi-group, cross-lagged-path model with two latent variables for personality (N/E = 
Neuroticism/Extraversion) measured by respectively three item parcels (e.g. par_1) and two 
manifest variables modeling life satisfaction (LS) (Model 1). Objective and subjective health 
variables are added as controls (Model 2; with dashed lines). Grouping variable is cohort. 
Model is either defined by time 2 or time 3. 
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Abstract 
We examined longitudinal associations between personality, objective 
(physician-rated) and self-rated health over 12 years in two German cohorts (midlife 
cohort, born 1950/52, nT0 = 502; late life cohort, born 1930/32, nT0 = 500) from the 
“Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Adult Development (ILSE)”. Based on cross-
lagged panel design analyses controlling for gender, education, depression and 
cognitive abilities, we found that better baseline objective health predicted lower 
neuroticism and higher agreeableness after 12 years, whereas baseline extraversion 
and conscientiousness were positive predictors of later self-rated health. Our findings 
thus illustrate that the direction of longitudinal personality-health associations is 
dependent on whether objective or self-rated health is considered, whereas relations 
do not seem to be considerably different in midlife vs. in old age.   
Key words: Personality, health, middle adulthood, old age, Big Five, 
neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness 
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Introduction 
Both personality and health are changeable across the entire life span 
(Morack, Infurna, Ram, & Gerstorf, 2013; Wagner, Ram, Smith, & Gerstorf, 2015). 
The aim of this study is to examine reciprocal longitudinal associations between the 
“Big Five” personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) and health over 12 years in a 
midlife (baseline age 43-46 years) and a late-life cohort (baseline age 61-65 years). 
Given the multidimensionality of health (Spiro, 2001), we will investigate the interplay 
of both objective health (rated by a physician) and self-rated health with personality. 
Rather than focusing on single diseases, we are interested in how individuals’ 
position on a general health continuum, as rated by themselves as well as by 
physicians, interacts with personality traits. We argue that most of previous research 
has (1) considered personality only as a predictor, rather than as both an antecedent 
and an outcome, of health, and (2) neglected the potentially differential role of 
objective vs. self-rated health regarding the longitudinal personality-health interplay. 
Moreover, we will investigate whether personality-health association patterns are 
different in midlife vs. late life.  
Personality as a Predictor of Health 
Most existing research on the longitudinal personality-health interplay has so 
far been dedicated to the question whether personality traits predict health outcomes 
(Friedman & Kern, 2014; Smith & MacKenzie, 2006). Various interacting 
mechanisms may underlie such associations, including behavioral (e.g., Lodi-Smith 
et al., 2010), physiological (Luchetti, Barkley, Stephan, Terracciano, & Sutin, 2014), 
and social pathways (Hill, Nickel, & Roberts, 2014). 
Regarding empirical evidence, the role of personality as a predictor of health, 
particularly neuroticism, has frequently been investigated. High neuroticism seems to 
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play a consistent role as a risk factor for poor health: For instance, Sutin, Zonderman, 
Ferrucci, and Terracciano (2013) found that neuroticism (and particularly its sub-facet 
impulsiveness) was associated with a higher risk of developing disease or of getting 
more ill. Moreover, apart from predicting future self-rated health (Human et al., 2013; 
Magee, Heaven, & Miller, 2013; Turiano et al., 2012) and decline in self-rated health 
(Löckenhoff, Terracciano, Ferrucci, & Costa, 2012), neuroticism also acts as an 
important prospective risk factor when an individuals’ health is rated by a physician 
rather than self-reported (Chapman, Roberts, Lyness, & Duberstein, 2013). 
Furthermore, extraversion seems to be a protective trait regarding health outcomes, 
with higher scores and increases in extraversion over time being associated with 
better prospective self-rated health (Magee et al., 2013; Turiano et al., 2012). 
Regarding openness to experience, most studies so far found no meaningful 
relationship between baseline openness and prospective health outcomes or health 
changes (Magee et al., 2013; Morack et al., 2013; Tolea, Costa, et al., 2012; Turiano 
et al., 2012). In contrast, agreeableness may play a more meaningful role with regard 
to health: For instance, lower agreeableness was found to be associated with faster 
accumulation of morbidity (as assessed by a physician) over time (Chapman et al., 
2013). However, regarding subjective health outcomes, Turiano et al. (2012) reported 
that higher agreeableness scores as well as increases in agreeableness over time 
were prospectively associated with worse self-rated health. Conscientiousness may 
be, together with neuroticism, the most important health predictor (Reiss, Eccles, & 
Nielsen, 2014; Shanahan, Hill, Roberts, Eccles, & Friedman, 2014). Specifically, 
higher conscientiousness was found to be associated with a lower prospective risk of 
“getting sicker” as well as with lower future disease burden (Sutin et al., 2013). 
Additionally, higher conscientiousness also predicts lower physician-assessed illness 
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burden accumulation over time (Chapman et al., 2013). Moreover, individuals with 
higher baseline conscientiousness as well as with increases in conscientiousness 
over time were found to report better subsequent self-rated health (Human et al., 
2013; Magee et al., 2013; Turiano et al., 2012).  
Personality as an Outcome of Health 
However, a one-sided perspective, focusing on personality as a determinant of 
health, may not fully capture the complexity of the longitudinal personality-health 
interface. Health deterioration and the onset of an illness may challenge personality 
stability. For instance, the experience of health restrictions may upset individuals and 
complicate the engagement in social and other activities, consequently leading to 
tendencies of social withdrawal and avoidance of new experiences which may be too 
exhausting once health is compromised. Thus, poor health may result in an increase 
in neuroticism as well as a decrease in extraversion and openness to experience. In 
addition, severe health problems may also challenge an individual’s capacity to 
maintain a certain level of agreeableness, e.g. due to feelings of envy with regard to 
others’ health.  
Although the overwhelming majority of empirical studies has considered 
personality as an antecedent of health, there is also some evidence in favor of 
meaningful health effects on later personality. For instance, the onset of chronic 
disease was found to be associated with an increase in neuroticism and a decrease 
in extraversion, openness, and conscientiousness (Jokela, Hakulinen, Singh-
Manoux, & Kivimäki, 2014). Sutin et al. (2013) observed that an increase in illness 
burden was associated with a decrease in openness and – though only marginally 
significantly– with a decline in extraversion. Similarly, in a sample of very old adults, 
higher self-reported disability emerged as risk factor for declines in extraversion and 
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openness (Wagner et al., 2015). Finally, turning to specific health conditions, the 
experience of late-life sensory (vision or hearing) impairment seems to be associated 
with an increase in neuroticism (Lißmann, 2003), and hearing impairment is related 
with steeper declines in extraversion (Berg & Johansson, 2014; Lißmann, 2003).   
To summarize, personality (particularly neuroticism and conscientiousness) 
seems to meaningfully predict health outcomes, but there is also some evidence 
pointing at the role of health as a predictor of personality change. However, there is 
still a lack of studies simultaneously investigating both directions of the personality-
health interface instead of (or in addition to) considering personality as only a 
determinant of health.  
 Are Objective and Self-rated Health Differentially Related With 
Personality? 
So far, many studies investigating personality-health associations have either 
focused on self-rated or objective/physician-rated health. However, the strength and 
direction of associations may vary according to whether self-rated or objective health 
is considered. Regarding neuroticism, for instance, it seems that this trait is more 
strongly related with self-rated than with objective health (Israel et al., 2014), and the 
relationship between neuroticism and self-rated health also holds when controlling for 
objective health indicators (Duberstein et al., 2003). As another example, 
agreeableness was found to be a protective factor for later objective health as rated 
by a physician in one study (Chapman et al., 2013), but in another study in which 
health was assessed by self-reports, agreeableness turned out to be a negative 
predictor (Turiano et al., 2012).  
76  
Generally, correlations between indicators of self-rated and objective health 
are far from deterministic (French, Sargent-Cox, & Luszcz, 2012; Pinquart, 2001), 
which implies that self-rated and objective health represent empirically 
distinguishable constructs. The discrepancy between these both health modalities 
seems to increase with advancing age (French et al., 2012; Pinquart, 2001; 
Schnittker, 2005). A reason for this discrepancy could be that different factors predict 
self-rated vs. objective health, and personality might be one of these factors. 
Specifically, self-rated health may be more strongly influenced and predicted by 
personality than objective health. Indeed, most of the studies which examined 
personality effects on later health considered self-rated rather than objective health 
(e.g., Löckenhoff et al., 2012; Magee et al., 2013). In contrast, though evidence 
regarding the effects of health on personality change may still be too scarce for firm 
conclusions, personality may rather change in reaction to objective health conditions 
(such as sensory impairment or chronic disease; Berg & Johansson, 2014; Jokela et 
al., 2014; Lißmann, 2003) than to self-rated health.  
To summarize, we assume that objective health predicts personality change to 
a larger extent than being predicted by personality. In contrast, self-rated health may 
be rather predicted by personality traits than acting as a prospective predictor of 
personality. 
The Personality-Health Interplay in Midlife and in Late Life 
Finally, associations between personality and health may be different at 
different life phases. Health is generally good in middle adulthood (Lachman, 2004; 
Lachman, Teshale, & Agrigoroaei, 2015), whereas old age is usually associated with 
declining health (Jacobs et al., 2012; Morack et al., 2013). This could imply that 
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health affects personality more strongly in late life than in midlife, because as long as 
health is good (i.e., in midlife), it should not have a major impact on personality.  
However, the opposite scenario is also plausible: Considering that health 
decline in old age is rather “normative” (Moser et al., 2013; Sprangers & Schwartz, 
1999) and can be anticipated by aging individuals, health restrictions in old age may 
not represent a severe challenge for personality stability. In contrast, experiencing 
health problems in middle adulthood is a rather non-normative, “off-time” experience, 
because “biologically based changes are typically not as dramatic in midlife as in 
other periods of the lifespan” (Lachman, 2004, p. 325), so that the impact of health 
restrictions on personality could as well be stronger in midlife than in late life.  
Turning to self-rated health, empirical evidence is inconclusive. Some studies 
report stronger associations between personality and self-rated health with 
advancing age (Canada, Stephan, Jaconelli, & Duberstein, 2016; Duberstein et al., 
2003), whereas other studies state the opposite effect (Magee et al., 2013), and still 
other studies found no age trend at all (Morack et al., 2013).  
Given the paucity of empirical findings comparing personality-health 
associations across different age groups in general, and particularly based on 
longitudinal and reciprocal personality-health relations, we will not derive specific 
predictions for this study regarding differences between middle-aged and older adults 
in the personality-health interplay.  
 Research Questions and Expectations 
In this study, we examine 12-year longitudinal relationships between personality traits 
and self-rated as well as objective health in middle-aged and older adults. Our 
predictions are: (1) Generally, associations are reciprocal, i.e., personality is not only 
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a determinant of health, but also predicted by health; (2) self-rated and objective 
(physician-assessed) health are differentially related with personality [for objective 
health, stronger effects are expected for the direction “health ? personality”; for self-
rated health, stronger effects are expected for the direction “personality ? health”]. 
Moreover, we investigate whether cohort membership moderates longitudinal 
personality-health associations as an exploratory research question.  
Methods 
Study Population and Sample Description 
The data of the present study was obtained from the „Interdisciplinary 
Longitudinal Study of Adult Development” (ILSE; Sattler et al., 2015), a German 
population-based study which started in the early 1990’s. The ILSE sample was 
stratified by gender and region (with one subsample drawn in the cities Heidelberg, 
Mannheim, and Ludwigshafen, and the other subsample recruited in Leipzig) and 
consists of two cohorts, a late-life cohort born 1930-1932 and a mid-life cohort born 
1950-1952. The sample was drawn with the help from city registries (for further 
information on the sampling procedures, see Martin & Martin, 2000) and was 
representative for the two regions in which the sampling took place. The overall 
participation rate at the first measurement occasion was 42.3%. The study comprises 
three completed measurement waves (i.e. first wave: 1993-1996, n = 1002, second 
wave: 1997-2000, n = 896, third wave: 2005-2008, n = 769; response rate at third 
wave: total sample 76.7%, late-life cohort 74.84%, mid-life cohort 81.45%). For the 
following analyses, we focused on the entire study interval of 12 years, because we 
were interested in the longitudinal personality-health interplay over an extended time 
period; investigating this interplay over only 4 years may not adequately capture the 
reciprocal associations because very high rank-order stability of personality traits and 
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health across this rather short time interval can be expected. In the following, the first 
measurement occasion will be denoted “T0” and the third measurement occasion 
(which took place 12 years later) will be denoted “TFU” (FU = follow-up). 
Significant group differences favoring the younger cohort were found for 
education, physician-rated health, cognitive abilities and depressive symptoms. Basic 
descriptive data of the sample is shown in Table 3.1. Correlations between study 
variables are shown in Table 3.2.  
To investigate potential effects of selective dropout as well as to compare the 
size of these dropout effects between both cohorts, we computed 2x2 analyses of 
variance with the factors “TFU Participation” (yes vs. no) and “cohort” (mid-life vs. late-
life) as well their interaction. Regarding education, TFU study participants had 
significantly more years of education compared to the dropout sample (F[1, 946] = 
15.64, p < .001), but this difference corresponded to a small effect size (partial η² = 
.016). Similarly, there was a statistically significant interaction effect of cohort and TFU 
study participation (F[1, 946] = 5.14, p = .024), with the difference between dropouts 
and non-dropouts in mean years of education being more pronounced in the mid-life 
cohort compared to the late-life cohort, but the effect size of this interaction effect 
was also small (partial η² = .005). The gender distribution of dropouts vs. non-
dropouts was not significantly different in both cohorts. Regarding depression, there 
was no significant difference between the dropout and the non-dropout sample, and 
the interaction of cohort and TFU study participation did also not reach significance. 
General cognitive abilities were significantly higher in TFU study participants 
compared to the dropouts (F [1, 965] = 34.61, p < .000), though this effect was small 
(partial η² = .16), and there was no significant interaction with cohort. Regarding 
differences in our target variables, both self-rated health (F [1, 948] = 19.07, p < .000, 
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partial η² = .020) and physician-rated health (F [1, 951] = 24.80, p < .000, partial η² = 
.025) were significantly poorer in the dropout sample than in non-dropouts. 
Regarding self-rated health, this difference between dropouts and non-dropouts was 
significantly larger in the late-life sample than in the mid-life sample (F [1, 951] = 
7.42, p = .007, partial η² = 0.008). Remarkably, TFU participants and dropouts did not 
significantly differ in any of the Big Five personality traits, and interaction effects with 
cohort were consistently not significant. 
To summarize, selective dropout occurred regarding some, but not all of the 
study variables, and all of the selective dropout effects that reached statistical 
significance were of small effect size. The mid-life and late-life samples only differed 
in the size of two selective dropout effects and these differences were also of small 
effect size. 
Measures 
Personality traits.  
Personality traits were measured by the German version of the NEO-Five-
Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1992b). 
The NEO-FFI consists of 60 items, i.e. 12 items per personality trait (Cronbach’s 
alphas at both measurement occasions: neuroticism .79/.84, extraversion .71/.77, 
openness .54/.61, agreeableness .62/.71, and conscientiousness .75/.79). 
Health.  
Self-rated health was assessed using a single-item measurement. Participants 
were asked to rate how satisfied they were with their health. The answer options 
ranged from 1 = “very dissatisfied” to 5 = “very satisfied”. Second, physician-rated 
health was based on the judgment of one-to-two trained study geriatricians (for a 
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detailed description, see Miche, Elsässer, Schilling, & Wahl, 2014). Overall the 
clinical health ratings of the physicians were a summary score based on four in-depth 
examinations, namely an anamnesis, a medical check-up, a laboratory blood test and 
a geriatric assessment. Each of the clinical examinations consisted of several 
subtests (such as hearing and vision assessment or blood pressure measurement). 
Geriatricians integrated the results from the four examinations into one rating of each 
study participant’s overall health, with the response scale ranging from 1 = 
“participant exhibits a serious medical condition, which is immediately life-threatening 
– professional health care is urgent” to 6 = “participant exhibits very good health (i.e., 
no chronic disease, no chronic pain, all clinical assessments conducted led to non-
pathological findings)”. 
Covariates.  
In analogy to other studies addressing relationships between personality traits 
and health measures, we controlled for gender and education (Chapman et al., 2013; 
Jaconelli, Stephan, Canada, & Chapman, 2013; Löckenhoff et al., 2012; Sutin et al., 
2013; Turiano et al., 2012). In addition, some previous studies addressing the 
personality-health interplay also controlled for depressive symptoms (e.g., Tolea, 
Ferrucci, et al., 2012) and cognitive abilities (e.g., Israel et al., 2014; Tolea, Costa, et 
al., 2012). As these both variables are meaningfully associated with personality 
(Curtis, Windsor, & Soubelet, 2015; Klein, Kotov, & Bufferd, 2011) and health 
(Schilling, Wahl, & Reidick, 2013; Tolea, Morris, & Galvin, 2015), we decided to 
additionally include baseline depression and cognitive abilities as covariates. 
Education was measured in years (of attending school and university). Depression 
was measured by the 20-item self-rated Zung depression scale (SDS; Zung, 1965; α 
= .42). To control for cognitive abilities, we included a composite score of global 
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cognitive ability based on a set of well-established and widely used cognitive 
measures implemented in the regular data protocol of the ILSE (for a detailed 
description of the cognitive assessment which took place as part of the ILSE study 
and of each single cognitive test that was conducted, see Zimprich, Allemand, & 
Dellenbach, 2009; Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010). Specifically, we included tests of 
information processing speed (Number-Connecting Test and Digit Span Substitution 
task; Oswald & Roth, 1987; Tewes, 1991), crystallized abilities (Information and 
Similarities tests from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; Tewes, 1991), memory 
(Picture Recall, Delayed Picture Recall and Word List Recall from the Nuremberg 
Inventory of Old Age; Oswald & Fleischmann, 1995), and working memory capacity 
(Digit Span Forward and Digit Span Backward from the Nuremberg Inventory of Old 
Age; Oswald & Fleischmann, 1995). The scores of these different cognitive tests 
were z-transformed and then averaged, resulting in a composite score representing 
global cognitive ability.  
Statistical Analyses 
The 12-year longitudinal interplay between personality traits and health indicators as 
well as the role of cohort (midlife vs. late-life) as potential moderator were 
investigated by multi-group cross-lagged panel analyses (Kenny, 2005) which are 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 and can be considered as “best possible option for 
investigating causal directionality when experiments are not available” (Newsom, 
2015).  
For the evaluation of goodness of fit in our models, we relied on established 
recommendations (McDonald & Ho, 2002). Specifically, we took both the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the root mean squared error of approximation 
(RMSEA) into account. A CFI score ≥ .90 or above indicates an acceptable model fit, 
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and scores ≥ .95 indicate a good model fit. RMSEA scores ≤ .08 indicate an 
acceptable model fit, and a good model fit is indicated by RMSEA values ≤ .05 (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). IBM SPSS Statistics 20 and IBM SPSS Amos 22 (Arbuckle, 2013) 
were used for statistical analyses.  
Parameter estimation was done via Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML). With regard to missing data treatment, FIML has been recommended as 
state-of-the art approach, using the full data information available and relying on less 
restrictive “missingness pattern” assumptions compared to approaches such as list-
wise deletion (Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
Regarding model specification, a stepwise approach was chosen by 
successively testing additional restrictions: First, the (unstandardized) autoregressive 
paths of the personality and health indicators, denoted a and b in Figure 3.1, were 
constrained to be equal across groups (i.e., between the midlife and the late-life 
cohort). If this restricted model led to a significant misfit as indicated by the χ² 
difference test, the unrestricted model was accepted. If no significant misfit resulted, 
the cross-sectional personality-health correlations (e and f in Figure 3.1 and both 
cross-lagged paths (c and d in Figure 3.1) were additionally set equal across groups. 
If this “more restricted” model did not reveal a significantly worse fit than the “less 
restricted” model, it was accepted. Otherwise the alternative model (with only 
autocorrelations set equal between groups) was selected.  
Results 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the multi-group cross-lagged panel analyses. 
Goodness-of-fit of all models was very good, with RMSEA scores ranging between 
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.00 and .08 (all RMSEA values not significantly deviating from the cut-off criterion of 
.05) and CFI values ranging between .99 and 1.   
Regarding potential differences between cohorts regarding rank-order 
stabilities, we found that all autocorrelations of the personality traits as well as of the 
health indicators could be set equal across cohorts without a significant loss in model 
fit. Stability coefficients of the Big Five personality traits ranged from .45 to .70, 
indicating high, but not perfect rank-order consistency. The rank-order stability 
estimates for the health indicators were generally lower than the ones of personality, 
ranging between .21 and .49. 
Notably, most cross-lagged paths coefficients could also be set equal between 
both cohorts. Only the cross-lagged paths between neuroticism and self-rated health 
could not be constrained to be equal between groups when controlling for covariates, 
though in the adjusted models these cross-lagged paths were not significant in both 
groups. Therefore, all cross-lagged effects that we describe in the following refer to 
both cohorts. 
Regarding neuroticism, better baseline objective health was significantly 
associated with lower neuroticism 12 years later. This association remained 
significant in the adjusted models. Higher neuroticism was significantly related with 
worse health after 12 years in the unadjusted model, but this association did not 
remain significant when controlling for covariates.   
Higher TFU extraversion was significantly related with better objective health at 
T0; however, this relationship was no longer significant when covariates were taken 
into account. In contrast, higher baseline extraversion was a significant positive 
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predictor of later self-rated health, and this association remained significant in the 
adjusted model.  
Higher openness at T0 was a significant predictor of better objective health 12 
years later, but this effect was no longer significant after controlling for the covariates. 
Moreover, the adjusted cross-lagged relations between openness and self-rated 
health were all not significant. 
Agreeableness at TFU was significantly associated with T0 objective health, 
with better baseline health predicting higher subsequent agreeableness. This 
association remained significant in the adjusted model. Better self-rated health at 
baseline was also associated with higher agreeableness scores after 12 years, but 
this relationship did not remain significant when including the covariates.  
Higher baseline conscientiousness was significantly associated with both 
better objective and self-rated health after 12 years. However, only the relationship 
with self-rated health remained significant when adjusting for the covariates. 
Moreover, better self-rated health at T0 was significantly related with higher 
conscientiousness 12 years later, but this association did not remain significant when 
adjusting for the covariates.  
Regarding the effects of the covariates included, we observed the following 
significant effects (in both cohorts): In the models including neuroticism, gender was 
significantly related to neuroticism (higher neuroticism scores in women). Moreover, 
depression was significantly positively related to T0 and TFU neuroticism as well as to 
TFU physician-rated health and T0 self-rated health. In the models containing 
extraversion, depression was also a significant negative predictor of baseline 
extraversion as well as of T0 and TFU physician-rated health and T0 self-rated health. 
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In the models with openness to experience, education was a significant predictor of 
both baseline and follow-up openness. Moreover, the relationship between 
depression and baseline openness was negative and significant. Depression was 
also significantly related with baseline physician-rated and self-rated health, and 
cognitive abilities were a significant positive predictor of T0 physician rated health. 
Regarding the models with agreeableness, gender was significantly associated with 
baseline agreeableness (higher agreeableness scores in women), and depressive 
symptoms were a significant negative predictor of baseline agreeableness, T0 self-
rated health, and both T0 and TFU physician-rated health. Finally, in the models with 
conscientiousness included, depressive symptoms were a significant negative 
predictor of baseline conscientiousness as well as of baseline physician-rated and 
self-rated health. It thus seems that – also in line with the bivariate correlation pattern 
among the variables (see again Table 3.2) - depression was the covariate with 
strongest and most consistent associations with both personality traits and health 
variables2. 
Discussion 
Our expectation of reciprocal personality-health relationships in the second 
half of life could be confirmed, implying that personality is not only a predictor of 
health as reported in multiple studies and reviews (Friedman & Kern, 2014; Smith & 
MacKenzie, 2006), but may as well be an outcome of personality. Specifically, we 
                                            
2 Following the suggestion of one reviewer, we further investigated the role of the different covariates by first 
including only the demographic variables (gender, education) as covariates before additionally controlling for 
cognitive abilities and depression. Most of the cross-lagged paths that were significant in the unadjusted 
models remained significant when controlling only for the demographic covariates; only the path from baseline 
openness to TFU physician-rated health was no longer significant, and the path from baseline self-rated health to 
TFU agreeableness was slightly above the significance threshold (p = .055). It thus seems that adjusting for 
demographic variables hardly altered the cross-lagged relations between personality and health, whereas 
additional adjustment for cognitive abilities and particularly for depression did.   
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found that better physician-rated health at baseline was significantly associated with 
lower neuroticism and higher agreeableness after 12 years in both cohorts. These 
associations remained significant when controlling for gender, education, depression, 
and cognitive abilities. Meaningful relations between health and later neuroticism 
have also been reported by other studies (Jokela et al., 2014; Lißmann, 2003). Better 
physician-rated health was also significantly related with higher subsequent 
extraversion in both cohorts (for comparable findings, see Berg & Johansson, 2014; 
Jokela et al., 2014; Sutin et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2015), but this association did 
not remain statistically significant after adjusting for covariates. Aspects of physical 
and functional health may thus not be major and robust predictors of change in 
extraversion, which has also been reported by other studies (Mõttus, Johnson, Starr, 
& Deary, 2012). Regarding self-rated health, some associations between T0 self-
rated health and TFU personality (agreeableness and conscientiousness) reached 
significance in both cohorts, but were reduced to non-significance when adjusting for 
covariates. It thus seems that – in line with our assumptions – physician-rated health 
challenges personality stability to a larger extent than self-rated health. Specifically, 
having the objective confirmation that one’s health is poor may worry individuals, 
resulting in an increase in neuroticism. Suffering from poor (objective) health may 
also complicate the maintenance of agreeableness; for instance, realizing that many 
peers are in better health may provoke feelings of envy or hostility. In contrast, 
regarding self-rated health, the mere feeling that one’s health gets poorer may affect 
personality to a lesser extent than having objective evidence via a physician. 
Moreover, given that the relationships between T0 self-rated health and TFU 
agreeableness and conscientiousness did not remain significant when controlling for 
covariates, it seems that the relationship between self-rated health and later 
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personality is – unlike the one between physician-rated health and personality - to 
some extent spurious. Among the covariates, particularly depression may have acted 
as a “common cause” by influencing both self-rated health (Despot Lucanin & 
Lucanin, 2012; Pinquart, 2001; Schnittker, 2005; Spuling, Wurm, Tesch-Römer, & 
Huxhold, 2015) as well as personality change (Klein et al., 2011) over time. Indeed, 
we found that depression was the covariate which exhibited strongest associations 
with both personality traits and health measures, and adjusting only for demographic 
variables attenuated the personality-health cross-lagged relationships to a lesser 
extent than additionally adjusting for depression and cognitive abilities. However, 
more research is needed to investigate the role of potential third variables in the 
personality-health interplay. Some of these third variables may actually be important 
mediators or moderators of personality-health associations. For instance, personality-
health associations have been found to vary according to gender (Chapman, 
Fiscella, Duberstein, Coletta, & Kawachi, 2009) and education (Jaconelli et al., 
2013). The identification of such mediating and moderating factors requires further 
research. 
Our finding of significant associations of objective health with subsequent 
personality may imply that the well-known effect of health on quality of life and well-
being (e.g., Kunzmann, Little, & Smith, 2000) is mediated by personality. That is, 
poorer objective health seems to predict unfavorable personality levels 12 years later 
which could in turn affect well-being. Indeed, previous research has shown that 
personality traits act as meaningful predictors of well-being (Charles, Reynolds, & 
Gatz, 2001; Mroczek & Spiro, 2005; Tauber, Wahl, & Schröder, 2016).    
Considering the opposite paths, from baseline personality to later health, both 
higher baseline openness and conscientiousness were significantly related with 
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better subsequent physician-rated health in both cohorts which is in line with other 
findings (Chapman et al., 2013; Sutin et al., 2013; Tolea, Costa, et al., 2012; Tolea, 
Ferrucci, et al., 2012); however, associations were no longer significant when 
controlling for covariates. In line with our assumption, associations between 
personality and later self-rated health were stronger and more robust compared to 
the associations between personality and later physician-rated health. Specifically, 
higher extraversion and conscientiousness scores at T0 were significantly related with 
better self-rated health 12 years later in both cohorts, and relationships remained 
significant when controlling for covariates. This potentially protective role of both 
extraversion and conscientiousness for self-rated health has also been found in other 
studies (Human et al., 2013; Magee et al., 2013; Sutin et al., 2013; Turiano et al., 
2012) and could be due to social and lifestyle factors (such as health-related 
behaviors; Friedman, Kern, Hampson, & Duckworth, 2014; Shanahan et al., 2014).   
Moreover, in analogy to other reported findings (Human et al., 2013; 
Löckenhoff et al., 2012; Sutin et al., 2013; Turiano et al., 2012), the relationship 
between baseline neuroticism and later self-rated health was also significant in both 
cohorts, with lower neuroticism predicting better health. However, when adjusting for 
covariates, this association did not remain significant.  
Our finding that some personality traits (extraversion and conscientiousness) 
are significant and robust predictors of self-rated health may have meaningful 
implications regarding interventions. As self-rated health is a meaningful marker of 
functioning, significantly predicting mortality above and beyond objective health 
(DeSalvo, Bloser, Reynolds, He, & Muntner, 2006; Idler & Benyamini, 1997), 
interventions to improve self-rated health could be beneficial for “distal” health 
outcomes such as longevity. Specifically, following our findings, interventions 
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targeting at personality change could also affect self-rated health, and there is indeed 
first promising evidence for the changeability of personality traits via interventions 
(Chapman, Hampson, & Clarkin, 2014; Magidson, Roberts, Collado-Rodriguez, & 
Lejuez, 2014). Moreover, an interesting question for future research could be 
whether the well-established effect of personality on mortality (e.g., Turiano, 
Chapman, Gruenewald, & Mroczek, 2015) is mediated by self-rated health.   
Notably, unlike other studies (Canada et al., 2016; Duberstein et al., 2003; 
Magee et al., 2013), we found weak evidence for the moderating role of age/birth 
cohort regarding longitudinal personality-health associations: apart from the 
covariate-adjusted model relating neuroticism with later self-rated health, all other 
associations between personality and health could be set equal between groups. 
However, most of the research reporting age differences in personality-health 
associations has been based on cross-sectional study designs. It may thus be that 
when considered longitudinally, associations between personality and health do not 
(or only negligibly) change from middle adulthood to old age. Alternatively, the 
cohorts in our study may still have been too similar regarding mean age, with our 
late-life sample representing “young-old age” rather than “old-old age”; the age-
associated increase in associations between self-rated health and personality, as 
reported in other studies (Duberstein et al., 2003), may not occur before the onset of 
very old age. Further research including additional age cohorts (particularly old-old 
samples) will be needed to investigate this assumption.   
The present study has several strengths, including the extensive 
measurement of physician-rated health, the long measurement interval, and the low 
attrition rate. However, there are also some limitations. First, the present study 
investigated longitudinal interrelationships of (admittedly) broad concepts of 
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personality and health. Investigations of associations between personality trait sub-
facets (such as impulsiveness; Sutin et al., 2013) - or even single personality scale 
items (Murray & Booth, 2015) - and health, and more refined, multidimensional 
assessments of health based on additional health indicators might offer deeper, 
“micro-level” insights in the personality-health interplay.  
Second, possible mechanisms underlying the personality-health interplay were 
not investigated in the present study. For instance, it seems that the combination of 
(daily) stress (Neupert, Mroczek, & Spiro, 2008; Rickenbach, Almeida, Seeman, & 
Lachman, 2014) or sensory impairment (Gaynes, Shah, Leurgans, & Bennett, 2013; 
Wettstein, Kuźma, Wahl, & Heyl, 2016) with high neuroticism is particularly 
detrimental for cognitive functioning. Whether this is also true for health in general 
(and not only for cognitive health), remains unclear and an important issue for future 
investigations. Moreover, personality-health associations may be stronger when 
considering trait interactions (e.g., Tolea, Terracciano, Milaneschi, Metter, & Ferrucci, 
2012; Turiano, Mroczek, Moynihan, & Chapman, 2013) instead of isolated, single 
personality traits only which requires further research. Further, associations of 
personality traits with health (or health-related behaviors; Armon & Toker, 2013) 
could be nonlinear which also deserves future empirical investigation. 
Third, regarding measurement issues, self-rated health was measured by one 
single item only so that psychometric properties of this variable may be questionable. 
However, single-item measures of self-rated health are commonly utilized, 
“parsimonious” and exhibit consistent and meaningful correlates with objective health 
parameters (DeSalvo et al., 2006; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Pinquart, 2001). 
Therefore such single-item measures can be considered as valid. Fourth, the issue of 
sample selectivity must be addressed. Overall, participants who continuously take 
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part and remain in longitudinal studies are healthier (Vestergaard et al., 2015), which 
can be subsumed under the term “healthy volunteer bias”. Similarly, personality traits 
have been found to be systematically related with both study participation (Walsh & 
Nash, 1978) and missing data patterns (Jerant, Chapman, Duberstein, & Franks, 
2009). This, of course, limits the extent to which the results can be transferred to the 
general population. Regarding the ILSE-sample, there is a similar selective dropout 
dynamic as in other longitudinal studies (Sattler et al., 2015), but the very low attrition 
rates which we observed for both sample cohorts may counteract this problem to 
some extent. We also want to point out that our selectivity analyses suggest that 
there is no evidence for selective dropout with regard to personality traits in our 
sample. Regarding health and the covariates, some selective dropout effects were 
significant, but all of them were of minor effect size. This is also true regarding 
differences between cohorts regarding the size of selective dropout effects. 
Therefore, it is rather unlikely that our findings were severely biased due to selective 
dropout. Moreover, sample selectivity might have contributed to lower inter-individual 
variability in health and personality traits so that the results of the present study may 
have actually underestimated the ”true” size of personality-health associations. Fifth, 
it is important to point out that our rather restrictive control for covariates, which has 
resulted in several attenuated (and no longer significant) longitudinal relationships, 
may to some extent reflect an “over-adjustment”. For instance, depressive symptoms 
are (both conceptually and empirically) closely related to personality traits such as 
neuroticism (Klein et al., 2011; Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2009), and depressive 
symptoms and cognitive abilities (i.e. as a marker for mild cognitive impairment (MCI) 
or dementia) were also an explicit criterion for the rating of participants’ health by the 
study physicians. Therefore, the “true” strength of associations between personality 
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and health may lie somewhere in between the coefficients from the unadjusted 
models and the ones estimated in the adjusted models. Sixth, the availability of more 
measurement occasions would have been desirable. According to Kenny (2005), the 
unfolding of processes and their interrelations over time may not be sufficiently 
informed (and described) based on two assessments only (see also Johnson et al., 
2012). Therefore, future studies including more measurement occasions are 
necessary.   
Our study provides important conclusions regarding the general longitudinal 
interplay of personality and health in the second half of life. First, our findings suggest 
that the longitudinal relationships of personality and health are indeed reciprocal. 
Second, we found objective health to be a stronger predictor of later personality, 
particularly of neuroticism and agreeableness, than self-rated health. Third, 
considering the opposite direction, personality (particularly extraversion and 
conscientiousness) seems to be more strongly related to later self-rated than to 
objective health. Fourth and finally, no differences regarding the interrelationships 
according to cohort were found, implying that longitudinal associations are similar in 
midlife and early late life.  
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Table 3.1  
Publication 2: Sample Description. 
Variable  
N 
Total  
1,002 
Midlife Cohort 
502 
Late-Life Cohort 
500 
Statistical Testa  
Age (M, SD) 53.50 (9.40) 44.17 (0.91) 62.87 (0.89)  
 
Gender (%)  
 Male  
 
520 (51.9%) 
 
260 (51.8%) 
 
260 (52.0%) 
 
?² (1) = 0.00, ns 
Education (years) 
(M, SD) 
13.48 (2.70) 14.07 (2.50) 12.89 (2.76) t (980) = -7.05, p < .001 
Self-rated health1 
(M, SD) 
3.74 (0.97) 3.77 (0.96) 3.72 (0.98) t (983) = -0.83, ns 
Physician-rated1 
health (M, SD) 
4.63 (0.84) 4.73 (0.78) 4.53 (0.88) t (966.19) = -4.71, p < .001 
Depression (M, SD) 1.67 (0.36) 1.61 (0.35) 1.73 (0.36) t (984) = 5.31, p < .000 
Cognitive Abilities (M, SD) -0.00 (0.60) 0.19 (0.54) -0.20 (0.59) t (1000) = -10.96, p < .000 
 
Note. 
a t-test for continuous variables and Chi-square-test for categorical variables. ns = not significant. 
1 Higher values indicate better health. 
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Table 3.2 
Publication 2: Overview of Bi-Variate Relations Between Study Variables, Separately For Each Cohort. 
 
C3 \ C5 
 
Sex 
 
 
Educ 
 
 
SDS 
 
 
Cog 
 
 
S-R 
Health 
T0 
 
S-R 
Health 
TFU 
 
P-R 
Health 
T0 
 
P-R 
Health 
TFU 
 
N 
T0 
 
N 
TFU 
 
E 
T0 
 
E 
TFU 
 
O 
T0 
 
O 
TFU 
 
A 
T0 
 
A 
TFU 
 
C 
T0 
 
C 
TFU 
Sex 1 -.066 .222** -.003 -.064 -.055 .022 -.075 .291** .271** .003 -.033 -.041 .001 .179** .100 -.032 .014 
Educ -.270** 1 -.162** .476** .084 .212** .240** .231** -.088 -.227** -.062 .075 .333** .324** .001 .040 -.058 -.004 
SDS .230** -.219** 1 -.239** -.371** -.251** -.188** -.221** .665** .517** -.289** -.266** -.185** -.120* -.185** -.199** -.258** -.231** 
Cog -.001 .474** -.219** 1 .099* .101 .193** .186** -.133** -.122* .045 .017 .330** .225** .091* .037 -.068 -.071 
S-R Health T0 .008 .068 -.371** .103* 1 .338** .378** .207** -.243** -.203** .240** .152** .123** .090 .138** .144** .121** .160** 
S-R Health TFU -.046 .059 -.304** .120* .506** 1 .332** .407** -.240** -.421** .238** .319** .098 .165** .025 .103 .124* .175** 
P-R Health T0 .007 .061 -.294** .204** .488** .431** 1 .409** -.129** -.179** .090* .138* .095* .120* .050 .103 .006 .110* 
P-R Health TFU .077 .028 -.183** .210** .239** .430** .383** 1 -.115* -.267** .070 .064 .117* .134* .003 .075 .121* .103 
N T0 .266** -.274** .666** -.216** -.269** -.155** -.182** -.092 1 .624** -.331** -.266** -.088* -.030 -.202** -.133* -.328** -.197** 
NTFU .195** -.241** .593** -.354** -.249** -.319** -.183** -.163** .651** 1 -.139* -.406** -.119* -.149** -.112* -.230** -.256** -.303** 
E T0 -.027 .032 -.348** .016 .165** .158** .112* .070 -.361** -.300** 1 .618** .148** .078 .129** .038 .277** .185** 
E TFU -.017 .028 -.365** .093 .170** .269** .138* .156** -.361** -.445** .697** 1 .135* .188** .091 .168** .214** .325** 
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Table 3.2 – Continued  
 
C3 \ C5 
 
Sex 
 
 
Educ 
 
 
SDS 
 
 
Cog 
 
 
S-R 
Health 
T0 
 
S-R 
Health 
TFU 
 
P-R 
Health 
T0 
 
P-R 
Health 
TFU 
 
N 
T0 
 
N 
TFU 
 
E 
T0 
 
E 
TFU 
 
O 
T0 
 
O 
TFU 
 
A 
T0 
 
A 
TFU 
 
C 
T0 
 
C 
TFU 
O T0 -.023 .317** -.195** .207** .102* .138* .034 .092 -.169** -.221** .204** .246** 1 .628** .038 .066 -.106* -.113* 
O TFU -.025 .405** -.162** .338** .109 .174** .013 .134* -.181** -.284** .171** .236** .630** 1 -.016 .087 -.127* -.033 
A T0 .160** .063 -.145** .075 .029 .073 .036 .126* -.240** -.168** .240** .238** .041 .001 1 .612** .246** .190** 
A TFU .274** -.022 -.133* .079 .096 .153** .111 .181** -.126* -.275** .194** .234** .017 .048 .627** 1 .173** .245** 
C T0 -.117** .026 -.279** .032 .072 .124* .154** .104 -.322** -.266** .240** .234** -.012 -.036 .241** .135* 1 .615** 
C TFU -.073 .040 -.247** .052 .099 .202** .128* .077 -.252** -.397** .285** .391** .052 .073 .164** .371** .627** 1 
Note. Values below the diagonal represent Pearson-correlation coefficients of the late-life cohort (C3), and values above the 
diagonal represent correlations of the mid-life cohort (C5). Educ = education, SDS = Zung self-rated depression scale, Cog = 
composite of global cognitive ability, S-R Health = self-rated health, P-R Health = physician-rated health, N = neuroticism, E = 
extraversion, O = openness, A = agreeableness, C = conscientiousness, T0 = baseline measurement occasion, TFU = follow-up 
measurement occasion. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
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Table 3.3 
Publication 2: Overview of Standardized Path Coefficients in Cross-Lagged Models. 
Person-
ality   
Trait 
Model Health Domain Correlation 
Health T0 – 
Personality T0 
___________
C3/C5 
Correlation 
Health TFU – 
Personality 
TFU 
C3/C5 
Autoregressive 
Path 
(Personality 
T0?TFU) 
C3/C5 
Autoregressive 
Path (Health 
T0?TFU)  
____________
_C3/C5 
Health T0 ? 
Personality TFU          
. 
____________
_C3/C5 
Personality 
T0 ? 
Health TFU               
. 
C3/C5 
Neuro-
ticism 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
Physician-R. Health1 
Physician-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 1 
Self-R. Health 
-.15***/-.16*** a 
.00/.00 a 
-.26***/-.26*** a 
-.04/.00 
-.18***/-.18*** a 
-.14***/-.13*** a 
-.35***/-.28*** a 
-.24***/-.34*** 
.64***/.61*** a 
.46***/.44*** a 
.64***/.61*** a 
.46***/.45*** a 
.41***/.42*** a 
.37***/.37*** a 
.45***/.40*** a 
.43***/.36*** a 
-.12***/-.10*** a 
-.06*/-.06* a 
-.06/-.06 a 
.01/-.02 
-.05/-.06 a 
.06/.07 a 
-.09*/-.09* a 
.08/-.13 
Extra-
version 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
Physician-R. Health 
Physician-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
.09**/.10** a 
.03/.04 a 
.20***/.21*** a 
.10**/.10** a 
.10*/.10* a 
.08*/.08* a 
.25***/.20*** a 
.23***/.18*** a 
.67**/.64*** a 
.63***/.62*** a 
.67***/.65*** a 
.63***/.63*** a 
.42***/.42*** a 
.37***/.37*** a 
.46***/.39*** a 
.41***/.35*** a 
.07*/.06* a 
.05/.04 a 
.02/.02 a 
-.03/-.03 a 
.03/.03 a 
.00/.00 a 
.11**/.10** a 
.09*/.08* a 
Openness No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
Physician-R. Health 
Physician-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
.07*/.07* a 
-.03/-.03 a 
.12***/.11*** a 
.04/.04 a 
.10*/.09* a 
.08/.07 a 
.14**/.09** a 
.13**/.08** a 
.65***/.61*** a 
.58***/.56*** a 
.64***/.61*** a 
.57***/.56*** a 
.42***/.42*** a 
.37***/.37*** a 
.48***/.41*** a 
.42***/.36*** a 
.03/.02 a 
.01/.01 a 
.02/.01 a 
.01/.01 a 
.07*/.09* a 
.03/.04 a 
.06/.06 a 
.02/.02 a 
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Table 3.3 – Continued 
Person-
ality 
Trait 
Model Health Domain Correlation 
Health T0 – 
Personality T0 
____________
__C3/C5 
Correlation 
Health TFU – 
Personality TFU 
____________
_C3/C5 
Autoregressive 
Path 
(Personality 
T0?TFU) 
C3/C5 
Autoregressive 
Path (Health 
T0?TFU)  
____________
_C3/C5 
Health T0 ? 
Personality 
TFU 
___________
__C3/C5 
Personality 
T0 ? Health 
TFU 
__________
C3/C5 
Agree-
ableness 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
Physician-R. Health 
Physician-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
.04/.05 a 
-.01/-.01 a 
.09**/.09** a 
.02/.02 a 
.10*/.10* a 
.08/.08 a 
.11*/.09* a 
.10*/.08* a 
.62***/.61*** a 
.58***/.60*** a 
.62***/.61*** a 
.59***/.60*** 
.42***/.42*** a 
.37***/.,37*** a 
.49***/.41*** a 
.43***/.36*** a 
.10**/.08** a 
.08*/.07* a 
.07*/.06* a 
.03/.03 a 
.02/.02 a 
-.01/-.01 a 
.01/.01 a 
.00/.00 a 
Cons-
cien-
tious-
ness 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
No Covariates 
Adjusted2 
Physician-R. Health 
Physician-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
Self-R. Health 
.08*/.08* a 
.03/.03 a 
.10**/.10** a 
.00/.00 a 
.02/.02 a 
.00/.00 a 
.14**/.11** a 
.12**/.10** a 
.64***/.63*** a 
.60***/.62*** a 
.62***/.63*** a 
.61***/.62*** a 
.39***/.42*** a 
.36***/.37*** a 
.49***/.41*** a 
.43***/.36*** a 
.07/.06 a 
.05/.04 a 
.08*/.07* a 
.05/.04 a 
.06*/.07* a 
.06/.07 a 
.09*/.08* a 
.08*/.07* a 
 Note. C3 = Cohort born 1930/32, C5 = Cohort born 1950/52. a unstandardized paths set equal between cohorts.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
1 Higher values indicate better physician-rated health and higher health satisfaction. 
2 Covariates: gender, education, depression, general cognition score 
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Figure 3.1. Illustration of a cross-lagged panel design of a personality trait and a 
health indicator at two measurement occasions lying 12 years apart (here: T0 and 
TFU).  
Note. The two measurement occasion are abbreviated with T0 and TFU, respectively.  
a and b: auto-regression path coefficients; c and d: cross-lagged path coefficients; e 
and f: concurrent correlations at both measurement occasions. 
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Abstract 
Research on relationships between personality and cognitive abilities has so far 
resulted in inconsistent findings regarding the strength of the associations. Moreover, 
relationships have rarely been compared longitudinally and bi-directionally between 
midlife vs. late-life cohorts by considering different personality traits as well as 
multiple cognitive domains over a long-term follow-up period. We hypothesize that 
the interplay between the “Big Five” personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) and cognitive 
abilities (information processing speed, crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence) 
may change from midlife to old age due to differential dynamics of cognitive decline 
across the adult lifespan and due to age-associated changes in cognitive and 
personality. We used data from the German Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of 
Adult Development (ILSE study; n = 1,002). Participants were either born in 1950/52 
(midlife sample, n = 502) or in 1930/32 (late-life sample, n = 500) and followed up for 
up to 12 years. Based on bi-variate latent change score regression models (adjusted 
for gender, education, self-rated and physician-rated health), we observed that, apart 
from very few exceptions, the intervariable cross-lagged associations between 
personality traits and cognitive abilities were generally similar between cohorts. 
Moreover, in case of neuroticism, extraversion, and openness, the effects of 
cognitive abilities on change in personality were stronger than the reversed effects. 
Our findings thus suggest that the so far predominant perspective of personality in 
middle adulthood and late-life as a predictor, rather than as an outcome, of cognitive 
abilities needs more differentiation and reconsideration. 
Key words: Big Five, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, information 
processing speed, midlife, old age   
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Introduction 
Previous research has shown that both personality and cognitive abilities are 
subject to change across the entire life span (McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & 
Woodcock, 2002; Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). Moreover, in every life phase, 
substantial interindividual differences in intraindividual trajectories of personality 
(Allemand, Zimprich, & Hertzog, 2007; Allemand, Zimprich, & Martin, 2008; Wagner, 
Ram, Smith, & Gerstorf, 2015) and cognitive functioning (Martin & Zimprich, 2005; 
Mungas et al., 2010; Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010) have been observed. Given this 
life-long interindividual heterogeneity in both personality change and cognitive 
trajectories, it is an important empirical question if and to what extent both constructs 
drive each other’s changes. Previous, mostly cross-sectional studies report 
meaningful, small-to-moderate relationships between both domains (Schaie, Willis, & 
Caskie, 2004; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011; von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013), with 
openness (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; DeYoung, 2014; DeYoung, Peterson, & 
Higgins, 2005) and conscientiousness (e.g., Curtis, Windsor, & Soubelet, 2015) 
representing the personality traits most closely associated with cognitive abilities. 
However, findings on the personality-cognition interplay have been inconsistent and 
heterogeneous regarding the strength of the relationship (Ackerman & Heggestad, 
1997; Curtis et al., 2015) with some studies reporting weak effects (e.g., Schaie et 
al., 2004), whereas others found moderate or even strong associations (e.g., 
Terracciano et al., 2014). 
Moreover, associations between personality traits and cognitive indicators 
have rarely been investigated longitudinally, bi-directionally, and across longer time 
spans over the second half of life. Personality traits and cognitive abilities may 
mutually influence each other. Further, given that change dynamics in personality 
104  
and cognitive abilities may be different in middle adulthood compared to old age 
(Lachman, 2004; Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Willis & Schaie, 1999) and that middle 
adulthood and old age represent distinct life phases, also regarding functional and 
developmental domains (and their changes) beyond personality and cognitive ability 
(such as health, subjective well-being, daily ecologies, and social relationships; 
Lachman, 2004; Lachman, Teshale, & Agrigoroaei, 2015), longitudinal personality-
cognition relationships may as a consequence change from midlife into old age.  
Longitudinal Personality-Cognition Associations: A Bi-Directional and 
Cohort-Differential Perspective 
In the current study, we aim to investigate the potential bi-directional nature of the 
long-term relationship between personality traits and different cognitive abilities 
across 12 years in two subsamples: a “midlife cohort,” aged 43-46 years at baseline 
(T1) and a “late-life cohort” (61-65 years at T1). In terms of personality, this study’s 
focus is on the “Big Five” personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1995; McCrae & John, 
1992), i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness. These traits are well established (Goldberg, 1990; Matthews, 
Deary, & Whiteman, 2013) and frequently used in personality research. Regarding 
cognitive abilities, we focus on three established subdomains of cognitive functioning, 
namely information processing speed, fluid/mechanic abilities (e.g., spatial abilities), 
and crystallized/pragmatic abilities (e.g., general knowledge). These three broad 
domains of cognitive abilities are influenced by different determinants (Lövdén, 
Ghisletta, & Lindenberger, 2004) and – when considered on a mean-level 
perspective - unfold differentially across the adult lifespan (Baltes, Lindenberger, & 
Staudinger, 2006; Martin & Zimprich, 2005; McArdle et al., 2002; Park & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2009): Decline in processing speed and fluid intelligence begins already in 
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early adulthood (Salthouse, 2009), whereas crystallized abilities are largely 
maintained into old age and do not decline before the 8th or 9th life decade (Singer, 
Verhaeghen, Ghisletta, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 2003).  
The Big Five Personality Traits and Cognitive Abilities: A Bi-Directional View 
The mechanisms underlying the personality-cognition relationships may vary 
according to the specific personality trait considered: First, neuroticism, which is 
characterized by higher general distress proneness, greater exposure to stressors, 
and less efficient strategies to cope with stressors (Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999), 
seems to exacerbate the well-known detrimental effect of stress on the brain and on 
(everyday) cognitive functioning (Neupert, Mroczek, & Spiro, 2008; Sapolsky, 1996). 
Indeed higher distress proneness as a specific component of neuroticism has been 
found to be associated with steeper cognitive decline among older adults (Wilson et 
al., 2005). Second, individuals who are more extraverted may experience lower 
arousal when working on cognitive tasks, which may result in better cognitive 
performance (Curtis et al., 2015). Extraversion also seems to be associated with 
higher positive affect (Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Isaacowitz & Smith, 2003) 
that in turn may facilitate certain cognitive processes (Fredrickson, 2004; Graham & 
Lachman, 2014; Isen, 2008). Third, individuals with higher levels of openness to 
experience (and also extraversion) tend to seek more cognitive and social stimulation 
and “environmental enrichment,” which in turn contributes to better cognitive, 
particularly fluid abilities (Ziegler, Cengia, Mussel, & Gerstorf, 2015; Ziegler, Danay, 
Heene, Asendorpf, & Bühner, 2012). This is also in line with intellectual investment 
theories which postulate that so-called “investment traits” (such as openness to 
experience) have a strong influence on how and to what extent people invest their 
time and resources in their intellect (e.g., von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013). More 
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generally, the principle of “gene-environment correlation” (Scarr & McCartney, 1983) 
states that an individual’s genotype – which also contains aspects of personality 
(e.g., openness) – influences the exposure to environmental conditions (such as the 
amount of cognitive stimulation). Among the Big Five personality traits, particularly 
openness to experience seems to be a primarily “cognitive trait” (DeYoung et al., 
2005) determining the extent to which individuals seek cognitive stimulation 
(DeYoung, 2014; Ziegler et al., 2015; Ziegler et al., 2012). Fourth, higher 
conscientiousness may be related to better cognitive functioning via prudent health 
behaviors (Booth-Kewley & Vickers, 1994) and stronger adherence to cognitively 
stimulating activities. Regarding agreeableness, Curtis et al. (2015) summarize that 
“current research provides no conceptual rationale for a relationship between 
agreeableness and cognitive ability” (p. 60). 
However, there are good reasons to assume the opposite direction, i.e., 
considering cognitive abilities as predictors of personality (e.g., Mueller, Wagner, & 
Gerstorf, in press), although this direction has so far been insufficiently investigated 
(and mostly with a focus on personality change after the onset of cognitive 
impairment such as Alzheimer’s disease; Robins Wahlin & Byrne, 2011; Talassi, 
Cipriani, Bianchetti, & Trabucchi, 2007). For example, experiencing cognitive decline 
may be distressing and cause anxiety, thus contribute to an increase in neuroticism. 
However, research findings on awareness of cognitive changes are inconsistent, with 
some studies reporting weak associations between changes in self-reports of 
everyday functions and objective cognitive changes (e.g., Tucker-Drob, 2011), 
whereas others reported meaningful relationships between changes in cognitive 
functions and cognitive complaints (e.g., Martin & Zimprich, 2003). There may thus at 
least be a subgroup of individuals who perceive changes in their cognitive abilities, 
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and this awareness may be a risk factor for an increase in neuroticism. Individuals 
may also withdraw from social activities when cognitive decline sets in due to 
embarrassment and/or feeling too challenged by social interactions, resulting in a 
decline in extraversion. Moreover, according to the “environmental success 
hypothesis” (Ziegler et al., 2015), (fluid) cognitive abilities affect the development of 
openness to experience; individuals with higher cognitive abilities may be more 
successful in solving new problems, which may motivate them to continue seeking 
new situations and challenges, as expressed by an increase in openness to 
experience. Translating this hypothesis into later life, the onset of cognitive decline 
may result in less “environmental success” and, consequently, a lower willingness to 
seek out new, challenging experiences, which may lead to a decrease in openness. 
Cognitive decline may also affect agreeableness. Specifically agreeableness may 
increase as a compensatory mechanism when cognitive resources decrease. 
Individuals with fewer cognitive resources may ensure social support by being more 
agreeable, whereas such support is less needed as long as cognitive functioning is 
intact (Baker & Bichsel, 2006). Finally, regarding conscientiousness, maintenance of 
conscientious behavior (e.g., being dutiful and reliable; keeping appointments) 
throughout life may require cognitive resources. Therefore, cognitive decline may 
precede decline in conscientiousness. 
Long-Term Personality-Cognition Relationships Across the Adult 
Lifespan: Does the Strength of Relationships Change from Midlife into Old 
Age? 
We investigate and compare the longitudinal personality-cognition 
associations in a midlife and a late-life cohort. Longitudinal relationships between 
personality traits and cognitive abilities in midlife and late life may be different 
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because both life phases are characterized by a different trade-off of resources and 
challenges (Lachman, 2004; Lachman et al., 2015; Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Willis & 
Schaie, 1999). More specifically, plasticity of both personality and cognition changes 
from midlife to old age, which may have meaningful implications for the bi-directional 
longitudinal personality-cognition relationship patterns in both cohorts.  
Predicting Midlife vs. Late-Life Cognitive Changes by Personality 
Across the life span, rank-order stability of cognitive abilities in general is 
subject to dramatic age related changes (Tucker-Drob & Briley, 2014). Specifically, 
rank-order stability of cognitive performance increases from middle adulthood to old 
age (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2015; Hertzog & Schaie, 1986), with this increasing 
phenotypic stability of cognitive abilities over the life span being primarily driven by 
genetic factors (Tucker-Drob & Briley, 2014). Moreover, not only cognitive abilities 
per se, but also cognitive plasticity underlies lifelong changes and is reduced in old 
age as compared to younger ages (Baltes & Kliegl, 1992; Noack, Lövdén, 
Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 2013; Schmiedek, Lövdén, & Lindenberger, 2010). This 
age-associated decline in cognitive plasticity may have important implications for the 
dynamics of personality-cognition relationships. Specifically, given that cognitive 
abilities are less modifiable by interventions and other environmental or lifestyle 
factors in old age, and given the described age-associated increase in stability of 
cognitive abilities, the impact of personality on cognitive changes may become 
smaller in old age compared to middle adulthood.  
Regarding general evidence on predictive effects of personality on cognitive 
abilities over the second half of life, previous studies have reported significant 
relationships of neuroticism (Graham & Lachman, 2012; Luchetti, Terracciano, 
Stephan, & Sutin, 2015), extraversion (T. Y. Arbuckle, Maag, Pushkar, & Chaikelson, 
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1998; Gold et al., 1995), openness (Graham & Lachman, 2012; Luchetti et al., 2015), 
and conscientiousness (Curtis et al., 2015; Luchetti et al., 2015) with cognitive 
change. However, there is a lack of studies comparing middle-aged and older adults 
regarding the strength of effects of personality on cognitive change. Some cross-
sectional studies have found that extraversion, openness (Baker & Bichsel, 2006) 
and neuroticism (Graham & Lachman, 2014) are more closely related with cognitive 
abilities in younger adults compared to older adults. Moreover, several longitudinal 
findings suggest that the effects of personality traits on late-life cognitive 
development (or maybe even on cognitive development at all adult ages; Salthouse, 
2014) are weak (Jelicic et al., 2003; Sharp, Reynolds, Pedersen, & Gatz, 2010; von 
Stumm & Deary, 2013; Waggel et al., 2015).  
Predicting Midlife vs. Late-Life Personality Changes by Cognitive Ability 
The development of personality stability and plasticity with chronological age 
may considerably deviate from the prototypical age trajectory of cognitive plasticity. 
For instance, Baltes, Lindenberger, and Staudinger (2006) state that “in contrast to 
the domain of cognitive functioning where resources in old age are depleted to 
maintain a certain level of functioning, the resource situation for life span growth in 
self and personality might present itself more favorably” (p. 625). Indeed, although 
stability of personality first increases from childhood into adulthood, which has been 
subsumed and described as “cumulative continuity principle of personality 
development” (Roberts & Caspi, 2003) and which is primarily due to environmental 
mechanisms (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2014), it seems that the maximum rank-order 
stability of personality is reached in middle adulthood (or between midlife and old 
age). Stated differently, midlife represents a life phase in which the overwhelming 
majority of individuals reveals no reliable personality change (Allemand, Gomez, & 
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Jackson, 2010). After middle adulthood, (slight) decreases in rank-order stability of 
personality have been observed (Roberts & Del Vecchio, 2000; Specht, Egloff, & 
Schmukle, 2011; Terracciano, McCrae, & Costa Jr, 2010; Wortman, Lucas, & 
Donnellan, 2012), particularly in old and very old age (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; 
Mõttus, Johnson, & Deary, 2012). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the 
heritability of personality decreases with age (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2015). 
Therefore, given the lower rank-order personality stability in old age than in midlife, 
personality plasticity and interindividual heterogeneity in intraindividual personality 
changes seem to be even higher in late life compared to middle adulthood.  
This age-differential personality plasticity may have implications for how 
cognitive abilities shape intraindividual personality changes in both life phases: Given 
the peak of personality rank-order stability in midlife (Roberts & Del Vecchio, 2000; 
Specht et al., 2011; Terracciano et al., 2010; Wortman et al., 2012), the influence of 
cognitive function on long-term personality changes in this life phase may be weaker. 
However, in late life, when personality plasticity increases and its rank-order stability 
decreases, the influence of cognitive abilities on personality changes may become 
stronger.  
In contrast to middle adulthood, late-life is characterized by steeper mean-
level decline in cognitive functions—particularly in processing speed and fluid abilities 
(Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2003; McArdle et al., 2002; Singh-
Manoux et al., 2012). Importantly, there is evidence for substantial interindividual 
heterogeneity around this mean-level decline trend (Martin & Zimprich, 2003; 
Mungas et al., 2010; Zimprich, Martin, & Kliegel, 2003). Therefore, those affected by 
steeper cognitive late-life decline may as a consequence experience more 
pronounced personality changes, e.g., an increase in neuroticism due to worries 
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about one’s decreasing cognitive resources (or even "dementia worry"; Kessler, 
Bowen, Baer, Froelich, & Wahl, 2012) or a decrease in openness and extraversion 
because new experiences may get too cognitively challenging (Ziegler et al., 2015). 
In addition, late-life cognitive decline may also challenge the maintenance of 
conscientiousness (e.g., increasing forgetfulness may lead to declines in 
conscientiousness). As pointed out before, the agreeableness-cognition interplay has 
not been well understood so far, both conceptually and empirically (Curtis et al., 
2015). However, late-life cognitive decline may, on the on hand, be troubling and 
lead to a decline in agreeableness. On the other hand, however, individuals may 
become more agreeable when their cognitive resources become limited which might 
reflect some kind of compensation (Baker & Bichsel, 2006).  
Regarding empirical evidence, some findings indeed suggest that cognitive 
ability acts a meaningful predictor of late-life personality changes: Changes in 
neuroticism (Wettstein, Kuźma, Wahl, & Heyl, 2016), extraversion (Wagner et al., 
2015), openness (von Stumm & Deary, 2013)— a personality trait that may be, 
according to first empirical evidence, even modifiable in older adults by means of 
cognitive interventions (Jackson, Hill, Payne, Roberts, & Stine-Morrow, 2012)— and 
conscientiousness (Mõttus, Johnson, Starr, & Deary, 2012) were found to be 
significantly predicted by cognitive abilities. Other longitudinal studies report coupled 
late-life changes in neuroticism and cognitive abilities (Waggel et al., 2015; Wahl, 
Schmitt, Danner, & Coppin, 2010), but these studies did not investigate whether 
neuroticism or cognitive ability is the driving force for these coupled changes. 
The Role of Information Processing Speed, Fluid vs. Crystallized Intelligence 
So far, only few studies have compared multiple cognitive abilities when 
investigating personality-cognition associations (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; 
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Baker & Bichsel, 2006; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011; Ziegler et al., 2015; Ziegler et 
al., 2012), and most of them have been cross-sectional in nature. These previous 
findings are very inconsistent. As pointed out, information processing speed, fluid 
and crystallized cognitive abilities follow different lifespan trajectories and are driven 
by different factors. This may have implications for the longitudinal personality-
cognition interplay.  
Specifically, crystallized abilities are more closely related to socio-biographical 
and culture-based markers (e.g., income, education), whereas both information 
processing speed and fluid intelligence are generally more strongly driven by genetic, 
physiological, and biological influences (e.g., sensory and sensorimotor functioning; 
Anstey & Smith, 1999; Baltes et al., 2007; Hofer, Berg, & Era, 2003; Lövdén et al., 
2004). Therefore, the impact of personality traits on cognitive changes may be 
stronger for crystallized abilities than for fluid abilities and information processing 
speed. However, personality traits may also represent genetic and biological 
influences and therefore be meaningfully related to components of processing speed 
and crystallized abilities as well. This highlights the need to further investigate the 
role of different cognitive components in the personality-cognition interplay. 
Regarding the opposite direction from cognitive abilities to personality change, 
personality trajectories may be more strongly driven by processing speed and fluid 
rather than by crystallized abilities. Both information processing speed and fluid 
abilities show more pronounced and more noticeable decline, beginning already in 
early adulthood, whereas crystallized abilities usually peak in midlife (Hartshorne & 
Germine, 2015; Lachman, 2004; Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Willis & Schaie, 1999; 
Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010) and remain stable into very old age (Finkel et al., 2003; 
Singer et al., 2003). Therefore, interindividual differences in the extent of late-life fluid 
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ability decline may be associated with differential personality changes. Moreover, 
with respect to previous research, most studies demonstrating associations between 
cognitive abilities and personality changes were indeed based on fluid ability 
indicators (Jackson et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2015; Wahl et al., 2010; Ziegler et al., 
2015). 
Research Aims and Hypotheses 
To summarize existing empirical research, findings on the interplay between 
personality and cognitive abilities are scarce and mostly inconclusive. Most studies 
were either based on cross-sectional study designs and/or lacked a direct 
comparison of different adult age cohorts. In addition, there is a clear lack of studies 
considering the longitudinal relationship between personality and cognition bi-
directionally. Finally, only few studies included multiple cognitive measures and all 
Big Five personality traits. As outlined above, we assume that the associations 
between personality traits and cognitive abilities are reciprocal, i.e. personality acts 
both as a predictor and as an outcome of cognitive abilities. Moreover, we examine 
whether the longitudinal personality-cognition interplay differs between a midlife and 
a late-life cohort. Given that conceptually as well based on previous research no 
clear prediction can be derived, we argue that such a comparison is primarily an 
empirical and exploratory question. We also explore whether different cognitive 
abilities (information processing speed, crystallized abilities, fluid abilities) are 
differentially related to personality over time. 
Methods 
Study Population and Sample Description 
 Our study is based on data from the Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of 
Adult Development (ILSE; Sattler et al., 2015; Schmitt, Wahl, & Kruse, 2008). Three 
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measurement waves have been completed so far (T1: 1993-1996, n = 1002; T2: 
1997-2000, n = 896; T3: 2005-2008, n = 789), with high longitudinal response rate 
(78.7% of the initial sample took part at T3). Participants were followed up for a mean 
of 11.7 years (SD = 1.69 years). The ILSE sample consists of two age cohorts: the 
late-life cohort (born in 1930-1932) and the midlife cohort (1950-1952). Sample 
characteristics, study design, and attrition analyses have been described elsewhere 
(e.g., Allemand et al., 2007; Miche, Elsässer, Schilling, & Wahl, 2014; Sattler et al., 
2015; Schmitt et al., 2008). Comprehensive cognitive assessments were 
administered in both cohorts at T1 and T3, whereas several cognitive tests were not 
were not assessed in the midlife cohort at T2. Therefore, we focused on T1 and T3 in 
our analyses, also because we were primarily interested in the long-term relationship 
between personality and cognitive abilities over the full measurement interval 
spanning 12 years; differential changes in personality and cognition may not fully 
unfold over a shorter time interval of only 4 years due to the generally high rank-order 
consistency of both constructs.  
Sample characteristics are provided in Table 4.1. Mean baseline age was 44.2 years 
(SD = 0.91 years) in the midlife cohort and 62.9 years (SD = 0.89 years) in the late-
life cohort. The gender distribution was not significantly different in both cohorts, with 
about 52% of the study participants being male in both subsamples. There was a 
significant cohort difference in education; the mean difference in years of education 
amounted to slightly more than 1 year and was in favor of the younger cohort. Mean 
self- and physician-ratings of health were overall positive in both cohorts, and only 
physician-ratings were significantly different between groups (again in favor of the 
midlife cohort). Regarding the cognitive indicators, the midlife cohort scored 
significantly higher than the late life cohort on all tests of processing speed (Number-
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Connecting 1 and 2, Digit Symbol Substitution task) as well as on all fluid ability tests 
(Picture Completion, Block Design, Spatial Ability), whereas, not surprisingly, no 
significant group difference was observed for the tests of crystallized cognitive ability, 
namely Information and Similarities. With the exception of conscientiousness, cohorts 
were also significantly different regarding personality traits, with the late-life cohort 
scoring higher on neuroticism and agreeableness than the midlife cohort, whereas 
middle-aged older adults had higher extraversion and openness scores than older 
adults. Most effect sizes of cohort differences were ,according to the classification by 
Cohen (1992), small. Group differences that were of medium (or close-to-medium) 
effect size were found for education as well as the cognitive tests Number-
Connecting 1 and 2, Block Design and Spatial Ability. The only difference 
corresponding to a large effect was observed for Digit Symbol Substitution.  
Measures 
Cognitive abilities. Following previous empirical and conceptual differentiations 
between cognitive domains based on ILSE data (e.g., Zimprich, Allemand, & 
Dellenbach, 2009; Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010), our analyses included multiple 
indicators of three broader cognitive constructs, namely information processing 
speed, crystallized intelligence, and fluid intelligence. This distinction was also 
empirically supported based on an exploratory factor analysis (using Promax 
rotation). Information processing speed as a key marker of cognitive aging (Finkel, 
Reynolds, McArdle, & Pedersen, 2007; Lindenberger, Mayr, & Kliegl, 1993; 
Salthouse, 1996) was assessed with the Number-Connecting Test (with two 
subtests; Oswald & Roth, 1987) and the Digit Symbol Substitution task, a subtest of 
the revised Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R; Tewes, 1991). Crystallized 
intelligence was assessed with the Information and Similarities tests of the WAIS-R 
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(Tewes, 1991). Fluid intelligence was assessed based on the tests Picture 
Completion and Block Design, both subtests from the WAIS-R (Tewes, 1991), and on 
the Spatial Ability test from the LPS (Horn, 1983). 
Personality. Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, 
and Conscientiousness were assessed with the NEO-Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-
FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992b; internal consistencies [Cronbach’s α] at T1 and T3: 
neuroticism: .79, .84; extraversion: .71; .76; openness to experience: .54, .56; 
agreeableness: .62; .71; conscientiousness: .75, .75).  
Covariates. In the following analyses, we controlled for sociodemographic variables 
(gender and education in years), and – given that health is meaningfully related with 
both personality traits (e.g., Friedman & Kern, 2014) and cognitive abilities (e.g., 
Deary, Weiss, & Batty, 2010)– also for self-rated and physician-rated health. Both 
age cohorts also differed significantly regarding education and physician-rated health 
(Table 4.1), which was another reason to include these variables as covariates in 
order to rule out that potential age cohort differences in personality-cognition 
associations are due to differences in education or health.  
Self-rated health was assessed by a single item, with a Likert-scale response format 
ranging from 1 = very good to 6 = very poor. Physician-rated health (i.e., health of 
study participants rated by the examining study physician based on an in-depth 
clinical examination; see Miche et al., 2014 for further details) was also assessed 
using a single item with the same response format.  
Statistical Analyses 
To investigate the extent to which cognitive abilities predict change in 
personality traits and vice versa, we computed multi-group bi-variate latent change 
regression models (McArdle, 2009). In short, these models allow for the specification 
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of a latent change component in personality and cognitive abilities (as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1), and this change component varies across individuals. By specifying 
intervariable cross-lagged parameters (a and b in Figure 4.1; we adopt the term 
“intervariable cross-lagged parameter” from Gerstorf, Lövdén, Röcke, Smith, & 
Lindenberger, 2007), predictive effects of baseline personality on cognitive change 
from T1 to T3 and effects of baseline cognitive ability on personality change from T1 
to T3 can be estimated. To ensure strong measurement invariance, we constrained 
factor loadings and intercepts of each latent construct to be equal both across groups 
and measurement occasions.  
We controlled for gender, education, self-rated and physician-rated health in 
all analyses by (1) specifying correlations between these covariates and baseline 
personality as well as baseline cognitive ability, and (2) adding paths from these 
covariates to the latent change components of both constructs. To test whether the 
age cohorts differed regarding the size of intervariable cross-lagged relations, we set 
these paths (a and b in Figure 4.1) equal between groups in an additional step. If no 
significant misfit (in terms of the χ² difference test) resulted, the model with cross-
lagged associations constrained to be equal between groups was chosen. If the χ² 
difference test indicated a significant misfit, the less restricted model with group-
specific cross-lagged relationships was selected. Statistical analyses were conducted 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 22 and IBM SPSS Amos 22 (J. L. Arbuckle, 2013).       
Results 
Results of the multi-group bi-variate latent change regression models, without 
covariates as well as adjusted for covariates (gender, education, self-rated and 
physician-rated health), are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. In the following, we will 
focus on findings based on the adjusted models. Model fit of all specified models was 
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acceptable to good, with all CFI values but one (which was .893) above the threshold 
of .90 and all RMSEA scores close to or below the cut-off criterion of .05 (McDonald 
& Ho, 2002; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003).  
Predicting Change in Personality Traits and Cognitive Abilities 
The intervariable cross-lagged parameters could be set equal between cohorts in all 
but three models. All three models with group-differential cross-lagged associations 
contained information processing speed: Regarding the association between 
neuroticism and information processing speed, the negative path from speed to 
neuroticism change reached significance in the late-life cohort only. Associations 
between agreeableness and information processing speed also varied by group, with 
a significant positive association between agreeableness and speed change in the 
late-life cohort, whereas in the midlife cohort, speed was a significant negative 
predictor of change in agreeableness (i.e., higher baseline speed was associated 
with a steeper decline/less increase in agreeableness over time). Finally, 
conscientiousness was a significant and positive predictor of change in information 
processing speed in the midlife cohort only. 
All other intervariable cross-lagged associations could be set equal between 
groups without a significant deterioration of model fit and were as follows: For 
neuroticism and extraversion, crystallized and fluid abilities were significant 
predictors of changes in these personality traits (with negative effects for neuroticism 
and positive effects for extraversion), whereas the opposite effects from neuroticism 
and extraversion to changes in fluid and crystallized abilities were consistently 
nonsignificant. Regarding openness to experience, all three cognitive domains were 
significant positive predictors of change in openness. Baseline openness was, in 
turn, also significantly and positively related to change in crystallized abilities. The 
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model relating openness with crystallized abilities was thus the only one where both 
intervariable cross-lagged parameters reached significance. Baseline agreeableness 
was a significant negative predictor of change in fluid abilities, which was – apart 
from the group-differential agreeableness-speed interplay described above – the only 
significant cross-lagged relation between this personality trait and the cognitive 
components. Finally, T1 conscientiousness was a significant predictor of change in 
crystallized abilities, and this association was negative. 
Effects of the Covariates 
The effects of the covariates on the change scores of the different personality 
traits and cognitive components are summarized in Table 4.4. In short, more years of 
education were significantly associated with less increase (or stronger decrease) in 
neuroticism and stronger increase (or less decrease) in agreeableness only in the 
midlife cohort. The effects of physician-rated health on change in both extraversion 
and openness were consistently significant in the late-life cohort only (with better 
health being associated with stronger increase/less decrease in extraversion, but 
with less increase/stronger decrease in openness). This is also true regarding the 
effect of self-rated health on change in openness, with better self-rated health being 
associated with stronger increase or less decrease in openness. Significant gender 
differences occurred in the late-life cohort only with regard to openness and 
agreeableness (i.e., stronger increase/less decrease in both traits for women 
compared to men). With the exception of several significant effects of physician-rated 
health, the covariates included were not significantly related to change in any of the 
three cognitive components.  
Finally, for the latent change scores of the personality traits and the cognitive 
domains squared multiple correlation (SMC) coefficients, which correspond to R² 
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values (amount of variance accounted for by predictors) used in regression models, 
were computed and are shown in Table 4.5. Not surprisingly, SMC coefficients were 
in most cases considerably higher in the adjusted models compared to the 
unadjusted models, which underlines the role of included covariates (particularly 
health; see Table 4.4) as meaningful predictors of change in both personality and 
cognitive ability. Moreover, the SMC coefficients of the change scores of the Big Five 
personality traits (of both the unadjusted and the adjusted models) were generally 
higher than the ones of the change scores of the cognitive domains. This pattern 
seems to be due to (1) stronger predictive effects of baseline cognitive abilities on 
personality change than vice versa, and (2) stronger predictive effects of the 
covariates on personality change than on change in cognitive abilities. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we investigated the interplay of the Big Five personality traits 
(neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness) and cognitive abilities (processing speed, crystallized 
intelligence, and fluid intelligence) over 12 years in a midlife (aged between 43 and 
46 years at baseline) and a late-life cohort (61-65 years). We also investigated 
whether the longitudinal relationship between personality and cognitive abilities 
changes from midlife to late life, due to changes in cognitive plasticity and personality 
plasticity over the adult life span. In the following, we will discuss our major findings 
against the background of our theoretical assumptions and of existing research 
findings. We will also point out limitations of this study, as well as directions for future 
research. 
Predicting 12-Year Personality Change by Cognitive Abilities 
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As pointed out, research has so far mostly considered personality as a 
predictor, rather than as an outcome, of cognitive abilities. However, we found 
significant effects of different cognitive domains on change in neuroticism, 
extraversion and openness, whereas regarding the opposite direction, only 
crystallized abilities were significantly related to change in openness. It thus seems 
that – at least when considering these three of the Big Five personality traits – 
cognitive abilities are consistent predictors of personality change. This is in line with 
previous findings reporting meaningful longitudinal neuroticism-cognition 
interrelations (Waggel et al., 2015; Wahl et al., 2010; Wettstein et al., 2016) as well 
as with findings of significant predictive effects of cognitive abilities on changes in 
openness (von Stumm & Deary, 2013). Moreover, according to Jackson et al. (2012), 
openness can even be modified through cognitive intervention. 
With regard to possible explanations for the meaningful effects of baseline 
cognitive abilities on personality change, the distressing experience of cognitive 
decline or lower cognitive abilities may upset individuals and cause feelings of 
anxiety, resulting in higher neuroticism scores over time. Neuroticism has also been 
found to be one of the personality traits most susceptible to change when cognitive 
impairments such as Alzheimer’s disease set in (Robins Wahlin & Byrne, 2011). 
Lower cognitive abilities may also endanger an individual’s motivation to seek out 
novel (cognitive) stimulation and experiences because these may become too 
demanding so that – also in line with the “environmental success” hypothesis (Ziegler 
et al., 2015; Ziegler et al., 2012).- a decline in openness to experience results. In 
addition, lower cognitive functioning may also affect individuals’ willingness to 
engage in (cognitively challenging) social interactions and thus lead to a decrease in 
extraversion. 
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Evidence for cohort differences in longitudinal cognition-personality 
associations was generally limited. However, one of the effects of cognitive abilities 
on personality change that varied by group was the path from baseline information 
processing speed to neuroticism change which reached significance in the late-life 
cohort only. Late-life cognitive abilities and changes have been found to be highly 
heterogeneous (Mungas et al., 2010; Zimprich & Martin, 2002), and those who have 
been affected by particularly steep declines in processing speed even before T1 
may, as a consequence, have revealed an increase in neuroticism over time, 
possibly due to the distressing experience of cognitive decline. In contrast, only very 
few middle-aged older adults are affected by a strong decline in processing speed, 
as such accelerated declines do not usually set in before late-life (Finkel et al., 2003; 
McArdle et al., 2002; Singh-Manoux et al., 2012), which may explain why this effect 
of baseline speed on neuroticism change did not reach significance in the midlife 
cohort. 
The other effect of cognitive ability on personality change that varied according 
to group was the effect of baseline speed on change in agreeableness, which was 
negative and significant in the midlife cohort only. This negative association may 
seem surprising at first glance; however, Baker and Bichsel (2006), for instance, 
reported a similar finding, speculating that ”those who are highly intelligent are more 
independent” and that “non-reliance on others means Agreeableness is less 
necessary” (p. 9). It is thus possible that those with lower processing speed scores at 
T1 exhibit a stronger increase in agreeableness over 12 years because they are – 
due to their lower cognitive resources – more dependent on others, and higher 
agreeableness may help them to get the amount of social support needed. It is, 
however, difficult to explain why this association emerged in the midlife, rather than 
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the late-life sample. Experiencing impairments in processing speed already in midlife 
is rather non-normative and perhaps particularly alerting, so that individuals affected 
by such impairments may be particularly “reactive” in terms of personality change 
(i.e., an increase in agreeableness). This is, however, highly speculative, and further 
research is therefore needed to replicate and account for our finding. 
None of the other associations from baseline cognitive abilities to change in 
agreeableness reached significance, which is in line with other work stating that 
agreeableness is not reliably associated with cognitive abilities (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997; Curtis et al., 2015; Luchetti et al., 2015; Mueller, Wagner, 
Drewelies, et al., 2016). Moreover, none of the cognitive abilities was significantly 
related to change in conscientiousness. However, conscientiousness trajectories 
have been found to be affected by cognitive ability in very old age (Mõttus, Johnson, 
Starr, et al., 2012). Therefore, perhaps change in conscientiousness may only be 
meaningfully predicted by cognitive abilities in advanced old age when all intelligence 
components, namely processing speed, fluid and crystallized abilities, exhibit 
declining trends. However, more research—including also very old cohorts in addition 
to midlife and late-life samples—is needed to investigate this possible explanation 
and the impact of fluid vs. crystallized vs. combined ability decline on personality 
change. 
As pointed out, we only found limited evidence for a cohort moderation of the 
associations between cognitive abilities and personality change, with only two paths 
varying as a function of age cohort. Moderating effects of chronological age on the 
personality-cognition interplay have been reported before (e.g., Baker & Bichsel, 
2006; Graham & Lachman, 2014; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011; Sutin et al., 2011), 
but most of these findings were based on other age groups than the ones included in 
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this study and on cross-sectional study designs, comparing personality-cognition 
associations only at one point in time. More research, ideally comprising multiple 
adult age groups, is therefore needed to further address the role of cohort in the 
longitudinal personality-cognition interplay. 
Our finding that cognitive abilities meaningfully predict personality change, 
particularly in neuroticism, extraversion, and openness, could also have relevant 
implications for future interventions: Undesirable personality changes potentially 
caused by low cognitive abilities or cognitive decline, such as increases in 
neuroticism and decreases in extraversion and openness—which may in the long run 
also be detrimental for well-being and quality of life (Charles et al., 2001; Isaacowitz 
& Smith, 2003; Mroczek & Spiro, 2005; Tauber, Wahl, & Schröder, 2016)—could 
possibly be prevented or at least attenuated by interventions aiming to improve or 
maintain cognitive functioning. Indeed, as pointed out before, there is promising 
evidence that cognitive training can also result in “positive” personality developments 
(such as an increase in openness; Jackson et al., 2012). Obviously, for future 
interventions we first need to make sure if cognitive abilities indeed affect personality 
change by further ruling out the existence of confounding variables beyond the ones 
included in this study (gender, education, self-rated health, physician-rated health). 
Specifically, we acknowledge that caution is warranted with regard to causal 
interpretation of our findings: Even if cognitive abilities precede changes in 
personality traits (and vice versa), there may be additional confounding influences 
that were not controlled for and which may have caused spurious associations. A 
stronger test of causality can only be achieved by experimental study designs, e.g. 
by investigating whether intervention-based cognitive change is also accompanied by 
change in personality traits (Jackson et al., 2012).  
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Furthermore, designing such interventions to change personality also requires 
that we know more about how and via which mechanisms cognitive abilities lead to 
personality change. Specifically, personality and cognitive abilities may be related 
with each other via multiple mediating and moderating factors (Curtis et al., 2015). 
Among the numerous candidates for mediation and moderation are health behaviors 
(Booth-Kewley & Vickers, 1994), coping strategies (Gunthert et al., 1999), (daily and 
chronic) stress exposure (Neupert et al., 2008), sensory impairment status (Gaynes, 
Shah, Leurgans, & Bennett, 2013; Wettstein et al., 2016), or environmental 
enrichment factors (Ziegler et al., 2015; Ziegler et al., 2012). Moreover, health – 
which we considered as a covariate in this study – may as well act as a mediator of 
personality-intelligence associations. Future research should investigate these 
potentially mediating and moderating factors of the personality-cognition interplay, 
particularly regarding the so-far theoretically and empirically neglected pathway from 
cognitive abilities to personality change. In addition, a more differentiated picture may 
emerge when distinguishing between subfacets of the different personality traits 
(Zimprich et al., 2009). 
Predicting 12-Year Cognitive Change by Personality Traits 
Only some of the prospective relationships between prior personality and later 
cognitive changes were significant. Neither neuroticism nor extraversion reached 
significance as predictors of change in any of the cognitive outcomes, which is in line 
with several prior findings (Jelicic et al., 2003; Salthouse, 2014; Waggel et al., 2015). 
Particularly extraversion may indeed not belong to the major personality 
predictors of cognitive change (Curtis et al., 2015). Generally, it is still unclear how 
extraversion is related to cognitive abilities. Cross-sectionally, some studies report 
positive associations (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Pearman, 2009), whereas other 
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found negative relationships (ForsterLee, 2007; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011), and 
still others observed both positive and negative correlations, depending on the age 
group and on the cognitive domain considered (Baker & Bichsel, 2006). 
Longitudinally, lower extraversion may be associated with less steep cognitive 
decline over time (T. Y. Arbuckle et al., 1998; Chapman et al., 2012; Gold et al., 
1995; Luchetti et al., 2015), but again, other studies did not find meaningful 
associations between extraversion and cognitive change (Graham & Lachman, 2012; 
Salthouse, 2014). A possible explanation for this explanation could be that the 
association between extraversion and cognitive trajectories is nonlinear, with 
moderate extraversion scores being most protective against cognitive decline 
(Crowe, Andel, Pedersen, Fratiglioni, & Gatz, 2006); however, more research is 
needed to investigate this assumption.      
Openness was positively related to change in crystallized abilities in both 
cohorts. Positive relationships between openness and cognitive changes were also 
reported by other studies (Duberstein et al., 2011; Graham & Lachman, 2012; 
Hogan, Staff, Bunting, Deary, & Whalley, 2012; Luchetti et al., 2015; Sutin et al., 
2011; Ziegler et al., 2015). The underlying mediating mechanism may be cognitive 
stimulation or “environmental enrichment” (Ziegler et al., 2015; Ziegler et al., 2012), 
which individuals high in openness seek out more frequently and more intensively 
than individuals with lower openness scores. Moreover, openness may, according to 
investment theories, represent a typical “investment trait” (von Stumm & Ackerman, 
2013) and influence the extent to which individuals invest in their intellect (DeYoung, 
2014; DeYoung et al., 2005). 
Notably, only crystallized ability change was predicted by openness, but not 
change in fluid ability and processing speed, which is in line with other findings 
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demonstrating that fluid vs. crystallized abilities have different correlates and 
predictors (Lövdén et al., 2004). The effect of openness on change in crystallized 
abilities that was significant in both cohorts may also have important practical 
implications: Openness has been shown to be modifiable via interventions, also at 
older ages (Jackson et al., 2012; Mühlig-Versen, Bowen, & Staudinger, 2012), just 
like personality in general (Chapman, Hampson, & Clarkin, 2014; Magidson, Roberts, 
Collado-Rodriguez, & Lejuez, 2014), and such interventions to promote openness 
may in the long run also contribute to maintaining or even improving crystallized 
cognitive abilities. 
Agreeableness was a significant positive predictor of change in information 
processing speed in the late-life cohort only. In contrast, this trait was a significant 
negative predictor of change in fluid abilities in both cohorts. This pattern implies that 
the direction of associations between personality traits and cognitive abilities may 
considerably vary according to the cognitive domain considered (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997; Baker & Bichsel, 2006; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011; Ziegler et al., 
2015; Ziegler et al., 2012) and underlines the importance to take the 
multidimensionality of cognitive abilities into account when investigating the 
personality-cognition interplay. Adopting again the tentative explanation by Baker and 
Bichsel (2006), higher agreeableness may precede steeper decline in fluid abilities 
because agreeableness may represent a strategy to cope with lower cognitive 
abilities by relying more on others. 
Conscientiousness was significantly positively related to change in processing 
speed in the midlife cohort only. This finding is in line with other studies reporting a 
protective effect of conscientiousness on cognitive change and on risk of cognitive 
impairment (Curtis et al., 2015; Duberstein et al., 2011; Luchetti et al., 2015). Higher 
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conscientiousness is associated with more prudent health behaviors (Booth-Kewley 
& Vickers, 1994), which may in turn contribute to less decline in processing speed 
scores in the midlife sample. On the contrary, less conscientious individuals may be 
less willing and motivated to invest in their cognitive resources, resulting in stronger 
processing speed decline for these persons. However, in the late-life sample 
plasticity of cognitive ability, and particularly of processing speed, may already be 
considerably compromised (Brehmer, Li, Müller, von Oertzen, & Lindenberger, 2007; 
Dahlin, Nyberg, Bäckman, & Neely, 2008; Noack et al., 2013; Schmiedek et al., 
2010). This may explain why the effect of baseline conscientiousness on change in 
speed did not reach significance in this age group.  
Similarly to agreeableness, there was also a shift in sign for 
conscientiousness, which was significantly negatively related to change in 
crystallized abilities in both cohorts, which means that - in contrast to the described 
positive effect of conscientiousness on speed change in the midlife cohort - higher 
conscientiousness was associated with steeper decline (or smaller increase) in 
crystallized abilities. As already pointed out, negative relationships between 
conscientiousness and cognitive abilities have been found before (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997; Moutafi, Furnham, & Paltiel, 2004; Pearman, 2009; Soubelet, 
2011; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011). The intelligence compensation hypothesis as 
one possible explanation suggests that individuals may compensate for lower 
cognitive ability by becoming more conscientious in order to reach similar levels of 
achievement compared to cognitively more able individuals (who may not, or to a 
lesser degree, have to rely on conscientiousness for performing well). However, the 
reason for such negative relations remains controversial. According to Murray, 
Johnson, McGue, and Iacono (2014), selected samples have caused these negative 
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associations in prior research. Regarding our sample, those individuals with highest 
conscientiousness scores at T1 may have also been the ones scoring highest on 
crystallized ability tests at T1 so that – due to such a ceiling effect – they could not 
further improve regarding their test scores, whereas others with lower 
conscientiousness scores could. Future research is needed to further address the 
relationship between conscientiousness and crystallized abilities and its underlying 
mechanisms.  
Our finding that the direction of the relationship between prior 
conscientiousness and processing speed change in the midlife sample deviates from 
the direction of the respective conscientiousness-crystallized ability association again 
underlines the importance of considering multiple aspects of cognitive abilities when 
analyzing the personality-cognition interplay. This is in line with previous research 
that has shown that different cognitive domains are differentially related to personality 
traits (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Baker & Bichsel, 2006; Ziegler et al., 2015). 
This is not the first study reporting rather weak effects of personality on 
cognitive changes, particularly in late life (Jelicic et al., 2003; Salthouse, 2014; Sharp 
et al., 2010; Waggel et al., 2015). Other factors such as health (or sensory abilities; 
Lin et al., 2013) may be more important determinants of late-life cognitive 
development than personality characteristics. Indeed, when reporting our results, we 
focused on the models adjusted for covariates (gender, education, subjective health, 
physician-rated health) which may explain why many of the intervariable cross-
lagged personality-cognition associations (and particularly the ones from baseline 
personality to 12-year cognitive change) were not significant: The personality-
cognition interplay may to some extent be spurious and driven by a “common cause”. 
Among the included covariates, particularly health may be such a common cause as 
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it was the strongest and most consistent predictor of changes in both personality and 
cognitive abilities. Importantly, this is only true for physician-rated health, as 
subjective health was not meaningfully related to change in any cognitive domain and 
also less consistently associated with personality change than physician-rated health 
(which is in line with other findings, e.g. Wettstein, Tauber, Wahl, & Frankenberg, in 
press). The important role of (objective) health and certain diseases for cognitive 
development has been reported previously (Anstey, 2016; Anstey & Christensen, 
2000; Spiro & Brady, 2011). Moreover, some recent studies have shown that health 
acts as a meaningful predictor of personality change (Jokela, Hakulinen, Singh-
Manoux, & Kivimäki, 2014; Mueller et al., 2016; Sutin, Zonderman, Ferrucci, & 
Terracciano, 2013; Wagner et al., 2015). However, the role of health as a “common 
cause” of both personality and cognitive changes in midlife and late-life requires 
further research. 
Moreover, personality may play a more important role as predictor of cognitive 
trajectories in very old age (Chapman et al., 2012; Mõttus, Johnson, Starr, et al., 
2012). Wilson et al., (2015), for example, found that terminal decline in cognitive 
abilities in the last years of life was predicted by conscientiousness, whereas pre-
terminal cognitive changes were not. Personality may also be a more important 
predictor of pathological cognitive changes such as mild cognitive impairment and 
dementia (Duberstein et al., 2011; Johansson et al., 2014; Kuźma, Sattler, Toro, 
Schönknecht, & Schröder, 2011; Low, Harrison, & Lackersteen, 2013; Terracciano et 
al., 2014). Specifically, conscientiousness seems to be a protective factor with regard 
to late-life cognitive health (Low et al., 2013; Terracciano et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 
2015; Wilson, Schneider, Arnold, Bienias, & Bennett, 2007), whereas neuroticism, 
and particularly its subcomponent distress proneness (Wilson et al., 2003; Wilson, 
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Schneider, Boyle, et al., 2007), has been found to be risk factor for mild cognitive 
impairment and Alzheimer disease.  
Another possible explanation for the weak effects of personality traits on 12-
year cognitive changes is that personality unfolds its effects on cognitive abilities only 
in combination with other genetic, personal, or contextual factors. Many examples for 
such interactive effects of personality with other factors on cognitive abilities and 
cognitive development exist, such as the interaction effect of neuroticism with daily 
stress on everyday memory failures (Neupert et al., 2008); the interaction effect of 
the apolipoprotein E (ApoE) e-4 allele with neuroticism (and extraversion) on 
cognitive functioning and Alzheimer’s disease (Dar-Nimrod, Chapman, Franks, et al., 
2012; Dar-Nimrod, Chapman, Robbins, et al., 2012); the interaction between 
neuroticism, openness to experience, and depression regarding older adults’ 
neuropsychological functioning (Ayotte, Potter, Williams, Steffens, & Bosworth, 
2009); or the combined effect of neuroticism and sensory impairment on cognitive 
abilities and cognitive decline (Gaynes et al., 2013; Wettstein et al., 2016). Another 
moderating factor is lifestyle: neuroticism has been found to be a risk factor for 
dementia only in individuals with an inactive or socially isolated lifestyle (Wang et al., 
2009), and effects of a cognitive enrichment intervention on cognition have been 
found to be moderated by openness (Stine-Morrow et al., 2014). Further factors that 
may moderate personality-cognition associations are demographic indicators such as 
gender (ForsterLee, 2007; Pearman, 2009) or education (Soubelet, 2011; Sutin et al., 
2011). Moreover, it may be the specific constellation of certain personality traits, e.g., 
of neuroticism and extraversion, that is prospectively associated with cognitive 
outcomes, instead of isolated single personality traits only (Crowe et al., 2006; 
Johansson et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2009).       
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Finally, as pointed out before, some of the effects of personality on cognitive 
development may be nonlinear in nature (Crowe et al., 2006) and may need even 
more than 12 years to unfold. Following the assumption made by Anstey (2014) that 
“mid-life is a time when cognitive reserve is built” (p. 5), the contribution of midlife or 
(even earlier) personality phenotypes for cognitive reserve as well as the beneficial 
effects of cognitive reserve itself may not be immediately observable, but rather 
several decades later, when individuals reach old and very old age. Specifically, 
Crowe et al. (2006) found that neuroticism and extraversion prospectively predicted 
risk of cognitive impairment 25 years later. Similarly, Johansson et al. (2014) 
reported that midlife personality in women was significantly related to risk of 
Alzheimer’s disease 38 years later. Substantial long-term relations in the opposite 
direction have also been found, e.g., with childhood intelligence predicting late-life 
emotional stability (Gow, Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 2005). Therefore, future studies 
should consider operationalizing even wider time spans than the 12 years 
investigated in this study and including more than two measurement occasions, 
because two assessments may not be sufficient to capture and describe meaningful 
patterns of aging as well as the unfolding of processes and their interrelation over 
time (Johnson et al., 2012; Kenny, 2005). 
Study Limitations 
This study has several limitations. Notably, personality is related to study 
participation, typically resulting in a volunteer/selection bias (Walsh & Nash, 1978), 
as well as to study dropout and missing data patterns (Jerant, Chapman, Duberstein, 
& Franks, 2009). This is also true for cognitive abilities, with study participants usually 
scoring higher on cognitive tests than the general population, particularly in samples 
of old and very old adults (Vestergaard et al., 2015). However, as the primary goal of 
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this study was not to describe levels and changes of personality and cognitive 
abilities in middle adulthood and old age, but rather to investigate the longitudinal 
personality-cognition interface in both cohorts, we are confident that our findings 
were not severely biased by sample selectivity and selective study dropout. Rather, 
selective dropout may have contributed to a restricted range in our target variables of 
personality and cognitive abilities, so that the longitudinal associations between both 
domains may actually have been underestimated in this study. Moreover, the dropout 
rate over 12 years was quite low in this study (i.e., 78.7% of the initial sample took 
part at T3).   
Moreover, regarding measurement issues, self-rated health was measured 
only by one item. However, apart from enabling a “parsimonious” and quick 
assessment, single-item measures of subjective health have been found to exhibit 
high validity and to have consistent and meaningful correlates (DeSalvo, Bloser, 
Reynolds, He, & Muntner, 2006; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Pinquart, 2001). Another 
limitation is that the internal consistency of openness to experience was rather low. 
However, openness was measured using an established assessment instrument, 
namely the NEO-Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992b).  
Regarding the effect sizes of the intervariable cross-lagged personality-
cognition parameters, many of them can indeed be considered small (according to 
Cohen, 1992). However, they refer to a considerable long-term interval 
encompassing 12 years. Moreover, we found also several parameter estimates 
which were < .30 and thus of medium effect size, and two estimates (namely, 
processing speed ? neuroticism change in the late-life cohort, and crystallized 
abilities ? openness in the midlife cohort) were even close to the cutoff value of .50 
and can therefore be considered as strong effects. As pointed out, stronger effects of 
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personality on cognitive development may be observed when considering incidence 
of cognitive impairments (such as mild cognitive impairment or dementia; Archer et 
al., 2009; Crowe et al., 2006; Duberstein et al., 2011; Kuźma et al., 2011; Low et al., 
2013; Terracciano et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2015) instead of focusing on 
“normal”/healthy cognitive aging as we did in this study. However, we focused on 
healthy cognitive aging because early old age and particularly midlife are 
characterized by rather low prevalence rates of cognitive impairment. These 
pathological cognitive developments thus affect a very small minority of these 
individuals only, whereas many more individuals are affected by non-pathological 
cognitive changes over 12 years. 
Finally, as already pointed out, the personality-cognition interplay may reveal 
stronger mutual associations in very old age. However, only two adult age cohorts, 
representing midlife and early-old age, were available in this study. More research 
focusing on personality-cognition interrelations in multiple cohorts, including also 
advanced old, age is needed. Moreover, comparing two different age groups in this 
study, the few personality-cognition associations we found to be different between 
groups may be either due to cohort or age effects (or both). Assessing and 
comparing several birth cohorts across long time periods, ideally from 
childhood/young adulthood into very old age, could be an approach to disentangle 
cohort and age effects in future investigations.     
Conclusion 
To summarize, this study is, to our knowledge, the first to compare long-term 
personality-cognition associations in two different adult cohorts based on all Big Five 
personality traits and a comprehensive set of cognitive indicators. For neuroticism, 
extraversion and openness, we found stronger relationships between baseline 
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cognitive abilities and personality change than vice versa. We also observed that the 
intervariable cross-lagged associations between personality traits and cognitive 
abilities were generally very similar in middle-aged and older adults suggesting 
stability of the longitudinal personality-cognition interplay over the second half of life. 
Our findings challenge the so far predominant view of personality in middle adulthood 
and late-life as solely a predictor, rather than as an outcome, of cognitive abilities by 
demonstrating that cognitive abilities seem to play a particular role for personality 
change in middle adulthood and late life. 
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Table 4.1  
Publication 3: Sample Description (T1) of the Midlife Cohort (n = 502) and of the Late-Life Cohort (n =500) 
Variable  
 
N 
 
Total  
 
1,002 
Midlife Cohort 
 
502  
(Mage: 44.17 years,  
SD =0.91) 
Late-Life Cohort 
 
500 
(Mage: 62.87 years,  
SD =0.89) 
Statistical Testa 
 
 
Effect Size 
(Cohen’s d/ϕ) 
 
Gender (% Male) 520 (51.9%) 260 (51.8%) 260 (52.0%) ns Φ = .012, ns 
Education (years) (M, SD) 13.48 (2.70) 14.07 (2.50) 12.89 (2.76) p < .001 d = .48   
Self-rated health1(M, SD) 2.51 (0.86) 2.47 (0.81) 2.55 (0.91) ns d = .07  
Physician-rated health1 (M, SD) 2.36 (0.84) 2.26 (0.78) 2.46 (0.88) p < .001 d = .24 
Number-Connecting 1 (M, SD) 22.60 (9.53) 19.71 (6.72) 25.52 (10.96) p < .000 d = .64 
Number-Connecting 2 (M, SD) 21.25 (12.20) 18.54 (6.12) 23.99 (15.70) p < .000 d = .46 
Digit Symbol Substitution (M, SD) 48.17 (11.66) 53.27 (9.74) 43.05 (11.19) p < .000 d = .98 
Information (M, SD) 15.86 (4.47) 16.03 (4.22) 15.69 (4.70) ns d = .08 
Similarities (M, SD) 25.26 (5.73) 25.58 (5.23) 24.94 (5.50) ns d = .12 
Picture Completion (M, SD) 12.30 (3.51) 12.84 (3.14) 11.74 (3.90) p < .000 d = .31 
Block Design (M, SD) 28.78 (8.65) 30.61 (9.14) 26.85 (8.14) p < .000 d = .46 
Spatial Ability (M, SD)  22.78 (6.73) 24.19 (6.87) 21.29 (6.57) p < .000 d = .43 
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Table 4.1 – Continued 
Variable  
 
 
Total  
 
 
Midlife Cohort 
 
 
Late-Life Cohort 
 
 
Statistical Testa 
 
 
Effect Size 
(Cohen’s d/ϕ) 
 
Neuroticism (M, SD) 18.24 (6.98) 17.79 (7.02) 18.71 (6.91) p = .040 d = .13 
Extraversion (M, SD) 27.52 (5.78) 28.51 (5.73) 26.51 (5.65) p < .000 d = .35 
Openness to Experience (M, SD) 26.66 (5.03) 27.31 (5.29) 25.98 (4.66) p < .000 d = .27 
Agreeableness (M, SD) 31.95 (4.82) 31.53 (4.89) 32.40 (4.71) p = .005 d = .18 
Conscientiousness (M, SD) 35.22 (5.34) 35.15 (5.44) 35.30 (5.23) ns d = .03 
Note. ns = not significant; M = mean; SD = standard deviation 
a t-test for continuous variables and Chi-square-test for categorical variables 
1 Lower values indicate better health. 
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Table 4.2 
Publication 3: Model-Fit Indices of the Multi-Group Bi-Variate Change Regression Models 
Personality 
Domain 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Model χ² df p CFI RMSEA 
Neuro-
ticism 
Speed Adjusted a 570.965 174 .00 .930 .049 
No Covariates 714.228 116 .00 .879 .073 
Cryst. 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 410.793 122 .00 .939 .049 
No Covariates 219.369 74 .00 .961 .045 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 390.282 180 .00 .958 .035 
No Covariates 390.914 116 .00 .934 .050 
Extra-
version 
Speed Adjusted a 597.525 176 .00 .919 .050 
No Covariates 741.494 116 .00 .865 .075 
Cryst. 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 446.857 122 .00 .925 .052 
No Covariates b 320.442 76 .00 .927 .058 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 412.201 180 .00 .948 .037 
No Covariates 459.509 116 .00 .911 .055 
Openness Speed Adjusted a 662.262 176 .00 .900 .053 
No Covariates 769.599 116 .00 .842 .076 
Cryst. 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 488.828 122 .00 .909 .056 
No Covariates 301.675 74 .00 .925 .056 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 487.823 180 .00 .926 .042 
No Covariates 443.752 116 .00 .904 .054 
Agree-
ableness 
Speed Adjusted a 604.921 174 .00 .910 .051 
No Covariates 777.536 116 .00 .842 .077 
Cryst. 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 380.810 122 .00 .932 .047 
No Covariates b 253.815 76 .00 .938 .049 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 362.079 180 .00 .955 .032 
No Covariates 402.855 116 .00 .914 .051 
Conscien-
tiousness 
Speed Adjusted a 725.783 178 .00 .893 .057 
No Covariates 1083.218 114 .00 .770 .094 
Cryst. 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 435.072 122 .00 .926 .052 
No Covariates  257.991 74 .00 .943 .051 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
Adjusted a 400.759 180 .00 .950 .036 
No Covariates 411.184 116 .00 .921 .051 
Note. χ² = Chi square, df = degrees of freedom, p = significance value, CFI = comparative fit 
index, RMSEA = root mean squared error of approximation, Cryst. = crystallized. 
a
 Adjusted for gender, education, self-rated and physician-rated health. 
b Model was estimable only with residuals of the indicators Similarities T1 and Similarities T3 
constrained as unrelated.  
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Table 4.3 
Publication 3: Overview of Standardized Path Coefficients of the Multi-Group Bi-Variate Latent Change Regression Models 
Person-
ality 
Domain 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Model Baseline 
correlation 
Cognition T1 – 
Personality T1 
Change 
residual 
correlation 
Auto-proportion: 
Personality T1 
? Δ Personality 
Auto-
proportion: 
Cognition T1 
? Δ Cognition 
Intervariable Cross-
Lagged Prediction: 
Personality T1 ? Δ 
Cognition 
Intervariable Cross-
Lagged Prediction: 
Cognition T1 ? Δ 
Personality 
   LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML 
Neuro-
ticism 
Speed 
 
Cryst. Int. 
 
Fluid Int. 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
-.238***/-.181** 
-.195***/-.157*** 
-.416***/-.327*** 
-.420***/-.335*** 
-.406***/-.267*** 
-.413***/-.257*** 
-.241/-.224* 
-.039/-.040 
-.015/-.147 
.007/-.181 
-.066/.232 
.125/.179 
-.392***/-.368*** 
-.395***/-.297*** 
-.379***/-.386*** 
-.468***/-.349*** 
-.400***/-.377*** 
-.462***/-.339*** 
-.138/.262** 
.098/.106 
-.052/-.332* 
-.048/-.113 
-.077/-.209 
-.002/-.226* 
.084/.085 
.068 b /.059 b 
.084 b /.122 b 
.110 b /.159 b 
.105 b /.145 b 
.019 b /.040 b 
-.472***/.009 
-.383*** b /-.169*** b 
-.178* b /-.125* b 
-.320*** b /-.236*** b 
-.272*** b /-.208*** b 
-.323*** b /-.263*** b 
Extra-
version 
Speed 
 
Cryst. Int. 
 
Fluid Int. 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates c 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
.169**/.087 
.167**/.066 
.020/-.014 
-.006/.006 
.009/.022 
.013/.023 
.330*/.070 
.420***/-.017 
.296/.079 
.098/.016 
.147/-.362* 
.379**/-.332* 
-.219/-.374*** 
-.168/-.380*** 
-.210/-.363*** 
-.132/-.384*** 
-.193/-.360*** 
-.140/-.383*** 
-.159/.273** 
.065/.109 
-.097/-.372* 
-.120/-.181 
-.088/-.239 
-.021/-.299* 
-.038 b /-.044 b 
.046 b /.040 b 
-.041 b /-.060 b 
.002 b /.003 b 
.013 b /.018 b 
.067 b /.140 b 
.205* b /.094* b 
.319*** b /.123*** b 
.224* b /.142* b 
.186* b /.119* b 
.211* b /.148* b 
.160* b /.114* b 
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Table 4.3 – Continued  
Person-
ality 
Domain 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Model Baseline 
correlation 
Cognition T1 – 
Personality T1 
Change 
residual 
correlation 
Auto-proportion: 
Personality T1 
? Δ Personality 
Auto-
proportion: 
Cognition T1 
? Δ Cognition 
Intervariable Cross-
Lagged Prediction: 
Personality T1 ? Δ 
Cognition 
Intervariable Cross-
Lagged Prediction: 
Cognition T1 ? Δ 
Personality 
   LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML 
Open-
ness 
Speed 
 
Cryst. Int. 
 
Fluid Int. 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
.430***/.243*** 
.335***/.195** 
.558***/.523*** 
.596***/.556*** 
.430***/.455*** 
.452***/.477*** 
-.004/-.139 
-.026/-.243** 
.468**/.028 
.465***/.071 
-.112/.072 
.018/.124 
-.256/-.219* 
-.336*/-.236* 
-.284/-.313** 
-.271/-.298** 
-.266/-.261* 
-.299*/-.270** 
-.171/.249* 
.110/.095 
-.311*/-.610*** 
-.329**/-.492** 
-.152/-.324 
-.045/-.407** 
.051 b /.072 b 
.015 b /.016 b 
.262*** b /.497*** b 
.297*** b /.566*** b 
.165 b /.275 b 
.108 b /.256 b 
.295** b /.141** b 
.302*** b /.123** b 
.374** b /.237** b 
.265** b /.180* b 
.349*** b /.261*** b 
.260** b /.212** b 
Agree-
ableness 
Speed 
 
Cryst. Int. 
 
Fluid Int. 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates c 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
.008/.119 
.016/.087 
-.025/-.009 
.010/.119* 
-.043/-.091 
-.059/-.086 
-.095/.197 
.086/-.148 
-.041/.091 
.019/.039 
.035/-.018 
-.123/.009 
-.355**/-.252* 
-.255/-.300** 
-.348**/-.267* 
-.255/-.303** 
-.352**/-.264* 
-.241/-.294** 
-.153/.268** 
.098/.106 
-.063/-.363* 
-.109/-.172 
-.079/-.220 
-.021/-.290* 
.200*/-.181 
.020 b /.017 b 
-.106 b /-.153 b 
-.134* b /-.198* b 
-.205* b /-.291* b 
-.143** b /-.305** b 
.072/-.193* 
-.016 b /-.007 b 
-.101 b /-.075 b 
.039 b /.028 b 
-.056 b /-.046 b 
.026 b /.021 b 
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Table 4.3 – Continued  
Person-
ality 
Domain 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Model Baseline 
correlation 
Cognition T1 – 
Personality T1 
Change 
residual 
correlation 
Auto-proportion: 
Personality T1 
? Δ Personality 
Auto-
proportion: 
Cognition T1 
? Δ Cognition 
Intervariable Cross-
Lagged Prediction: 
Personality T1 ? Δ 
Cognition 
Intervariable Cross-
Lagged Prediction: 
Cognition T1 ? Δ 
Personality 
   LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML 
Con-
scien-
tious-
ness 
Speed 
 
Cryst. Int. 
   
Fluid Int. 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
Adjusted a 
No Covariates 
.020/.026 
.019/-.017 
-.002/-.127* 
.006/-.110 
.055/-.061 
.060/-.064 
.200/-.045 
.390***/-.133 
.030/.036 
.105/-.055 
.319*/-.029 
.280*/-.052 
-.265**/-.374*** 
-.399***/-.443*** 
-.266**/-.362*** 
-.271**/-.357*** 
-.274**/-.372*** 
-.274**/-.367*** 
-.136/.227* 
.096/.108 
-.131/-.459** 
-.127/-.231* 
-.110/-.230 
-.026/-.282* 
-.103/.199* 
.002/.222** 
-.204*** b /-.312*** b 
-.228*** b /-.346*** b 
-.101 b /-.149 b 
-.043 b /-.096 b 
.113/-.098 
.189*/-.141 
.039 b /.040 b 
.045 b /.045 b 
-.017 b /-.019 b 
-.019 b /-.021 b 
 Note. LL = Late-Life Cohort born 1930/32, ML = Midlife Cohort born 1950/52, Cryst. = crystallized, Int. = Intelligence, Δ = Change score.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
a
 Adjusted for gender, education, self-rated and physician-rated health. 
b
 Unstandardized paths set equal between cohorts.  
c Model was estimable only with residuals of the indicators Similarities T1 and Similarities T3 constrained as unrelated. 
 
142
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Publication 3: Effects of the Covariates on the Change Scores of the Personality Traits and Cognitive Abilities (For Each Cohort 
Separately) 
Personality 
Domain 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Δ Personality 
LL/ML 
 Δ Cognition 
LL/ML 
  Gender Education Subj. health Physician-
rated health 
 Gender Education Subj. health Physician-
rated health 
Neuroticism Speed .015/.105 -.052/-.159*** -.085/.083 .059/.144*  -.001/.082 -.041/-.040 -.072/-.049 -.277**/-.055 
 Cryst. 
Intelligence 
-.117/.065 -.059/-.132*** -.076/.062 .165/.127*  .122/-.064 .022/.057 -.005/-.133 -.114/.305** 
 Fluid 
Intelligence 
-.116/.046 -.051/-.115** -.075/.059 .133/.123  -.002/-.122 -.048/-.016 -.170/.002 -.255*/.036 
Extraversion Speed -.034/-.073 -.014/.029 .160/-.039 -.267*/-.047  .019/.107 -.060/-.050 -.064/-.040 -.264**/-.053 
 Cryst. 
Intelligence 
.066/-.015 -.045/.011 .174/-.021 -.292**/-.042  .123/-.046 .015/.057 .001/-.135 -.106/-.301** 
 Fluid 
Intelligence 
.042/-.023 -.038/.012 .164/-.029 -.271**/-.042  .017/-.085 -.074/-.038 -.140/.034 -.248*/.034 
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Table 4.4 – Continued 
Personality 
Domain 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Δ Personality 
LL/ML 
 Δ Cognition 
LL/ML 
  Gender Education Subj. health Physician-
rated health 
 Gender Education Subj. health Physician-
rated health 
Openness Speed .160/.048 -.015/.000 -.362***/.115 .264*/-.158*  .025/.109 -.068/-.067 -.054/-.020 -.258**/-.047 
 Cryst. 
Intelligence 
.321**/.134 -.065/-.014 -.341**/.120 .218*/.146  .068/-.109 .019/.004 .016/-.067 -.105/-.330*** 
 Fluid 
Intelligence 
.267**/.136 -.052/-.028 -.338***/.119 .247*/-.137  .012/-.099 -.085/-.078 -.119/.083 -.245*/-.047 
Agree- Speed .314**/-.070 .044/.142*** -.080/-.014 -.026/-.174*  -.023/.148 -.071/-.048 -.052/-.082 -.239**/-.031 
ableness Cryst. 
Intelligence 
.289**/-.105 .072/.126** -.103/-.008 -.050/-.157  .152/-.016 .010/.053 .012/-.161 -.113/.317*** 
 Fluid 
Intelligence 
.309**/-.095 .061/.123* -.090/.001 -.058/-.158  .066/-.017 -.059/-.032 -.147/-.051 -.274*/.074 
Conscien- Speed .082/.091 .053/.045 -.139/-.114 -.008/-.027  -.018/.123 -.034/-.026 -.057/-.048 -.304**/-.087 
tiousness Cryst. 
Intelligence 
.105/.105 .056/.021 -.142/-.090 -.027/-.021  .079/-.084 .034/.073 .016/-.166 -.141/.315*** 
 Fluid 
Intelligence 
.088/.085 .070/.036 -.148/-.105 -.042/-.024  -.001/-.088 -.059/-.037 -.138/.018 -.269*/.043 
Note. LL = Late-Life Cohort born 1930/32, ML = Midlife Cohort born 1950/52, Cryst. = crystallized, Δ = Change score.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
144  
Table 4.5 
Publication 3: Overview of Squared Multiple Correlations for the Latent Change Scores 
of the Personality Traits and Cognitive Domains  
Person-
ality 
Domain 
Cognitive Domain SMC 
Δ  
Personality 
(Adjusted 
Model a) 
SMC 
Δ  
Personality 
(Unadjusted 
Model) 
SMC 
Δ  
Cognition 
(Adjusted 
Model a) 
SMC 
Δ  
Cognition 
(Unadjusted 
Model) 
  LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML LL/ML 
Neuro-
ticism 
Speed 
Cryst. Intelligence 
Fluid Intelligence 
.317/.153 
.157/.169 
.190/.190 
.244/.101 
.195/.122 
.195/.138 
.100/.089 
.044/.200 
.125/.076  
.012/.013 
.019/.050 
.000/.078 
Extra-
version 
Speed 
Cryst. Intelligence 
Fluid Intelligence 
.145/.148 
.146/.156 
.145/.153 
.112/.153 
.052/.161 
.044/.158 
.098/.095 
.043/.191 
.117/.071 
.007/.014 
.014/.033 
.005/.107 
Openness Speed 
Cryst. Intelligence 
Fluid Intelligence 
.206/.080 
.210/.098 
.226/.095 
.136/.059 
.058/.062 
.087/.064 
.093/.088 
.098/.381 
.119/.123 
.013/.010 
.080/.253 
.009/.132 
Agree-
ableness 
Speed 
Cryst. Intelligence 
Fluid Intelligence 
.196/.159 
.186/.129 
.182/.127 
.065/.090 
.066/.091 
.060/.088 
.126/.112 
.049/.211 
.169/.131 
.010/.012 
.030/.077 
.021/.162 
Conscien-
tiousness 
Speed 
Cryst. Intelligence 
Fluid Intelligence 
.116/.172 
.109/.155 
.110/.158 
.192/.214 
.075/.133 
.076/.134 
.109/.132 
.079/.298 
.125/.082 
.009/.060 
.069/.155 
.003/.085 
 
Note. LL = Late-Life Cohort born 1930/32, ML = Midlife Cohort born 1950/52, Δ = 
Change score, SMC = Squared multiple correlation.  
a
 Adjusted for gender, education, self-rated and physician-rated health. 
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Figure 4.1.  Illustration of a bi-variate latent change regression model of one 
personality trait and one cognitive ability domain at two measurement occasions. 
Note. T1 = baseline measurement occasion, T3 = 3rd measurement occasion, p = 
parcel, Δ = latent change variable, ε = error term, a/b = intervariable cross-lagged 
parameter, c/d = auto-proportion parameter, e = personality-cognition correlation at 
baseline, f = correlation of change score residuals. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
The overarching goal of this dissertation has been to add long-term evidence 
to the growing body of psychological research on personality development across 
adulthood. For this reason, the predictor dynamics of personality were investigated. 
Specifically, how personality predicts and is predicted by important and impactful 
constructs of different psychological life domains (i.e. life satisfaction, 
subjective/objective health, cognitive abilities) was analyzed. This work, when 
compared to current research on personality development across the life span, 
uniquely features investigations that all (1) are based on the same data set (ILSE, 
Sattler et al., 2015), (2) amount up to 12 years of longitudinal research interval (long-
term), (3) focus on mutual cross predictor dynamics of the Big Five personality 
factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b), and (4) investigate this predictor dynamics 
more precisely in explicitly comparing the dynamics in mid adulthood and old age 
with each other. With the previous presentation of the manuscripts, the below section 
condenses the findings, addressing the combined strengths and weaknesses of the 
research practice, outlines possible future research directions and evaluates its 
impact for practitioners. 
 
Main Findings 
The discussion of main findings is organized in four sections. First, the results 
of cross-sectional correlations are presented to give a general estimation on the 
relationship patterns across measurement times. Second, the results regarding 
longitudinal stability are considered. Third, the main findings, namely the cross-
predictions and intervariable cross-lagged predictions are discussed and, fourth and 
lastly, the results regarding the age group differentiation are critically examined. 
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Results of cross-sectional correlations of personality with domains of 
individual functioning. In line with previous meta-analyses (DeNeve & Cooper, 
1998; Steel et al., 2008), life satisfaction and personality demonstrated mild-to-
moderate cross-sectional correlations in both cohorts at baseline, 4-years, and 12-
years later. Both subjective and objective health surprisingly revealed only small 
correlations at baseline and 12-years later with the Big Five personality traits. These 
relations, moreover, were of equal magnitude, despite previous research indicating 
that especially neuroticism and conscientiousness are most closely related to 
individuals’ health (Reiss, Eccles, & Nielsen, 2014; Shanahan, Hill, Roberts, Eccles, 
& Friedman, 2014; Sutin et al., 2013). More importantly, the correlations lost 
statistical significance and their respective standardized path coefficients values were 
substantially reduced when control variables were added into the analyses, 
highlighting the importance and impact of the covariates of depression and cognitive 
abilities in particular. Previous research on the cognition and personality interplay 
indicates that there are small-to-moderate relationships between these domains with 
openness and conscientiousness being the closest related to cognitive abilities 
(Schaie, Willis, & Caskie, 2004; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011; von Stumm & 
Ackerman, 2013; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; DeYoung, 2014; DeYoung, 
Peterson, & Higgins, 2005; Curtis, Windsor, & Soubelet, 2015). The analyses in 
manuscript 3 show small-to-moderate cross-sectional relationships of openness and 
neuroticism with the different cognitive abilities. Even though the relations with 
openness were replicated, the expected cross-sectional-relationships with the other 
personality traits, except neuroticism, were not. It was especially surprising that 
conscientiousness showed almost no cross-sectional correlations with cognitive 
abilities like other studies suggest (e.g., Curtis, Windsor, & Soubelet, 2015).  
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Results regarding longitudinal stability of personality and domains of 
individual functioning. In the light of the discussion whether personality changes or 
remains stable across the life span (chapter 1; e.g. McCrae & Costa, 2003; Specht et 
al., 2014), the results of the present studies add to the view that personality 
development across adulthood is a coupled process of stability that goes hand in 
hand with small-in-magnitude but remarkable changes (Mroczek & Spiro, III., 2003; 
Ryff, Kwan, & Singer, 2001). The present analyses in manuscripts 1-2 indicate 
moderate-to-high rank-order stability coefficients of all five personality traits of the Big 
Five across 12 years in mid and in late adulthood alike. Taken together, it is 
acknowledged that personality development in mid adulthood and early old age as 
brought forward by the ILSE-Study (Sattler et al., 2015) is generally in line with 
current key empirical investigations and meta-analytic compilations on life span 
personality development (e.g., Roberts & Del Vecchio, 2000; Specht et al., 2011) 
regarding rank order consistency and mean value development. Considering the 
three domains of individual functioning, stability coefficients across 12 years were 
lower as compared to the stability coefficients of the personality traits, but still of 
considerable magnitude. Life satisfaction showed small-to-moderate, health 
moderate and cognitive functioning almost equally high, stability when compared to 
the personality factors.  
Results of longitudinal cross predictions and inter-variable cross-lagged 
predictions. Main research interest in all three manuscripts are the longitudinal 
predictions of personality to subsequent domains of individual functioning and vice 
versa. Despite prior research by Specht et al. (2013) and Soto (2015), who found 
meaningful effects of well-being for personality later in life, life satisfaction in 
manuscript 1 indicated only very small effects of limited practical value for later life 
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personality (i.e. neuroticism, extraversion) regardless of the study interval. 
Personality, on the other hand, showed small and significant predictions for 4-year 
later life satisfaction in both cohorts. Across 12-years, only in the younger cohort and 
only neuroticism was predictive for subsequent life satisfaction. All in all, the analyses 
in manuscript 1 indicate life satisfaction to be less of a predictor of personality than a 
developmental outcome of personality development. 
The analyses in manuscript 2 indicate that the longitudinal interrelationship of 
personality and health is indeed reciprocal in nature. It is important to state that the 
effects found are rather small. On the other hand, observed effects should be seen in 
the light of the long observational interval spanning an interval of up to 12-years. 
Moreover, the found results might underestimate the true longitudinal relationships, 
because the cross-paths in this analyses might be, due to the use of manifest 
modeling only, contaminated by measurement error (Allemand et al., 2007).  
Despite this critique, the results suggest a couple of promising perspectives. 
First, physician-rated health apparently challenges personality stability stronger than 
self-rated health, while self-rated health is more strongly indicated to be longitudinally 
shaped by prior personality traits. Second, observed effects highly depend on the 
specific personality factor and health domain considered. In particular, the physician-
based “objective” health rating was predictive only for later life neuroticism, 
agreeableness and extraversion (the latter only in the model without covariate 
control). Subjective health predicts later life conscientiousness, but only in the 
uncontrolled model. Regarding the opposing paths from personality to health, 
neuroticism (only uncontrolled model), extraversion and conscientiousness predicted 
later life subjective health. Moreover, openness and conscientiousness (but both only 
in the uncontrolled model) predicted later life physician rated health. Third, as to be 
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expected, the consideration of relevant control variables weakened the cross-lagged 
effects, which was especially true for depression. This is not a surprising finding, 
because both the subjective and the objective health measures are closely related to 
depressive symptoms on a conceptual as well as the empirical level (e.g. Moussavi, 
Chatterji, Verdes, Tandon, Patel, & Ustun, 2007; Matthews et al., 2009; World Health 
Organization, 1992). Taken together, although longitudinal results support the 
assumption that personality and subjective as well as objective health are 
reciprocally interrelated, a highly differentially framed interpretation is needed to do 
justice to the data. 
The analyses in manuscript 3, demonstrated mild to moderate effects for all 
three cognitive domains (speed, crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence) as 12-year 
longitudinal predictors for change in neuroticism, extraversion and openness. Only 
the cross-relationship of speed to neuroticism change was not predictive in the mid 
adulthood cohort. These findings are in line with recent research with regard to 
neuroticism and openness (e.g. Waggel et al., 2015; Wettstein et al.; 2016, von 
Stumm & Deary, 2013). The cognitive domains failed to predict agreeableness and 
conscientiousness changes in the present analyses, which is in line with previous 
research regarding agreeableness (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Curtis et al., 
2015), but in contrast to findings by Mõttus et al. (2012). Considering the path from 
personality to changes in cognitive ability, there were no intervariable cross-lagged 
predictions for neuroticism and extraversion, which is in line with previous findings 
(e.g. Salthouse, 2014). However, openness and conscientiousness were predictive 
for changes in crystallized intelligence; furthermore, the path coefficients of both of 
these personality factors also suggest a predictive role regarding other cognitive 
domain changes. Agreeableness, on the other hand, showed a somewhat surprising 
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pattern in that it was, as expected, positively related to changes in processing speed, 
but only in the old cohort; but it was negatively related to changes in fluid intelligence 
in both cohorts. The negative relation may be explainable in the light of Baker and 
Bichsel (2006)’s reasoning stating that high agreeableness might precede decline in 
fluid abilities due to being an adaptive coping strategy for cognitive decline by 
activating social resources as compensation. Taken together, manuscript 3 supports 
the view that the relationship of personality and cognition is to some extent 
reciprocal, but that such reciprocity highly depends on the specific factor and domain 
considered (e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Baker & Bichsel, 2006; Soubelet & 
Salthouse, 2011). Moreover, the intervariable cross-lagged predictions were clearly 
higher in number and overall more consistent from cognitive functioning to 12-year 
personality change than vice versa.  
In summary, the three manuscripts indicate significant and mostly 
meaningfully interpretable reciprocal intervariable cross-lagged predictions of the Big 
Five personality factors and the domains of health (subjective/objective) and 
cognitive abilities. Especially in the domain of cognitive abilities but also in the health 
domain were demonstrated rather strong cross-predictions for personality change 
across the 12-year observational period. In some contrast, life satisfaction as an 
indicator for long-term (12-years) personality changes appeared to be nearly 
negligible. Therefore, it may be concluded that life satisfaction works less as a 
change initiating entity, but should better be looked at as a developmental outcome.  
Results regarding the need to differentiate between mid adulthood and 
old age. Another goal of the present manuscripts was to examine the role of 
developmental phase (midlife versus old age) for observed predictor dynamics by 
utilizing multi-group analyses based on the two ILSE cohorts. This should be seen 
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against the background that previous research has not seriously addressed this issue 
so far. A number of reasons have been brought forward to support the overall 
assumption that predictor / cross-lagged effects might be stronger in the old age 
realm.  
However, results of all three manuscripts tell another story. Overall, there were 
almost no meaningful differences between the cross predictor paths regarding the life 
phase differentiation with only limited need for further specification. In manuscript 3, 
processing speed was demonstrated to be a significant and notable predictor for later 
neuroticism changes in the older cohort only, while processing speed significantly 
predicted changes in agreeableness in the midlife cohort only. The almost complete 
absence of age effects was unexpected, because prior investigations lend emerging 
data to the assumption that age may be a moderating factor (e.g. Baker & Bichsel, 
2006; Graham & Lachman, 2014). One possible explanation could be that assumed 
differences might unfold when comparing mid adulthood with very old age, rather 
than with old age, only. This issue is further discussed in the section on future 
research needs. Nonetheless, the research of the present manuscripts, as it stands, 
support that the two age cohorts are more alike than different, highlighting the 
overarching importance of health and cognitive ability for personality change across 
all of adulthood.  
 
Strengths and limitations 
The present study is based on data from the “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal 
Study of Adult Development (ILSE)” (Sattler et al., 2015). Besides all its strengths 
exploited in the 3 papers, ILSE comes with a number of limitations regarding the data 
analyses conducted in the present manuscripts.  
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First, regarding ILSE’s strengths, the German long-term longitudinal cohort 
study covers a research interval of up-to 12-years. The specific cohort design of the 
ILSE enabled the investigation and comparison of the two specific age cohorts of mid 
adulthood and old age. Its intense multidisciplinary data gathering and large 
bandwidth of different psychological and medical constructs at each measurement 
time allowed for a broad theory-driven selection of constructs as well as control 
variables. The ILSE sample amounted to 1002 participants at baseline and retention 
rate at the third measurement occasion was still high with 789 participants (retention 
rate = 78.74%). Furthermore, participants at T3 still distributed nearly equally across 
age cohorts, gender, and center (Heidelberg, Leipzig) and thus a key design criterion 
of the study was maintained across 12 years. In relation to the requirements of data 
analyses, the given sample size allowed for the reliable detection of strong, 
moderate, and even small effects. Indeed, some very small effects were detected as 
significant, like for example, the effects targeting the health with personality linkage. It 
needs to be acknowledged, however, that this should not lead to devaluation of the 
results at large. Even very small effects might accumulate over time (e.g., Soto, 
2015) and initiate larger-scale changes that might be visible only many years later, 
thus being of importance for the understanding of long-term developmental 
trajectories.  
Although far from unusual in longitudinal research, data analyses were bound 
to existing time distances of measurement time points which may or may not fit to 
important developmental phases in participants’ life history. While acknowledging 
that 12-years of cross-development is a very long time span, one can assume that 
the development initiating changes might have happened before, in between or even 
after the rather distant measurement time points used in ILSE. In other words, the 
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present analyses are, despite their longitudinal nature, a selective snapshot of “real” 
life span development and the underlying assumption of steady, long-term change 
processes is subject to debate.  
Linked with this reasoning, the impacts of specific critical life events on 
personality trajectories is assessed in numerous studies (e.g. Hutteman, et al., 2014; 
Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke, & Trautwein, 2012; Lüdtke, Roberts, 
Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011; Zimmermann & Neyer, 
2013). Although this approach is promising, it has its own limitations (Luhmann, Orth, 
Specht, Kandler, & Lucas, 2014). For instance, the precise definition of a critical life 
event is problematic and may lead to hard to justify inclusion or exclusion decisions. 
Changes can be perceived as slow and steady or even as continuous, and some 
changes might arise without the occurrence of a specific event at all. For example, a 
mental sickness like depression might occur gradually through the stepwise 
experience of more and more depressive symptoms and, more importantly, lacking a 
specific event like the date of diagnosis or a specific time period in hospital that might 
qualify it as a distinct critical life event. Therefore, instead of investigating the 
influences of certain specific life events, the present manuscripts targeted the 
predictability of personality development by three major life domains of adult 
development that all represent various dimensions of individual functioning.  
Going further, the ILSE sample suffers together with most other longitudinal 
studies from positive selection bias, systematic study dropout, and not “missing-at-
random” missing data patterns (Walsh & Nash, 1978; Jerant, Chapman, Duberstein, 
& Franks, 2009). On the positive side, ILSE’s drop-out/attrition rate across 12 years 
is below what one would expect based on other longitudinal studies (Sattler et al., 
2015).  Therefore, sample selectivity which reduces inter-individual variability in the 
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target variables which may lead to the underestimation of “true” cross-lagged 
relationships is likely acceptable in ILSE. 
Considering the measures used in the current research, mostly established 
devices have been included. Personality was assessed by the NEO-FFI inventory 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992b), which is widely recognized as an excellent, state-of-the-art 
personality questionnaire proving good internal consistency and temporal reliability 
as well as robust and valid measuring of the Big Five personality factors (e.g., 
Murray, Rawlings, Allen, & Trinder, 2003; Lang & Lüdtke, 2005). It should be noted 
that there are personality conceptualizations beyond the Big Five architecture, but in 
line with a large part of the current personality research community the Big Five is the 
most influential and best established framework (e.g. Matthews et al., 2009). The 
measurement of life satisfaction and subjective health was conducted based on 
established single-item measures. Despite the classic critique of limited reliability due 
to their non-scale character, single-item measures of self-rated health and life 
satisfaction are commonly used, exhibit meaningful correlates with objective health 
parameters and demonstrate sufficient validity as well as variability (DeSalvo et al., 
2006; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Pinquart, 2001). Single-item measurements of life 
satisfaction prove good longitudinal convergent validity and moderate-to-good 
discriminant validity (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996). Furthermore, they exhibit at least 
acceptable reliability (Lucas & Donnellan, 2012). In summary, the general critique on 
single-item measurements remains an issue of the data analyses of the present 
manuscripts, but there are also arguments in the literature strengthening the used 
models. The variable of objective health was based on a set of components 
containing key medical and gero-psychiatric assessments. Concretely, the rating 
consisted of an anamnesis, a gero-psychiatric assessment, a blood analysis and a 
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medical check-up, which were conducted by trained study geriatricians. All these 
elements were then condensed based on a spelled-out coding scheme into one 6-
point global rating (Miche et al., 2014). Thus, the Likert scaled categories were 
explicitly circumscribed to make the ratings as reliable and objective as possible. 
Note that utilizing information of various different sources and condensing them into 
one single scale is a strength and weakness at the same time. This procedure 
provides a broad construct that is more valid than relying on a single indicator; at the 
same time an interpretation going beyond a global notion is not possible. 
Nevertheless, having a high quality proxy for objective health is clearly more than 
most other longitudinal studies—typically solely relying on self-ratings or disease 
lists—have.  
Further, the papers of this dissertation did not only contain self- and 
professional ratings, but also internationally established reliable, valid, and objective 
testing procedures of a broad range of cognitive abilities. Based on a prior empirically 
done dimensionality by Zimprich and colleagues (e.g. Zimprich, Allemand, & 
Dellenbach, 2009; Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010) as well as additional factor analyses 
by the author, the papers build on three fundamental cognitive domains, namely 
information processing speed, crystalline and fluid intelligence, each measured by 
several well-established markers.  
In terms of co-variates included, the assessment of depressive symptoms by 
the scale suggested by Zung (SDS; Zung, 1965) is worth mentioning. Depression is 
an important control variable considering the second manuscript, but, unfortunately, 
the SDS showed only weak internal consistency in ILSE data space. Therefore, it is 
highly recommended to replicate the present findings and include a depression 
measure with better psychometric properties. Generally spoken, measuring 
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constructs exclusively by self-report questionnaires may indeed be regarded as a 
problem, because answers are influenced by individuals’ possibly biased self-
perception as well as by social desirability. Therefore, results might only to some 
extent capture the “true” score on a specific item. To counteract this challenge, 
participants of the ILSE were, prior to filling out their questionnaires, carefully 
reminded of the anonymous nature of analyses and evaluations. Moreover, 
participants were instructed to take their time and stay as true to themselves as 
possible while answering. Despite this effort, analyses should be replicated and 
enhanced using different measurement approaches in the spirit of a multi-method 
approach (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  
Statistical modeling was conducted following the work of McArdle (2009). 
Manuscripts 1 and 2 utilize multi-group dual cross-lagged autoregressive models with 
two measurement times, while manuscript 3 utilizes multi-group dual latent change 
regression models at two measurement points with cross-change predictions. 
Overall, the models suit the needed statistical complexity to answer the research 
questions of the present manuscripts and are straight-forward regarding 
interpretation of results. The conceptualization as multi-group models adequately 
offered the possibility to differentiate the cohorts from another and to precondition 
measurement invariance across the groups. There are two major critical issues that 
need to be addressed. First, the models used in manuscript 1 partly, and the models 
used in manuscript 2 completely, abstained from using latent modeling to control for 
measurement error contamination in the cross-predictor paths (e.g. Allemand et al., 
2007). Caution is recommended until future research replicates the findings using 
latent constructs for well-being and subjective as well as objective health. Second, 
the present statistical analyses are incapable of detecting non-linear trends, because 
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only two measurement times were implemented into each model. Theoretically, the 
interrelationships of personality with life satisfaction, health or cognition could be 
quadratic, cubic, or even more complex.  
Another critical point worth mentioning is the present study’s sole focus on 
normal aging. Pathological processes might, indeed, reveal stronger and practically 
more important effects with personality development. The rationale behind the 
present investigations was to find long-term predictors in the ordinary population. 
This rationale was based on a practical and a theoretical reason. Practically, a 
comparison of the two cohorts with the focus on pathological processes and their 
influence on personality development was discarded because the sample would have 
been restricted by the low prevalence rates of cognitive disability in the younger 
cohort, limiting means of statistical analyses. Theoretically, a selection on 
pathological processes was not intended, because it was desired to investigate 
normal aging processes.  
In summary and despite the critiques and methodical issues raised, ILSE 
provided a well-fitting data set for treating the research questions of this dissertation 
in terms of its specific cohort design and richness in available measures.  
 
Future directions in research on personality development across adulthood 
Although substantial longitudinal research based on state-of-the-art data-
analytic tools have substantially increased in recent years, personality development 
across adulthood and its inter-systemic relations to other domains (health, cognition, 
social relations, emotions) is still far from being understood. This section discusses 
future research needs and directions on two levels: (1) It targets issues directly 
derived from the present analyses to replicate and strengthen the results, and (2) it 
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addresses more general future research needs in the field of personality 
development across adulthood at large.  
As mentioned before, modeling in all analyses was restricted to two 
measurement occasions per model only, because the models suite the needed 
statistical complexity to answer the research questions and promote straight-forward 
interpretation of results. As Kenny (2005) and Johnson et al. (2012) argue, two 
assessments have their limits to properly investigate developmental patterns and 
processes. A study having more measurement occasions at its disposal would allow 
investigation of not only non-linear trends (as argued by Crowe et al., 2006), but also 
capture the underlying developmental dynamics in more depth. Additionally, the 
present analyses focused on long term predictor dynamics and investigated change 
across 12 years, but, nonetheless, personality change might unfold even across far 
longer time intervals than covered in the present analyses. Taken together, more 
measurement points would be needed to improve knowledge in life span 
developmental research on personality development. It is important to keep in mind 
that more research design complexity would also call for still more sophisticated 
modeling, which is, arguably, a double-edged sword, because psychological models 
of development try to fulfill two requirements at the same time, namely: (1) to 
describe as precisely as possible, and (2) to simplify the developmental processes to 
ease understanding and practical application. The models chosen in the present 
analyses were of limited complexity although state-of-the-art approaches, allowing a 
high degree of straightforwardness in their interpretation. 
To strengthen and replicate the results of this dissertation, future research 
should add more age groups to the research plan and analyses. Two age groups 
might, in analogy to the discussion on the sole use of two measurement points, not 
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be sufficient to capture the “true” age differences in the longitudinal dynamics of 
personality and the predictor domains. The present analyses did, as mentioned 
before, and very surprisingly, only detect very limited age group differences in the 
predictor paths, which could be explained as follows. First, it is questionable whether 
a mid adulthood sample was compared to a true old age sample in terms of the 
theoretical conceptions presented in chapter 1. The present analyses might have 
compared mid agers with young-olds, rather than with old-olds. This is crucial, 
because the categorization of individuals by age is not fixed, but socially defined. 
Differentiations by age are changing as a consequence of demographic and cultural 
change and issues of health and frailty that would have been important considering 
individuals aged 65 and older might be challenged by progress in healthcare and 
longevity, ultimately shifting the age group conceptualizations. Today’s 80s might in 
fact be yesterday’s 60s. Second, the age groups could be more similar than 
theoretically presumed, meaning that the theoretical considerations highlighting age 
group differences do overestimate the true empirical variation between mid adulthood 
and old age. It is possible that the investigated processes are indeed independent 
from, rather than susceptible to, age group effects. For these reasons, future studies 
on more than two age groups or investigations featuring even longer time intervals 
are needed to replicate the results and clarify theoretical reflections on age group 
differences.  
In summary, future research on personality development across the adult life 
span is a vivid field:  We are now beginning to understand confounding variables and 
conditions regarding longitudinal predictor dynamics of personality traits with different 
domains of individual functioning. The present analyses do indeed stress the 
importance of health and cognitive abilities for changes in personality. Moving 
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forward, future research endeavors should replicate and solidify the importance of 
health and cognitive abilities, as well as of other important confounding variables as 
predictors of personality change. Specifically, the use of time varying covariates and 
change-susceptible predictors might offer new and important insights. The second 
important and promising research direction following the present analyzes would be 
to investigate the age group differences more precisely. It is unclear why there were 
no significant differences in the cross-predictor paths or intervariable cross-lagged 
predictions between the two groups despite strong theoretical assumptions to the 
contrary. The integration of more than two different age groups, specifically 
integrating very old participants (i.e. aged 80 years and older), and different modeling 
approaches (e.g. growth curve modeling; Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010; 
McArdle, 2009) seems promising. Third and last, the mechanisms driving longitudinal 
predictor dynamics between personality traits and the domains of individual 
functioning need to be identified. Promising candidates that might influence the 
relationship are health behaviors, coping strategies, stress, sensory impairment, 
environmental enrichment factors, and more (e.g. Booth-Kewley & Vickers, 1994; 
Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999; Neupert et al., 2008; Gaynes et al., 2013; 
Wettstein et al. 2016; Ziegler et al., 2015; Ziegler et al., 2012). 
 
Emerging practical implications 
The present work promotes the individual’s ability to proactively change the 
one’s self for the better, acknowledging that individuals are active agents of their lives 
(e.g. McAdams & Olson, 2010). Admittedly, the change processes described in the 
present manuscripts are very difficult to effect, because of their long-term oriented 
nature, but the optimization of developmental conditions might one small single step 
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at a time alter one’s personality to be better suited facing challenges of old age. 
There is first promising evidence for interventions to change personality trait 
configuration to the better, i.e. increases in neuroticism and decreases in 
extraversion and openness (Chapman, Hampson, & Clarkin, 2014; Magidson, 
Roberts, Collado-Rodriguez, & Lejuez, 2014), and, as the present work 
demonstrates, health and cognitive abilities are important influencing factors. Health 
changes and changes in cognitive abilities might indicate that adaptive personality 
development in old age is in jeopardy, which could be used by health care 
practitioners to assess the need for special support, especially when individuals 
begin to suffer from severe health conditions or chronic diseases. 
People in general long for optimal, so-called “successful”, aging (Rowe & 
Kahn, 1997; Wahl, Siebert, & Tauber, 2015), which is a well-established and often 
taught model in applied medical practice regarding old age. Being “successfully 
aging” theoretically means that an individual is (1) healthy, (2) cognitively and 
physically functioning and (3) actively engaged in life. Having a positive and adaptive 
personality configuration is one important, additional tile in the puzzle of achieving 
high life satisfaction and quality of life in old age (e.g. Charles et al., 2001; Isaacowitz 
& Smith, 2003; Mroczek & Spiro, III., 2005). Therefore, the results of the present 
investigations underline the importance of incorporating personality traits in models of 
aging applied by practitioners, especially when optimal trajectories are desired.   
Taken together, the present analyses inform physicians and health care 
practitioners of the importance of personality in health care and their daily practice. 
Future medical and developmental concepts are recommended to incorporate 
personality more prominently. 
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Overall conclusion 
It is well established that personality develops throughout the lifespan, but less 
is known about the sources, opportunities and constraints of personality 
development, specifically when it comes to adulthood. Much needed long-term 
research in this important area of life-span developmental and aging psychology is 
still scarce. The present dissertation added a set of new empirical results to this field 
that help to better understand long-term personality change as well as to better frame 
future research priorities. In particular, health and cognitive abilities were successfully 
detected as relevant predictors for 12-year longitudinal personality development. 
Moreover, the results were nearly independent from effects of age group (midlife, old 
age), suggesting that the “wiredness” of personality with well-being, health, and 
cognitive function may be more stable than previously assumed in the conceptually 
driven life-span developmental literature. Lastly, the current work clearly supports the 
need for a highly differential approach regarding the personality traits considered, 
indicating that future research should put much emphasis on better understanding of 
the potentially different role of established personality subdomains. 
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